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Abstract
Emotional information is widely acknowledged to play a role in shaping human behavior. 
In particular, emotions, by modulating attentional capacity, provide an evolutionary 
advantage by facilitating quick responses to potential threat. By contrast, the impact of 
emotions on the decision-making processes is often seen as engendering suboptimal or 
even so-called "irrational" decisions
In this thesis, I combine innovative experimental paradigms with functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) and behavioral pharmacological manipulations to explore how 
at neurobiological level these processes share similar mechanisms. In doing so, I aim to 
attempt a reconciliation of the aforementioned contrasting views on emotion.
I examined four key aspects of interaction between emotion and both attention and 
decision-making: firstly, I investigated how the human brain is able to process emotional 
stimuli in conditions of limited attentional resources whilst subjects were engaged in an 
attentional blink paradigm. Secondly, using a similar paradigm and three different drug 
manipulations I examined the role of noradrenaline in modulating this process. Thirdly, I 
have studied how the human brain processes contextual emotional information when 
choice options are presented. Finally I extend my research to study how during 
economics transactions (in which the contextual emotional information is rooted in the 
subjects own role as either seller or buyer) an item’s value representation in the brain 
affects the decision process.
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I conclude that my results provide neurobiological support for theoretical accounts on 
how emotions plays a critical role in modulating complex cognitive capacity, such as 
attention and decision-making. Specifically, the findings suggest that the increased 
detection of emotional stimuli under attentional load is mediated by a frontal top-down 
control mechanism. The findings also show how phasic release of noradrenaline plays a 
crucial role in mediating this ability. My studies also provide empirical evidence that an 
amygdala-based emotional system is responsible for a bias in decision-making showing 
that the integration of emotional and analytic information is expressed in orbital and 
medial frontal cortex enabling the subjects to resist the bias. Finally, I show that a 
discrepancy in item evaluation during economic transaction is encoded in the ventral 
striatum.
My overall findings enable a specification of the biological mechanisms by which 
emotions modulate and shape human attention and decision-making and point, under 
certain experimental situations, to shared mechanisms.
5
Table o f Contents
Chapter 1 - Introduction
1.1 Outline o f thesis.................................................................................................14
1.2 Historical perspectives on the study o f emotional processing................ 16
1.2.1 The James-Lange theory and Cannon’s critique______________________________ 16
1.2.2 The limbic system: Papez’s circuit and “triune architecture” of the brain proposed 
by McLane_____________________________________________________________________ 18
1.2.3 A renewed interest in affective neuroscience: Damasio’s somatic markers hypothesis 
and LeDoux’s emotional bra in __________________________________________________ 21
1.3 Emotional modulation o f  Attention..............................................................23
1.3.1 Emotional control on selective attention: psychological evidences_______________ 24
1.3.2 Emotional control on selective attention: neural mechanisms __________________ 26
1.3.1.1 Bottom-up control.......................................................................................................................................27
1.3.1.2 Top-down control........................................................................................................................................ 31
1.4 Emotional modulation o f  Decision-Making................................................36
1.4.1 Expected utility Theory_____________________________________________________36
1.4.2 Prospect Theory___________________________________________________________ 38
1.4.3 Research in Psychology and Economics on emotions and decision-making_______ 42
1.4.4 Research in Neuroscience on emotions and decision-making___________________ 44
Chapter 2 - Methodology
2.1 Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fM R I)- ..............................52
P arti: Physics principles....................................................................................... 52
2.1.1 Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI): basic principles_________________________52
2.1.1.1 Spin and radiofrequency p u lse .............................................................................................................. 52
T1 relaxation:........................................................................................................................................................55
T2 relaxation:........................................................................................................................................................56
2.1.1.3 Frequency and phase encoding.................................................................................................................56
2.1.1.4 V oxels ............................................................................................................................................................ 58
2.1.1.5 Image contrast...............................................................................................................................................59
6
2.1.2 functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI): basic principles_______________ 60
2.1.2.1 BOLD contrast in fMRI.............................................................................................................................60
2.1.2.2 Neurophysiology o f the BOLD signal................................................................................................... 60
2.2 Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fM R I)- .................................64
Part II: Statistical analysis..................................................................................... 64
2.2.1 Pre-processing_________________________________________________________ 65
2.2.1.1 Spatial and temporal realignment............................................................................................................65
2.2.1.2 Spatial normalization................................................................................................................................. 66
2.2.1.3 Spatial.smoothing........................................................................................................................................67
2.2.2 General linear model (G L M )_______________________________________________ 68
2.2.1.3 Parameters estimation using the GLM...................................................................................................69
2.2.1.4 Choice o f haemodynamic response function (HRF)..........................................................................71
2.2.1.6 Inferences about subjects and populations: Random vs. Fixed effects analyses..........................74
2.2.1.6 Problem o f  multiple comparisons...........................................................................................................76
2.2 Drug experiments...............................................................................................78
2.2.1 Double blind design_______________________________________________________78
Chapter 3 - Enanched processing o f emotional information under limited 
attentional resources
3.1 Introduction........................................................................................................81
3.2 Materials and methods..................................................................................... 84
3.2.1 Subjects___________________________________________________________________84
3.2.2 Experimental paradigm ___________________________________________________ 84
3.2.4 Image acquisition and data analysis________________________________________ 87
3.2.4.1 Scanning parameters..................................................................................................................................87
3.2.4.2 Voxel-based analysis..................................................................................................................................88
3.2.4.3 ROI-based analysis..................................................................................................................................... 89
3.3 Results.................................................................................................................. 89
3.3.1 Behavioural resu lts________________________________________________________ 89
3.3.2 Imaging (fMRI) results_____________________________________________________92
3.4 Discussion ........................................................................................................97
1
3.4 Appendix (SPM significant activation tables).......................................102
Chapter 4 - Noradrenergic neuromodulation o f human attention for 
emotional and neutral stimuli
4.1 Introduction......................................................................................................105
4.2 Materials and methods...................................................................................110
4.2.1 Experiment 1 ____________________________________________________________ 112
4.2.1.1 Subjects........................................................................................................................................................112
4.2.1.1 Stimuli..........................................................................................................................................................112
4.2.1.1 Statistical data analysis............................................................................................................................113
4.2.2 Experiment 2 ____________________________________________________________ 113
4.2.2.1 Subjects....................................................................................................................................................... 113
4.2.2.2 Stimuli..........................................................................................................................................................114
4.2.2.3 Statistical data analysis............................................................................................................................114
4.2.3 Experiment 3 ____________________________________________________________ 115
4.2.3.1 Subjects........................................................................................................................................................ 115
4.2.3.2 Stimuli.......................................................................................................................................................... 115
4.2.3.3 Statistical data analysis............................................................................................................................ 115
4.3 Results................................................................................................................ 116
4.3.1 Experiment 1 ____________________________________________________________ 116
4.3.2 Experiment 2 ____________________________________________________________ 119
4.3.3 Experiment 3 ____________________________________________________________ 123
4.4 Discussion.........................................................................................................126
4.5 Appendix (tables o f the behavioural scores)........................................... 131
Chapter 5 - Contextual information and secision-making: "the framing 
effect"
5.1 Introduction......................................................................................................134
5.2 Materials and methods...................................................................................137
5.2.1 Subjects_________________________________________________________________137
5.2.2 Experimental paradigm 137
5.2.3 Behavioural data analysis_________________________________________________ 139
5.2.4 Image acquisition and data analysis_________________________________________ 140
5.3 Results..........................   142
5.3.1 Behavioural resu lts_______________________________________________________ 144
5.3.2 Imaging (fMRI) results____________________________________________________150
5.4 Discussion......................................................................................................... 155
5.4 Appendix (SPM significant activation tables)...........................................158
6.1 Introduction................................................................................................... 161
6.2.1 Subjects_________________________________________________________________ 164
6.2.2 Experimental paradigm __________________________________________________ 166
6.2.2 Skin conductance response (SCR)__________________________________________ 166
6.2.3 Questionnaires___________________________________________________________ 167
6.2.4 Behavioural data analysis_________________________________________________ 168
6.2.4 SCR data analysis________________________________________________________ 169
Chapter 6 - Contextual information and decision-making in Autism
6.3 Results................................................................................................................ 170
6.3.1 Behavioural resu lts_______________________________________________________170
6.3.2 Questionnaire correlations________________________________________________ 176
6.3.2 SCR results______________________________________________________________ 177
6.4 Discussion......................................................................................................... 179
6.5 Appendix (questionnaire)..............................................................................183
9
Chapter 7 - Contextual information and neural representation o f  value 
"the endowment effect"
7.1 Introduction......................................................................................................187
7.2 Materials and methods...................................................................................188
7.2.1 Subjects__________________________________________________________________188
7.2.2 Experimental paradigm __________________________________________________ 189
7.2.2.1 Endowment p hase.....................................................................................................................................189
7.2.2.2 Scanning Phase.......................................................................................................................................... 190
1 .2 .23  Transaction Phase......................................................................................................................................192
7.2.3 Behavioural data analysis_________________________________________________ 194
7.2.4 Image acquisition and data analysis_________________________________________ 194
7.3 Results................................................................................................................198
7.3.1 Behavioural resu lts_______________________________________________________200
7.3.1 Imaging (fMRI) results____________________________________________________203
7.4 Discussion.........................................................................................................208
7.5 Appendix (SPM significant activation tables)..........................................211
Chapter 8 - General discussion and conclusions
8.1 Overview............................................................................................................213
8.2 Mechanisms by which emotional stimuli enhance attentional 
processing.................................................................................................................215
8.2 Mechanisms by which emotional information is integrated in the 
decision process changing the brain value computation.............................221
8.3 Final conclusions............................................................................................ 228
References................................................................................................................231
10
Index o f Figures
Figure LI Original drawing o f the triune architecture o f the human brain 
proposed by MacLeane...........................................................................................19
Figure I. II Fear conditioning...............................................................................22
Figure I. I l l  Diagram o f the amygdala bottom-up control on visual cortical
areas.............................................................................................................................30
Figure LIV Diagram o f the ventral part o f orbito-medial prefrontal cortex 
(VMPFC) top-down control on amygdala and visual cortical areas..........35
Figure I. V Canonical utility function and Prospect Theory utility function 
.......................................................................................................................................39
Figure L VIRescorla-Wagner learning equation............................................ 45
Figure II.I Magnetic Spin...................................................................................... 54
Figure II. II Haemodynamic function................................................................. 62
Figure III.I The emotional attentional blink task............................................ 86
Figure / / / . / /  Behavioural results..........................................................................91
Figure / / / . / / /  Fusiform face area (FFA).......................................................... 93
Figure III.IV: Ventral striatum ...........................................................................94
Figure III. V: Rostral anterior cingulated cortex (rACC).............................. 96
Figure IV. I  Projections o f the NE system in the CNS.................................106
Figure IV.II Schematic diagram o f the AB task...........................................I l l
Figure IV. I l l  Behavioural results o f Experiment1........................................118
Figure IV.IV Behavioural results o f Experiment 2 ................................ .....122
Figure IV. V Behavioural results o f Experiment 3.........................................125
Figure V. I. The financial decision-making task............................................ 143
Figure V.II. Behavioral results.......................................................................... 145
Figure V.Ill Behavioural results: decisions across varying amount and 
probabilities..............................................................................................................147
11
Figure V. IV Behavioural results for catch trials............................................149
Figure V. VfMRI whiten subjects results........................................................152
Figure V. VI Between subjects fM RI results...................................................154
Figure VI.I Susceptibility to the framing manipulation...............................171
Figure VI. II Subjects’ risk attitude................................................................... 173
Figure VI.III Correlation between the subjects ’ risk attitude: control 
group.......................................................................................................................... 174
Figure VI.IV Correlation between the subjects9 risk attitude: control 
group..........................................................................................................................175
Figure VI. V Effect o f frames on SCR response............................................. 178
.................................................................................................................................... 199
Figure VII.I. The endowment effect task.........................................................199
Figure VII.II. Behavioral results.......................................................................202
Figure VII.III. Within subjects fM RI results..................................................206
Figure VII.IV. Within subjects fMRIresults................................................... 208
12
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Outline o f thesis.................................................................................................14
1.2 Historical perspectives on the study o f emotional processing................16
1.2.1 The James-Lange theory and Cannon’s critique______________________________ 16
1.2.2 The limbic system: Papez’s circuit and “triune architecture” of the brain proposed 
by McLane_____________________________________________________________________18
1.2.3 A renewed interest in affective neuroscience: Damasio’s somatic markers hypothesis 
and LeDoux’s emotional brain __________________________________________________ 21
1.3 Emotional modulation o f  Attention..............................................................23
1.3.1 Emotional control on selective attention: psychological evidences_______________ 24
1.3.2 Emotional control on selective attention: neural mechanisms __________________ 26
1.3.1.1 Bottom-up control.......................................................................................................................................27
1.3.1.2 Top-down control........................................................................................................................................31
1.4 Emotional modulation o f Decision-Making............................................... 36
1.4.1 Expected utility Theory____________________________________________________ 36
1.4.2 Prospect Theory___________________________________________________________38
1.4.3 Research in Psychology and Economics on emotions and decision-making_______ 42
1.4.4 Research in Neuroscience on emotions and decision-making___________________ 44
13
1.1 Outline of thesis
In this chapter (Chapter 1) I will review literature in the fields of psychology, 
neuroscience and economics, which addresses the subject of emotional processing and its 
modulation of cognitive activities such as attention and decision-making. This review 
contextualises the experimental studies on attention and decision-making that are 
presented in the body of this thesis.
In Chapter 2 I explain the methods used in the experiments described in this thesis. I 
describe the physics of magnetic resonance and the neurophysiology underlying the blood 
oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) signal, which is my prime measure of neuronal activity. 
Spatial preprocessing of fMRI images is described as well as the statistical models 
employed in making inferences about task-related regional brain activations.
In Chapter 3 I present an fMRI experiment designed to investigate how the human brain 
is able to process emotional stimuli in conditions of limited attentional resources whilst 
subjects are engaged in an attentional blink paradigm. I provide neurobiological evidence 
that the increased detection of emotional stimuli under attentional load is mediated by a 
frontal top-down control.
In Chapter 4 I present results of three experiments designed to examine how 
nordrenaline (NA) regulates an enhancement in attention for the emotional stimuli. These 
experiments use a modification of the attentional blink paradigm; using three different
14
drug manipulations I will show how noradrenalinen contributes to this process. These 
results will be interpreted in the context of an established theoretical account of the 
noradrenergic function.
In Chapter 5 I present the findings of an fMRI experiment that explores how the human 
brain processes contextual emotional information when choice options are presented 
(“framing effect”). I provide empirical evidence that an amygdala-based emotional 
system is responsible for the framing bias in decision-making. In addition, I demonstrate 
how the integration of emotional and analytic information expressed in the orbital and 
medial frontal cortex enables subjects to resist this bias.
In Chapter 6 I describe the results of a behavioural experiment that investigated how 
contextual emotional information affects the decision making of people affected by 
autism spectrum disorder (ASD), employing the framing paradigm used in the fMRI 
study presented in the chapter 5. These data show that ASD subjects are less susceptible 
the framing bias. These findings are discussed in the context of the current dominant 
theory on autism, as well as in relation to decision-making theories.
In Chapter 7 1 present the findings of an fMRI experiment which aims to investigate how 
the brain represents values during economics transactions (in which the contextual 
emotional information is rooted in the subjects own role as either seller or buyer). I
15
provide experimental evidence that during an economic transaction the ventral striatum 
encodes values on a relative rather than on absolute metric.
In Chapter 8 I integrate the results presented in the previous chapters with current 
theoretical accounts developed in psychology, neuroscience, and economics, of how 
emotions modulate complex cognitive capacity such as attention and decision-making.
1.2 Historical perspectives on the study of emotional processing
The word emotion is a composite word formed from the two Latin words: ex (out, 
outward) and motio (movement, action, gesture). Already the etymology of the word 
emotion embodies the motivational aspect of emotions in directing animal and human 
behaviour. Emotions embody both psychological and physiological states, which inform 
an organism about the value of action and events, which in turn exert an influence on 
behaviour.
1.2.1 The James-Lange theory and Cannon’s critique
In the 1872, Charles Darwin acknowledged that the two most crucial features of 
emotional processing are its physical expression and its motivational impact. In his book 
“The expression o f  the emotions in man and animals ” he proposed that the expressions of 
emotions in humans (for example the shedding of tears when upset, or the baring of teeth 
when angry) are vestigial patterns of actions, that were adaptive in our environment of
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evolutionary adaptiveness (Darwin, 1859). A decade later, the American psychologist 
William James proposed that emotions reflect the experience of sets of bodily changes 
that occur in response to distinct emotive stimuli (James, 1884); the Danish physician 
Carl Lange independently developed an analogous hypothesis (Lange, 1885). The James- 
Lange theory was challenged in the 1920s by Walter Cannon, on the following grounds: 
(1) the total surgical separation of the viscera from the brain in animals does not impair 
emotional behaviour; (2) bodily or autonomic activity cannot differentiate separate 
emotional states; (3) bodily changes are typically too slow to generate emotions; (4) 
artificial hormonal activation of bodily activity is insufficient to generate emotion. 
Cannon’s criticism of the James-Lange theory arose from his investigations with Bard 
into the effects of brain lesions on the emotional behaviour of cats. Decorticated cats 
were liable to make sudden, inappropriate and ill-directed anger attacks (Bard and Rioch, 
1937). On this basis Cannon and Bard argued that if emotions were the perception of 
bodily change, then they should be entirely dependent on having intact sensory and motor 
cortices (Bard, 1928; Cannon, 1927; Cannon, 1931). They argued that since the removal 
of the cortex did not eliminate emotions, James and Lange must be wrong. However, 
recent research has cast doubt on Cannon’s claims, showing that emotions are less intense 
when the brain is disconnected from the viscera as in Cannon’s studies, and that some 
artificial manipulations of organ activity can induce emotions (Harro and Vasar, 1991). 
Indeed implicit in their critique is a conflation of emotional experience (feeling states) 
and emotional expression (overt bodily manifestation of emotion). Nevertheless, on the
17
basis of their experimental observations, Cannon and Bard proposed the first substantive 
theory of the brain mechanisms of emotion. They argued that the hypothalamus is the 
brain region most involved in an emotional response to stimuli and that such responses 
are inhibited by evolutionarily more recently evolved neocortical regions (Bard, 1928). 
Removal of the cortex frees the hypothalamic circuit from top-down control, allowing 
uncontrolled emotions.
1.2.2 The limbic system: Papez’s circuit and “triune architecture” of the 
brain proposed by McLane
In 1937, James Papez proposed a central neural circuitry of emotion, known as the ‘Papez 
circuit’ (Papez, 1995). Papez proposed that sensory input into the thalamus diverged into 
upstream and downstream components, providing the separate streams of ‘thought’ and 
‘feeling’. The thought stream was transmitted from the thalamus to the sensory cortices, 
especially the cingulate region. Through this route, sensations were turned into 
perceptions, thoughts and memories. Papez proposed that this stream then continued 
beyond the cingulate cortex, through the cingulum pathway, to the hippocampus and, 
through the fornix, to the mammillary bodies and thence back to the anterior thalamus via 
the mammillo-thalamic tract. The feeling stream, on the other hand, was transmitted from 
the thalamus directly to the mammillary bodies, allowing the generation of emotions 
(with downward projections to the bodily systems).
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Paul MacLean in 1949 proposed an anatomical hierarchical model of the emotional brain 
inspired to its evolutionary development. MacLean proposed that our skull holds not one 
brain, but three, each representing a distinct evolutionary stratum formed upon an older 
layer, akin to geological stratification (MacLean, 1949). He called this organization the 
"triune brain architecture ."
11
Figure I.I Original drawing o f the triune architecture o f the human brain proposed by 
MacLeane
The first part is the evolutionarily ancient ‘reptilian’ brain (the striatal complex and basal 
ganglia) he propopsed as the seat of primitive emotions such as fear and aggression. The 
second is the ‘paleomammalian’ brain (which he originally called the ‘visceral brain’), 
which augments primitive reptilian emotional responses such as fear and also elaborates
19
the social emotions. This brain system includes many of the components of the Papez 
circuit — the thalamus, hypothalamus, hippocampus and cingulate cortex — along with 
important additional structures, in particular the amygdala and the PFC. Finally, the 
‘neomammalian’ brain consists mostly of the neocortex, which interfaces emotion with 
cognition and exerts top-down control over the emotional responses that are driven by 
lower systems (Figure I.I). MacLean’s essential idea was that emotional experiences 
involve the integration of sensations from the world with information from the body. 
MacLean’s limbic system concept survives to the current day as the dominant 
conceptualization of the ‘emotional brain’, although concepts at the core of the original 
theory have been criticized on both empirical and theoretical grounds.
Several decades after these studies in emotional processing, the emergence of cognitive 
science shifted the interest of those concerned with the relation between psychological 
functions and neural mechanisms toward processes (for instance, perception and 
memory) that are readily thought of in terms of computer-like operations. From the start, 
cognitive scientists claimed that their field was not about emotion (Neisser, 1967). The 
cognitive approach came to be the dominant approach in psychology and brain science, 
and research on emotions was neglected.
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1.2.3 A renewed interest in affective neuroscience: Damasio’s somatic 
markers hypothesis and LeDoux’s emotional brain
The work of Antonio Damasio and his colleagues has sparked a renewed interest in 
emotional processing and its interactions with cognitive processes. Their somatic marker 
hypothesis builds on the earlier ideas of James and Lange, promoting the role of bodily 
feedback in emotion (Damasio et al., 1994). Somatic markers are physiological reactions 
(such as shifts in autonomic nervous system activity) that mark previous emotionally 
significant events. Somatic markers therefore provide a signal delineating those current 
events that have had emotion-related consequences in the past. These signals allow 
individuals to track situations of uncertainty where decisions need to be made on the 
basis of the emotional properties of the present stimulus. In particular, somatic markers 
allow decisions to be made in situations where a logical analysis of the available choices 
proves insufficient. Damasio’s group has used human lesion studies to support these 
arguments, arguing that these somatic codes are processed in the ventromedial PFC 
(Damasio et al., 1990).
Meanwhile, LeDoux and colleagues have revitalized another area of research on 
emotional processing: that which began with the seminal work of Pavlov in 1927 on 
conditioning (Pavlov, 1927). LeDoux and colleagues used fear-conditioning paradigms to 
study how emotional information is processed and prioritized (LeDoux, 1996). In fear 
conditioning, arbitrary stimuli come to acquire fear-inducing properties when they occur
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in conjunction with a naturally threatening event such as an electric shock. For example, 
if a rat hears a tone followed by a shock then after repeated such pairings it will respond 
fearfully to the tone when presented alone, showing alterations in autonomic (heart rate 
and blood pressure), endocrine and motor (for example, freezing) behaviour, along with 
analgesia and somatic reflexes such as a potentiated startle response (figure I.II). This 
body of research has highlighted the roles of two afferent routes involving the amygdala 
that mediate such conditioning (LeDoux, 2000). The first is a direct thalamo-amygdala 
route, that processes crude sensory aspects of incoming stimuli and relays this 
information directly to the amygdala, allowing for an early conditioned fear response to 
any of these crude sensory elements which are signals of threat. The second route is a 
thalamo-cortico-amygdala pathway that allows a more complex analysis of the incoming 
stimulus and delivers a slower, conditioned emotional response (figure I.II).
Cortical Evaluation
fear conditioning
Thalamus
A m ygdala A m ygdala
Incoming S ignals
Figure I.II Fear conditioning
On the left a schematic representation o f the fear conditions in rats: an acoustic tone 
(conditioned stimulus) is paired with an electric shock (conditioned stimulus). The rat 
after the conditioning will show a fear response to the acoustic stimulus. On the right a
22
diagram o f  the two neural pathways that mediate the fear conditioning: the amygdala- 
thalamus pathway and the thalamus-cortex-amygdala pathway.
1.3 Emotional modulation of Attention
“Everyone knows what attention is. It is the taking possession by the mind, in clear and 
vivid form, o f  one out o f  what seem several simultaneously possible objects or trains o f  
thought. Focalization, concentration, o f  consciousness are o f  its essence ”
William James “The Principles of Psychology” 1980
Attention directs cognitive resources toward those aspects of the world that are more 
important than others. Emotional significance is a prime marker o f importance to the 
organism. Indeed, as shown in the previous paragraph, many definitions of emotion are 
inherently tied to the concept of motivation or goal-relevance. A stimulus or event is 
appraised as emotional when it has potential consequences for either furthering or 
obstructing goals. These goals can include immediate survival goals, such as avoiding 
danger, as well as more complex and socially embedded goals, such as forming 
friendships and alliances with other individuals, attracting viable mates, and protecting 
offspring. The number of stimuli which can be simultaneously appraised is limited: 
therefore, it is adaptive to prioritize those stimuli and events that affect goals in either a 
positive or negative way. Because evaluating emotional significance is a means of 
tagging stimuli or events according to their importance, it stands to reason that emotional 
significance should be an important factor guiding attentional selection.
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In this section I will review the scientific literature on how selective attention can be 
influenced by emotional meaning, considering the behavioral evidence and the potential 
neuropsychological mechanisms. The discussion of whether the emotional meaning of a 
stimulus can be encoded “automatically,” or preattentively it is beyond the interest of this 
chapter: for extensive reviews of this topic see (Dolan, 2002; Pourtois et al., 2006; 
Vuilleumier and Pourtois, 2007).
1.3.1 Emotional control on selective attention: psychological evidences
Several researchers e.g., (Ohman et al., 2001; Robbinson, 1998) have proposed that the 
emotional significance of stimuli is first evaluated pre-attentively; then, subsequently, 
stimuli that have been tagged with emotional significance are prioritized for access to 
selective attention mechanisms that operate within a limited-capacity system. As 
explained in the first section of this chapter, early studies in cognitive science which 
aimed to formulate an information-processing model of the mind underplayed the role of 
the emotions: however, the idea that the emotional meaning of a stimulus can influence 
selective attention is not new. For example, research in the 1950s described the 
phenomenon in which a person’s own name can capture attention, even when embedded 
in a stream of information that is otherwise effectively ignored (Moray, 1959). Since this 
early demonstration, a wealth of studies using a variety of paradigms has confirmed that 
emotionally relevant stimuli are likely to capture attention. A recent study by Anderson & 
Phelps, 2001 (Anderson and Phelps, 2001) demonstrated the influence of emotion on
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attention using an “attentional blink” paradigm (Raymond et al., 1992). A similar 
experimental paradigm was used in the experiments described in chapters three and 
chapter four of this thesis. The attentional blink paradigm involves a rapid serial 
presentation of visual stimuli in which subjects are required to identify two targets (T1 
and T2) embedded in a stream of stimuli. A common finding has been that it is difficult 
to detect a second target in the series if that second target closely follows the first target 
(Raymond et al., 1992). Anderson and Phelps (2001) demonstrated that participants were 
more likely to detect the second target (T2) if it was emotional, and that the effect was 
strongest with shorter lags between the first and second target, when the second target 
was usually the most difficult to detect. Interestingly, patients with amygdala damage did 
not exhibit this effect, providing evidence for the amygdala’s role in detecting emotional 
significance (Anderson and Phelps, 2001).
Evidence from clinical neuropsychology also supports the idea that emotionally 
significant information is especially likely to capture attention. Several relevant studies 
have focused on patients with unilateral neglect, who typically have right-hemisphere 
damage and who fail to attend to stimuli in the left half of space (Vuilleumier and 
Schwartz, 2001a; Vuilleumier and Schwartz, 2001c). The term extinction refers to the 
phenomenon in which a neglect patient is unable to attend to left-side stimuli when right- 
side stimuli are also present, presumably because these stimuli compete for access to 
attention and the stronger right-side stimuli “extinguish” the weaker, contralesional left­
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side stimuli. An intriguing aspect of this syndrome is that extinction of a left-side 
stimulus is less likely when that stimulus is emotionally salient (Vuilleumier and 
Schwartz, 2001a; Vuilleumier and Schwartz, 2001c). This finding implies that emotional 
salience adds a “boost,” helping a stimulus that would otherwise be extinguished to gain 
access to conscious attentional processes.
The study of attentional biases toward emotional information has consistently 
emphasized the role of individual differences. A large body of research has indicated, for 
example, that very anxious individuals are more likely to display attentional biases 
toward threatening information than less anxious ones (Bishop et al., 2004b). Individual 
differences in personality structure have also been linked to differences in attentional 
bias: for example, more anxious individuals are more likely than controls to display 
attentional biases toward threatening stimuli (Bishop et al., 2004b).
1.3.2 Emotional control on selective attention: neural mechanisms
The neurophysiological literature suggests that there are two primary neural mechanisms 
by which emotional significance can influence selective attention. Firstly, sensory 
processing of a stimulus can be enhanced in a bottom-up fashion by amplification of 
neural activity in the regions encoding that stimulus; such bottom-up influence is likely to 
involve input from the amygdala to sensory cortical areas. The second mechanism of 
emotional influence on attention involves executive attention, which imposes processing 
priorities in a top-down manner and primarily involves frontal lobe regions.
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1.3.1.1 Bottom-up control
One neural mechanism of selective attention is the enhancement of processing in neural 
areas that represent a selected stimulus (Corbetta and Shulman, 2002; Desimone and 
Duncan, 1995; Driver and Frith, 2000). For example, attentional selection of a specific 
visual object is postulated to involve amplification of activity in that portion of 
extrastriate cortex that represents the object, thus biasing competition in favor of the 
selected stimulus (Desimone, 1998). Attentional modulations have also been identified 
for feature-selective responses in visual areas (e.g. when attending to colour versus 
motion, (Corbetta et al., 1990)) and for particular directions of motion (Saenz et al., 
2002); together with differential responses to particular stimulus categories, such as 
visual words versus objects (Rees et al., 1999) or faces versus houses in the FFA and 
parahippocampal place area (PPA). Studies in monkeys have also demonstrated that 
single-cell firing rates within the extrastriate visual cortex are influenced by selective 
attention (Moran and Desimone, 1985). Moreover, during rapid perceptual learning, 
increased activity in inferior temporal regions is associated with correct recognitions of 
the object or face (Dolan et al., 1997).
Attentional factors related to task-relevance are not the sole modulatory influences upon 
visual processing. The emotional value of a stimulus may also produce analogous effects 
typified by relatively enhanced and/or sustained neural responses for emotional relative to 
neutral stimuli (Vuilleumier and Driver, 2007).
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Indeed, numerous studies have found increased activity in cortical visual processing areas 
when participants view emotionally provocative images, compared to when they view 
neutral images (Lane et al., 1997a; Lang et al., 1998; Paradiso et al., 1999; Vuilleumier 
and Driver, 2007). In particular, fMRI studies of face processing have repeatedly shown 
that emotional facial expressions can produce significant increases in activation of the 
amygdala, and also for face-responsive regions within the visual cortex (e.g. FFA in 
lateral fusiform gyrus) (Vuilleumier and Pourtois, 2007). Such increases are typically 
greater for negative facial expressions associated with a possible threat, such as fear 
(Pourtois et al., 2006; Surguladze et al., 2003; Vuilleumier, 2005; Vuilleumier et al., 
2001)
Other studies have found increased fusiform activity in response to fearful faces (Armony 
and Dolan, 2002; Morris et al., 2001). Interestingly, one study (Lane et al., 1999) reported 
that activity in a common area of visual cortex was modulated both by an emotional 
salience manipulation and by an attentional load manipulation, providing evidence that 
emotional salience and attention have similar locus of effect on visual cortex.
Together, these results support the idea that emotional significance leads to amplified 
neural representations at the cortical level, a primary mechanism thought to implement 
selective attention. Yet questions remain. How, for instance, is the amplification process 
initiated? What mechanisms cause the visual cortical areas to become more active when 
they are representing emotionally salient stimuli? Converging evidence from both animal
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and human research suggests that the emotion-related modulation of visual processing 
involves the amygdala, which is known to be implicated in fear processing and fear- 
related learning (LeDoux, 2000; Phelps and LeDoux, 2005) as described in the paragraph
1.1.3 of this chapter. One possibility is that projections from the amygdala to the sensory 
cortex may contribute to the amplification of cortical representations (Lang et al., 1998; 
Morris et al., 1998; Vuilleumier et al., 2001; Vuilleumier and Driver, 2007). The 
amygdala is an important structure in the initial encoding of emotional significance and it 
is known to have reciprocal connections with early cortical sensory areas (Amaral, 1982). 
Furthermore, Morris, Friston, and colleagues (Morris et al., 1998) reported evidence for 
functional connectivity between the amygdala and extrastriate cortex while participants 
viewed emotional faces; specifically, the correlation between amygdala activity and 
extrastriate activity was influenced by the emotionality of the face. Moreover, a 
combined fMRI-lesion study (Vuilleumier et al., 2004) demonstrated that amygdala 
lesions can abolish the enhanced visual activation for fearful faces relative to neutral 
faces, even if the visual areas remain structurally and functionally intact. These authors 
also found a significant inverse correlation between the severity of structural amygdala 
damage and the enhancement of fusiform activity by fearful faces, observed selectively 
within each hemisphere. These data (Vuilleumier et al., 2004) provide direct evidence 
that the amygdala influences processing in remote visual cortical areas, normally 
boosting the representation of fear-related faces in fusiform cortex, in a way that is 
disrupted after amygdala damage.
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Therefore, a likely bottom-up mechanism for attentional amplification of emotional 
stimuli suggests amygdala detects an emotionally significant stimulus and sends a 
boosting or modulating signal to the cortical areas responsible for building a detailed 
representation of that stimulus (figure I.III).
Amygdala
Figure I.III Diagram o f the amygdala bottom-up control on visual cortical areas
The amygdala nucleus is represented in red. The hatched arrow represents the feed­
forward input from the sensory (visual areas) cortex to the amygdala. The solid red 
arrow represents the feedback input from the amygdala to the sensory cortex.
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1.3.1.2 Top-down control
Whereas the amygdala can send bottom-up influences that amplify emotionally 
significant cortical representations, other processes may act in a top-down fashion to 
modulate the selection of emotional information. Such top-down processes are likely to 
involve both the main subdivisions of the prefrontal cortex, the dorsolateral and 
ventromedial regions. Anatomical evidence suggests that these two sub-regions, which 
are reciprocally interconnected, may influence selective attention to emotional 
information through different mechanisms. The dorsolateral region has reciprocal 
connections with cortical sensory and association areas, but not directly with the 
amygdala (Groenewegen and Uylings, 2000), and it appears to be involved in 
maintaining the strength of selected cortical representations in working memory. The 
ventromedial region has reciprocal connections with the amygdala, among other regions 
(Amaral, 1982; Groenewegen and Uylings, 2000), and may therefore modulate amygdala 
processing in a top-down manner, as well as in turn it being influenced by the amygdala. 
These anatomical connections allow the frontal lobes flexibility in the selection or 
suppression of emotionally significant information in accordance with current goals and 
task demands. Although many different interpretations of dorsolateral function have been 
proposed (see (D'Esposito, 2007; Kimberg et al., 2000), for a review), one idea gaining 
currency is that the dorsolateral region is involved in selecting and maintaining task­
relevant attributes represented by other areas of the brain (Miller and Cohen, 2001). 
Single-cell recordings in monkeys have demonstrated that some dorsolateral region
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(DLPFC) cells maintain their firing rate during the delay period between a cue and the 
relevant response, thus indicating that these cells may be involved in working memory 
(Romanski, 2004). Recent animal research has shown that activity in the extrastriate 
visual cortex is influenced by top-down signals from the frontal lobes (Tomita et al.,
1999). These findings are consistent with other neuroimaging evidence that the frontal 
cortex is involved in imposing top-down control that selects and maintains task-relevant 
representations (Hopfinger et al., 2000; MacDonald et al., 2000; Weissman et al., 2002). 
A recent study has confirmed that this top-down modulation require a synchronization 
between frontal and paretial cortex (Buschman and Miller, 2007)
Recent studies have shown that one area within the frontal lobes that seems to respond in 
the evaluation of emotional stimuli valence is dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) 
(Dolcos et al., 2007; Grimm et al., 2006). The DLPFC could therefore impose an 
attentional set that selects for information according to its emotional significance, or 
relevance to personal goals, by maintaining activation in posterior regions that represent 
an emotionally significant object or event. Although DLPFC seems a good candidate 
cortical area in modulating attention for emotional stimuli further empirical investigation 
are required to support this hypothesis.
More experimental evidence has been produced in support of a key role for orbitomedial 
prefrontal cortex (OMPFC) in the top-down modulation of attentional enhancement of 
emotional stimuli. OMPFC, including the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, the orbital
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cortex and the cingulate cortex, is closely connected with subcortical limbic regions such 
as the amygdala (Barbas, 2000; Groenewegen and Uylings, 2000). Evidence from single­
cell recording in an epileptic patient indicates that the ventromedial region of OMPFC 
detects emotional significance rapidly (Kawasaki et al., 2001), while studies on 
nonhuman primates have demonstrated that the orbital region of the OMPFC codes for 
stimulus-reward associations (Kringelbach, 2005). Furthermore, damage to the human 
OMPFC is known to produce socioemotional and motivational deficits (Bechara et al., 
2005). Although the cingulate cortex has long been recognized to play a role in emotional 
responsivity (Papez, 1995), recent evidence indicates that the most ventral portions of the 
cingulate cortex are especially involved in tasks designed to tap emotional functions 
(Bush et al., 2000; Whalen et al., 1998), whereas the dorsal portions are more closely 
involved in conflict monitoring and response preparation (Braver et al., 2001; Rushworth 
et al., 2005).
Few studies to date have investigated the potential role of the OMPFC in attention to 
emotional information. Armony and Dolan (Armony and Dolan, 2002) found that 
focusing attention on the spatial location of an emotionally relevant stimulus was 
associated with increased activity in bilateral OMPFC as well as bilateral frontal eye 
fields and parietal cortex, regions known to be associated with spatial shifts of attention. 
One interpretation of these findings is that the OMPFC is associated with directing 
attention toward emotionally significant targets. Supporting this interpretation, several
other studies have also found increased activity in the anterior cingulate cortex during 
selective attention to emotional information (Elliott et al., 2000; Lane et al., 1997a). In 
addition, Whalen, Bush, and collegues (Whalen et al., 1998) found that the ventral 
anterior cingulate was more active when participants had to ignore emotional 
information, compared to when they had to ignore neutral information. Together, these 
results indicate that the orbito-medial prefrontal cortex (OMPFC), and the anterior 
cingulate in particular, may be involved when participants select between competing 
representations that differ in their emotional salience (Elliott and Dolan, 1998).
In addition to a role for prefrontal regions in enhancing attentional processing of 
emotionally relevant information, this region may also be involved in selecting against, or 
suppressing, emotionally relevant information. Indeed, several studies have indicated that 
amygdala activity can be modulated by emotion regulation strategies, a modulation that 
appears to be under frontal lobe control. One study (Schaefer et al., 2002) found that 
amygdala activity was influenced by task instructions either to passively view aversive 
pictures or to maintain an emotional response to the pictures, indicating top-down 
influences on subcortical emotional processing. These authors did not, however, 
investigate the source of the top-down signals. Other evidence has supported an 
hypothesis that the top-down influence comes from the frontal lobes. For example, 
patients with orbitofrontal damage fail to habituate to repeated aversive stimuli (Rule et 
al., 2002), implying that this region is normally involved in inhibiting emotional 
responses. Ochsner and collegues (Ochsner et al., 2002) reported that instructing
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participants to reappraise aversive stimuli in unemotional terms decreased activity in the 
amygdala and increased activity in frontal regions. Taken together, these studies indicate 
that the regulation of emotional responses is likely to involve top-down control from the 
frontal lobe that modulates amygdala responsivity (figure I.IV). This top-down 
modulation may be elicited either by explicit task instructions or by endogenous personal 
goals and strategies of emotional regulation.
VMPFC
Amygdala
Figure I.IV  Diagram o f the ventral part o f orbito-medial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) 
top-down control on amygdala and visual cortical areas
The amygdala nucleus and the VMPFC are represented in red. The hatched arrow 
represents the input from the sensory (visual areas) cortex to the amygdala. The solid red 
arrows represent both the feedback and feed-forward input from the amygdala to the 
VMPFC.
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1.4 Emotional modulation of Decision-Making
In the previous section I briefly reviewed the scientific literature on how emotional 
information modulates attention, enhancing the neural processing for stimuli tagged with 
emotional valence. This capacity clearly constitutes a strong evolutionary adaptation, 
since it efficiently allocates limited computational resources to stimuli that are relevant 
for the individual’s fitness (e.g. predators, food, mate partners). Once this information is 
processed the individual will often take an action that it is the result of a decision-making 
process. Emotions strongly influence the decision-making process, and in this section I 
will briefly review the current relevant literature.
1.4.1 Expected utility Theory
Historically, the research on decision-making has received most attention in the field of 
economics. Economists have produced the first coherent decision making theory, which 
revolves around the concept of ‘expected utility’ (Bernoulli 1738) (Bernoulli, 1954). 
Expected utility theory states that a decision maker chooses between risky or uncertain 
prospects by comparing their expected utility values, i.e., the weighted sums obtained by 
adding the utility values of outcomes multiplied by their respective probabilities as 
described by the equation EU=5j:j pi(u)j. However, this formulation of utility neglect the 
role of emotions in the decision making process. Jeremy Bentham (1789) independently 
from Bernoulli proposed another variant of utility in which emotions figure prominently 
(Bentham, 1789). Because Bentham viewed utility as the net sum of positive over 
negative emotions, he devoted a substantial part of his treatise on utility to a discussion of
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the determinants and nature of emotions. Neoclassical economists later constructed their 
new approach to economics on the theoretical foundation of utility (von Neumann and 
Morgestem, 1944; P.Samuelson 1947). However, they rapidly became disillusioned with 
utility's psychological underpinnings and sought to expunge emotion from the utility 
construct. This process culminated in the development of “ordinal utility” and the “theory 
of revealed preference” which state that while the utility of a particular good cannot be 
measured using an objective scale, all the information about the consumer’s real utility a 
are expressed by the subject’s ranking of the different alternatives. This theory construed 
utility as an index of preference rather than of happiness. In von Neuman and 
Morgestem,’s (von Neumann and Morgestem, 1944) axiomatic version of utility theory 
the concept of ordinal utility and revealed preferences eliminated the alleged superfluous 
intermediate step of feelings and emotions that had proved difficult to quantify. Revealed 
preference theory simply equates unobserved preferences with observed choice. 
According to this view, decision-makers act “as i f ’ they were fully rational, unemotional 
creatures, following a few simple rules (“axioms”). These axioms are the core of utility 
theory (von Neumann and Morgestem, 1944).
From the very beginning, rational utility theory was challenged by empirical evidence. In 
1953 Maurice Allais described in his seminal paper (Allais, 1953) a striking violation (the 
“Allais paradox”) of the “independence axiom” of utility theory. The Allais paradox 
shows that a significant majority of real decision makers order uncertain prospects in a
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way that is inconsistent with the notion that choices are independent of irrelevant 
alternatives. The Allais paradox by showing the inadequacy of the independence axiom (a 
core axiom in EU theory) cast serious doubts on the validity of the classical utility theory 
(von Neumann and Morgestem, 1944). Simon (1956) was an early proponent of a 
different approach from utility theory based upon bounded rationality and concepts such 
as satisficing (as opposed to maximizing). The theory of bounded rationality relaxed 
several assumptions of the standard utility theory taking account of cognitive limitations 
to mental knowledge and capacity (Simon, 1982).
1.4.2 Prospect Theory
From the early 1970s, the psychologists Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman began to 
use economic models as a benchmark against which to contrast their psychological 
models. They argued that heuristic short-cuts created probability judgments which 
deviated from statistical principles (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). In their 1979 paper 
"Prospect theory: decision making under risk", they documented violations of expected 
utility and proposed an axiomatic theory, grounded in psychophysical principles, to 
explain these violations (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). One crucial innovation of 
prospect theory was the introduction of a new value function (figure I.V) that was able to 
explain several empirical anomalies (e.g. loss aversion, framing effect) that the were not 
captured by canonical utility function at the core of the expected utility theory proposed 
by Bernoulli (1738) (Bernoulli, 1954) and formalized by von Neumann and Morgenstem 
(von Neumann and Morgestem, 1944) (figure I.V).
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Figure I, V Canonical utility function and Prospect Theory utility function
The first diagram represents the utility function proposed by Bernoulli that it is at the 
core o f the classical utility theory. On the y-axis is represented the subjective value 
(utility); on the x-axis is represented the actual objective value (expected value). In 
graphical terms, subjective value or utility is a concave function o f money — i.e., the 
millionth dollar a person acquires has less utility than the first dollar he or she acquires. 
The second diagram represents the utility function proposed by Kahneman and Tversky 
that it is at the core o f prospect theory. In graphical terms, subjective value or utility is 
actually an asymmetrical function o f the absolute size o f a subject's gains or losses. More 
details about the characteristics o f these curves are given in the main text.
Three features characterize this value function: (1) it is concave in the domain of gains,
(manifested in risk averse behaviour); (2) it is convex in the domain of losses (manifested
in risk seeking behaviour); and (3) the function is sharply kinked at the reference point,
producing a curve which is steeper for losses than for gains (Kahneman and Tversky,
2000). Prospect theory introduced two innovative concepts: “loss aversion” and the
“reference point”. These two concepts are able to account for several anomalies in the
original expected utility theory. The observation that losses loom larger than gains is
readily explained if these choice prospects are evaluated on different limbs of the value
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function described above. Another consequence of the prospect theory is that the 
perception of reference point is strongly influenced by contextual information, in 
particular information of an emotional type. This effect was described for the first time by 
Kahneman and Tversky (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) as the “framing effect”. In their 
original formulation they presented a group of subjects with a hypothetical scenario 
called the “Asian disease problem”:
Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak o f an unusual Asian disease, which is 
expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been 
proposed. Assume that the exact scientific estimates o f the consequences are as follows: 
At this point the group was split in two subgroups, which were presented with the 
following options:
(1) For the first group:
I f  Programme A is adopted, 200 people will be saved.
I f  Programme B is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved 
and 2/3 probability that no people will be saved.
(2) For the second group:
I f  Programme C is adopted 400 people will die.
I f  Programme D is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that nobody will die and 2/3 
probability that 600people will die.
The majority of subject in the first group chose Programme A (72%) over Programme B 
(28%) but in the second group the majority of subjects chose Programme D (78%) over
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Programme C (22%). The only difference between program A and C and between 
program B and D it is in the way the options are presented or framed (death rate or
survival rate). Thus, this pattern of choice represents a violation of the independence
\
axiom of rational choice theory. On the contrary, prospect theory successfully explains 
this anomaly as a change in the perception of the reference point. The first group 
appraises the outcomes of the decision as a gain and show a risk adverse behaviour 
(preferring ‘sure’ choice A over ‘risky’ choice B) in accordance with the concave shape 
of the value function (figure I.V). Conversely the second group appraises the outcomes of 
the decision as a loss, and shows a risk-seeking behaviour (preferring ‘risky’ choice D 
over ‘sure’ choice C) in accordance with the convex curve in the loss domain (figure I.V).
These core ideas of prospect theory—that the value function is kinked at the reference 
point and that decision-makers are loss averse—became useful to economics when Thaler 
(1980) used prospect theory to explain riskless choices. For Thaler, loss aversion 
explained a violation of consumer theory that had identified and labelled as the 
“endowment effect” (Thaler, 1980). According to this effect, the selling price for 
consumption goods exceeds the buying price, often by a factor of 2 or more. The value of 
a commodity to an individual appears to be higher when that commodity is viewed as 
something that could potentially be forsaken, and lower when the same good is evaluated 
as a potential gain (Kahneman et al., 1990; Kahneman et al., 1991).
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1.4.3 Research in Psychology and Economics on emotions and decision­
making
Several investigators have elaborated the cognitive strategies underlying judgment and 
choice through models of constructed preferences (Gilovich et al., 2002; Payne et al., 
1992; Slovic et al., 2002; Slovic et al., 2007; Slovic et al., 1977). Despite an initial 
emphasis on the cognitive mechanisms involved in decision making, recent researchers 
have acknowledged the role played by emotions in this process. One early proponent of 
the emotional modulation of decision making was Zajonc (1984), who argued that 
emotional reactions to stimuli occur automatically, guiding information processing and 
judgment (Zajonc, 1984). According to Zajonc, all perceptions contain some emotion. 
“We do not just see a house: we see a handsome house, an ugly house, or a pretentious 
house.” In the last twenty years, Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein have carried out 
extensive investigations into the role of emotional information on risk perception 
(Fischhoff et al., 1993; Loewenstein et al., 2001; Slovic et al., 2002; Slovic et al., 2007; 
Slovic et al., 1980; Slovic et al., 1981). They propose an ‘affect heuristic’ that highlights 
the importance of affect for risk perception and risk-related behaviour. They have 
reported that people's perception of the risks of hazardous technologies or activities are 
influenced by risk dimensions that have little to do with consequentialist aspects (i.e., 
possible outcomes and their probabilities). Instead risk perception is dominated by 
emotional aspects.
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An extensive analysis on emotional states and their relevance for economics has been 
carried out by George Loewestein (Loewenstein and Lemer, 2003). He proposed that 
although immediate decisions are strongly influenced by emotional, “visceral” states (e.g. 
hunger, sexual desires, pains), individuals are generally incapable of anticipating the 
magnitude of these influences when they occur in the future. This creates a significant 
problem for decision-makers who would like to maximize their utility. Nevertheless 
emotions can have a contrasting effect on subsequent decisions. For example, positive 
emotional states have been shown to improve future decision-making (Estrada et al., 
1994; Isen et al., 1988; Isen and Patrick, 1983), while on the contrary, negative emotions 
produce a narrowing of attention and a failure to search for new alternatives (Fiedler 
1988). Isen and colleagues also proposed that the anticipated pain for a loss is greater for 
people in a positive mood that for those in a negative mood; this leads to a greater risk 
aversion among those in a good mood as they strive for “mood maintenance” (Arkes et 
al., 1988; Isen et al., 1988; Isen and Patrick, 1983; Kahn and Isen, 1993). These effects 
have been shown to have a substantial impact on real financial decision-making (Moore 
and Chater, 2003). Hsee and Rottenstreich (Hsee and Rottenstreich, 2004) have recently 
shown that when people rely on emotions in the decision making process, their evaluation 
is more strongly influenced by the nature of the stimulus than by the scope of their 
decisions. This evidence posits two differentiated value-systems: “valuation by feelings” 
and “valuation by calculation”.
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1.4.4 Research in Neuroscience on emotions and decision-making
The research in neuroscience on emotion and decision-making has been strongly 
influenced by the pioneering studies conducted by Pavlov in the late 1920s on learning 
and motivation. In his most famous experiment Pavlov showed that a conditioned 
stimulus (e.g. the ringing of a bell) produces behavioural change in an animal once it is 
paired with a conditional rewarding stimulus (e.g. food) or punishment (e.g. pain) 
(Pavlov, 1927). Based on the results of his research Pavlov defined reward as an object 
able to produce changes in behaviour. This definition of reward stimuli largely overlaps 
with one of the descriptions of emotional stimuli given at the beginning of this chapter. 
The concept of Pavlovian conditioning was extended by Skinner in the 1940s to include 
instrumental conditioning in which the conditional stimulus is substituted by a 
conditional action that the animal needs to perform in order to receive the reward 
(Skinner, 1938). Three factors govern conditioning: contiguity, contingency, and 
prediction. Contiguity requires that reward follows the conditioned stimulus/action by an 
optimal interval of a few seconds. The contingency requirement postulates that a reward 
needs to occur more frequently in the presence of a stimulus compared with its absence. 
The stimulus becomes a reward predictor only if the occurrence of the conditioned 
stimulus predicts a reward with a higher incidence than when no stimulus is present. 
Finally, the importance of the notion of prediction error is derived from Kamin’s 
blocking experiment (Kamin, 1969), which postulates that if a reward is fully predictable 
it does not contribute to learning, even when it occurs in a contiguous and contingent 
manner. This idea was fully conceptualized in associative learning rules (Rescorla and
44
Wagner, 1972), according to which learning advances only to the extent to which a 
reinforcer is unpredicted and slows progressively as the reinforcer becomes more 
predictable. Formally prediction error denotes the discrepancy between a received reward 
and its prediction. All three aspects can be summarized by the Rescorla-Wagner equation: 
AV=a(P)(A,-V) in which the changes in associative value of the conditioned stimulus and 
the reward in a trial are proportional to the saliency of the stimulus (a), the contingency 
of the stimulus to the reward (p) and prediction error (A.-V) term which asymptotically 
approaches zero after several learning trials (figure I.VI).
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Figure /. VI Rescorla-Wagner learning equation
This graph represents the learning curve during conditioning (generated from the 
Rescorla-Wagner learning equation). On the x-axis is represented the increase (change 
in A V) in associative value between conditioned stimulus and the reward as function o f 
the numbers o f trials (y-axis).
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In a landmark paper, Schultz and colleagues demonstrated that midbrain dopamnergic 
neurons activity code a prediction error signal according to the Rescorla-Wagner learning 
equation (Schultz et al., 1997). The dopaminergic neurons, before a Pavlovian 
conditioning procedure, are activated by the delivery of a primary reward (e.g. food). 
After the conditioning (according to the Rescorla-Wagner learning rule) the 
dopaminergic signal is shifted from the time when the primary reward is delivered, to the 
time when the unconditioned stimulus (e.g. bell’s ring predicting a future reward) is 
presented. Most interestingly, once the animal is fully conditioned, if the experimenter 
does not deliver the reward at the time that the animal is expecting it, the dopaminergic 
neurons show a reduction in the phasic activity. This pattern of activity of dopamine 
release is fully coherent with the hypothesis that dopaminergic neurons emit a Rescorla- 
Wagner prediction error signal (A,—V) (Schultz et al., 1997). Several brain regions, 
including the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (encompassing orbital and medial prefrontal 
regions), the amygdala and the striatum, encode this dopaminergic reward signal. These 
regions are highly interconnected and together they can be considered as an integrated 
reward network (Balleine and Killcross, 2006; Hassani et al., 2001; Kringelbach, 2005; 
Liu and Richmond, 2000; Nishijo et al., 1988; Rolls, 1996; Tremblay and Schultz, 1999). 
In particular, the vental striatum is one of the core regions involved in representing the 
associative value between a stimulus/action and a reward. Electrophysiological studies in 
monkeys show that the striatum computes the value of a stimulus/action (Samejima et al., 
2005). The human ventral striatum has also been shown to have a critical role in the 
representation of an option value encoding a prediction error signal (Knutson et al., 2001;
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Knutson et al., 2005; O'Doherty, 2004; O'Doherty et al., 2002). Another recent study 
confirmed that the striatal representation of value in humans is causally dependent on the 
dopaminergic modulation (Pessiglione et al., 2006). In particular, the human striatum 
responds to the magnitude of a predicted reward (expected value) (Knutson et al., 2005; 
Tobler et al., 2007; Yacubian et al., 2006).
Another key region in reward processing is the amygdala. Anatomically, this area is 
connected with all the main structures I have previously defined as the reward network 
(the medial and orbital parts of prefrontal cortex, ACC and ventral striatum). This region 
has been proposed to encode the emotional and motivational aspects of value. Although 
research on the amygdala has often emphasized its role in the process of negative 
emotion like fear (LeDoux, 1996), research has shown that the amygdala also plays a key 
role in linking stimulus/action with the current values for both negative (aversive) and 
positive (appetitive) outcomes (Baxter and Murray, 2002; LeDoux, 1996). For example, 
monkeys with lesions in the amygdala are insensitive to changes in the value of a 
(Maikova et al., 1997). Moreover, neurons in the monkey amygdala have been shown to 
be susceptible to the affective aspect of a reinforcer. For example, neurons in the 
amygdala fire strongly in response to the sight of watermelon and, but their firing is 
sharply reduced after a piece of salted watermelon is presented (Nishijo et al., 1988; 
Nishijo et al., 1998). Notably, the activity of these neurons is consistent with a role for
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this region in mediating reinforcer-devaluation effects. These results have been also 
confirmed in humans (Gottfried et al., 2003).
What I have broadly defined as the reward network also includes a large part of prefrontal 
cortex namely the orbital and medial prefrontal cortex (OMPFC). One of the first 
associations betwe'en OMPFC and reward processing comes from a study on stimulus- 
reward reversal (Mishkin, 1964). A monkey learns that choosing one of two objects will 
lead to a reward. When the contingencies reverse the monkey must learn that to get a 
reward he now has to choose the previously unrewarded object. Monkeys with lesions of 
OFC are impaired at the task (Mishkin, 1964). Following the reversal, they were unable 
to inhibit responding to the previously rewarded object, a behavior called perseveration. 
This impairment strongly resembles the impoverishment in decision-making shown by 
subjects with damage to OMPFC when tested on the Iowa gambling task (Bechara et al., 
1997; Bechara et al., 2005; Bechara et al., 2000; Bechara and Van Der Linden, 2005).
In the Iowa gambling task subjects are asked to extract one card at time from one of four 
decks of cards: two of the four decks produce large gains but also large losses (high risk 
decks), while the other two decks lead smaller gains but also smaller losses (low risk 
decks). After a certain number of trials, healthy volunteers will start to prefer the low risk 
decks, realising that the high risk decks leads to higher losses in the long run. Patients 
with OMPFC lesion persevere in preferring the high risk decks (Bechara et al., 1997; 
Bechara et al., 2005). Interestingly, when healthy subjects choose the high risk decks,
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they show an increase in autonomic emotional response, revealed by the increase in the 
skin conductance response (SCR). This SCR response is totally abolished in OMPFC 
patients. Damasio and colleagues explain this and other experimental evidence with the 
so-called somatic-marker hypothesis (Bechara et al., 2005) (briefly presented in the 
paragraph 1.1.3 of this chapter). But the somatic marker hypothesis is not the only 
explanation of these results. A recent study challenged this interpretation, proposing that 
the deficits on the gambling task might have arisen from the problems that OFC patients 
have in reversing stimulus-reward association (Fellows and Farah, 2005).
Experimental evidence shows that OMPFC is crucially involved in reward processing 
(Dolan, 2002; Kringelbach, 2005; O'Doherty, 2004; Rolls, 1996); however, it is still 
debated which aspect of reward is encoded by OMPFC. There are at least two aspects of 
reward: the incentive aspect (wanting) and the hedonic aspect (liking) (Robinson and 
Berridge, 1993). It has been proposed that where the dopaminegic striatal signals have a 
role in motivational aspects of reward, that OMPFC has a more flexible role in linking 
the reward to the hedonic experience (Kringelbach, 2005). For example, simple action- 
reward association does not seems to require OMPFC; animals with bilateral OFC 
removal can still be motivated to work for a reward (Izquierdo et al., 2004; Pears et al., 
2003), and can make Pavlovian associations (Pickens et al., 2003). However, in more 
complex decisions is necessary to compare different aspects of a decision by integrating 
different sensory dimensions of a reward in order to determine the option value.
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Anatomically, the OMPFC is ideal for the multimodal integration of the parameters 
necessary to evaluate an outcome, since it receives inputs from all sensory (Kringelbach, 
2005). Indeed, patients with OFC damage have difficulty integrating multiple attributes 
pertaining to a decision (Fellows and Farah, 2005). More generally, the fact that the 
OMPFC uses different sources of information seems to play a critical role in computing a 
common value currency (Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006; Tremblay and Schultz, 
1999).
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Chapter 2
Methodology
This chapter reviews the methodologies used in the experiments described in the 
experimental sections.
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2.1 Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) -  
Part I: Physics principles
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) measures an haemodynamic response to 
index neural activity in the brain. fMRI is based on the principle that more active neurons 
increase the consumption of oxygen carried by haemoglobin in red blood cells from local 
capillaries. The local response to this oxygen utilisation is an increase in blood flow to 
regions of increased neural activity leading to local changes in the relative concentration 
of oxyhemoglobin and deoxyhemoglobin. The magnetic resonance (MR) signal of blood 
changes as a function of the level of oxygenation is the basis blood-oxygen-level 
dependent (BOLD) contrast (for a full review see (Logothetis, 2002)).
2.1.1 Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI): basic principles
2.1.1.1 Spin and radiofrequency pulse
Nuclei with an odd total number of protons and neutrons, such as the hydrogen (!H) 
nuclei in the water, posses a magnetic property called spin, which refers to the rotation of 
the nucleus along its axes. In the MRI the subject’s brain is immersed in a strong static 
magnetic field (Bo) that induce the *H nuclei in the brain tissue to align to the direction of 
the magnetic field. Such alignment is however not perfect, and the axis of spin will 
precess around the direction of the magnetic field at a frequency, called Lamor frequency,
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determined by the strength of the static magnetic field and the type of nucleus in 
question.
Quantum mechanics states that a spin can have different energies depending on the 
orientation of its magnetic moment with respect to the applied magnetic field: when the 
magnetic moment is aligned with the field, its energy will be lower than when it opposes 
the field. For the simple spin system of 'H, the magnetic moment can have two 
orientations with respect the magnetic field, either against it (high energy state) or with it 
(low, ground energy state). The amount of energy required to flip orientations is so small 
that the normal thermal energy available at room temperature is enough to flip spins. 
Spins can be excited from the ground to the high energy state by applying an oscillating 
radiofrequency electromagnetic field (Bi) perpendicular to the main magnetic field (Bo, 
applied in the z plane). To achieve the most efficient transfer of energy, the oscillation 
frequency of the Bi field should be the same as the spin resonance (Larmor) frequency 
(e.g. 63.9 MHz for a proton in a 1.5 Tesla field). When a radiofrequency (RF) pulse 
matches wit the Lamor frequency applied to the nuclei, the axis of spin of the nuclei 
deviates from the static position. The degree to which the axis of spin deviates is also 
called the flip  angle, which can be controlled by varying the strength, and duration, of the 
RF pulse. Thus, when the flip angle is set at 90 degrees, as in all fMRI experiments 
described in this thesis, the RF pulses causes the axis of the spinning nuclei to change 
from the direction of the magnetic field to a perpendicular direction (90 degree rotation).
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It is this transverse component that gives rise to a detectable NMR signal. Following the 
above example, when the Bi field is turned off after this 90° pulse (produced by the RF 
pulse), the magnetisation vector will rotate about Bo in the xy plane with the spin 
resonance frequency.
Figure I  1.1 Magnetic Spin
The first diagram represents the two possible states o f a proton (H) immersed in a 
magnetic field; respectively either parallel (spin V2) or anti-parallel (spin -Z2). The 
second diagram represents how a spinning nucleus (H) becomes perpendicular to the 
direction o f the magnetic field (90 degree rotation) as a result o f the RF pulse.
This is observable because the oscillating magnetic field induces a voltage in a coil
positioned in the xy plane (Faraday’s Law). MRI systems are designed to measure the
transverse magnetisation, so the receiver coils, which may be the same as those used to
apply the RF pulses, are sensitive only to the transverse component. The initial amplitude
of the detected RF signal is proportional to the number of protons in the sample (the
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proton density). The greater the proton density, the greater the magnetisation hence the 
greater the signal detected by the RF coils.
2.1.1.2 Relaxation
Since the RF pulse is only transient, the orientation of the axis of spin will eventually 
resume to the direction of the static magnetic field. The rate at which the axis of spin 
resumes to the original position reflects the rate at which the nuclei losses their energy 
gained from the RF pulse. There are two ways by which the nuclei can lose their energy 
gained from the pulse: the first is giving it off to neighbouring molecules (spin-lattice 
relaxation); the second is by giving energy off to neighbouring spinning nuclei and thus 
desynchronising them (spin-spin relaxation).
T1 relaxation:
For a given medium, the rate of spin-lattice relaxation is determined by a constant called 
T l. Protons that have been excited to the higher energy state dissipate this energy to 
molecules of the surrounding structure (‘lattice’) as heat. Tl differs for different 
materials, because different molecules have different mobilities and thus different rates of 
taking away energy from the exited spinning nuclei. For example, the protons in water 
have a longer Tl than those in fat because the carbon bonds in fat resonate near the 
Larmor frequency, which facilitates the transfer of energy to the lattice. In the human 
brain, the different water content of grey and white matter (71% and 84%, respectively)
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means that Tl contrast can be used to provide contrast between these two tissues. This is 
indeed the basis for structural MRI imaging.
T2 relaxation:
In a perfectly uniform magnetic field the T2 relaxation or spin-spin relaxation describes 
the disappearance of coherence of the magnetic moment in the xy plane. The term spin- 
spin refers to the fact that interactions between protons determine the rate of T2 
relaxation. No energy is actually lost; rather, energy is exchanged between protons, and 
there is a loss of “order” or increase of entropy. As neighbouring spins pass energy from 
one to another, their rotations become desynchronised.
Although, a perfectly uniform magnetic field cannot be produced, T2 dephasing will still 
occur. The inhomogeneity of the magnetic fields affects the T2 relaxation. The combined 
effect of true T2 and the magnetic field inhomogeneity is called ‘apparent’ T2 relaxation 
or shortly T2*. Since the BOLD signal measured in fMRI depends on T2* constant in a 
certain medium, which in turns depend on the homogeneity of the local magnetic field, an 
increase in the ratio of oxyhaemoglobin to deoxyhaemoglobin, following change in 
neural activity, is reflected by an increase in the BOLD signal.
2.1.1.3 Frequency and phase encoding
Placing a sample within a homogenous B0 field will not produce tomographic MR images 
for the simple reason that all protons will experience (roughly) the same magnetic field 
and, hence, the frequencies of their emitted signal will all be identical. In MRI, a second
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magnetic field (called a gradient field) is applied so that protons within the sample will 
emit different frequency signals that are dependent on their spatial position. In other 
words, as the magnetic field varies across the object, the resonance frequencies of spins 
(their Larmor frequencies) also vary. The spins’ resonance frequencies are, therefore, 
determined by their location along the gradient axis. The number of spins resonating at a 
particular frequency determines the amplitude of that frequency in the spectrum of 
observable resonance frequencies. For each frequency component of the measured signal, 
the known value of the applied gradient strength and direction can be used to calculate 
the position from which the signal came.
Combining a frequency gradient with a pulse of the appropriate frequency and bandwidth 
can excite a small slice of the sample, allowing a slice by slice investigation of the 
sample. If the signal is acquired immediately after slice selection, its spectrum would be a 
one-dimensional projection of spin density for the spins in the selected slice. To produce 
a two-dimensional image of spin densities in the sample, encoding along a second axis is 
required. Thus, along the first axis locations are encoded by frequencies while locations 
along the second axis are encoded by phase. Location-dependent phase is achieved by 
temporarily switching on a linear gradient along the second axis. During gradient 
application, local magnetisation vectors will rotate with different frequencies depending 
on their positions within the gradient. These spins will possess different histories, 
reflected in phase differences among their magnetisation vectors dependent on their
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positions along this second axis. The duration of the applied phase encoding gradient 
dictates the degree to which local transverse magnetisations are dephased. A series of 
increasing gradient pulse lengths will enable a reconstruction of the frequencies giving 
rise to the dephasing of transverse magnetisation. Hence, despite the fact that phase is 
being manipulated in the second axis, the amplitudes of spin frequencies are again 
determined and expressed as a spin density projection along the phase encoding axis.
2.1.1.4 Voxels
Step-wise increases in both gradients divide the sample into small cubes, or voxels 
(volume-elements). Spins in one voxel experience the same frequency and phase 
encoding. The signal of a given voxel is the sum of all spin contributions. Hence spins 
within a voxel cannot be distinguished from each other. The resolution of the image 
depends on the size of the voxels, which is determined by the step size of the gradients. 
Increasing the size of the voxel increases its signal and therefore its signal to noise. 
However, larger voxels are more likely to encompass groups of spins with very different 
behaviour, which could evoke a misleading signal (referred to as the partial volume 
effect). The fMRI experiments described in this thesis have resolution of 3x3x3 
voxels/mm
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2.1.1.5 Image contrast
Image contrast is based on the difference in signal intensity between areas of different 
structure or composition in an image. The MR signal intensity from a given voxel arises 
from a complex interaction of many different factors including Tl and T2 relaxation 
times, proton density, RF pulse characteristics and magnetic susceptibility (magnetic 
susceptibility refers to the fact that the net field experienced by a given nucleus depends 
on other magnetic spins or electron clouds in their environments). The relative 
contribution of some of these factors to the transverse magnetisation may be manipulated 
by controlling the timing of the RF pulses (known as pulse sequence parameters). The 
timing parameters are the repetition time (TR; the time required to acquire each image 
volume, i.e. the time between two consecutive 90° RF pulses) and echo time (the time 
between the initial 90° RF pulse and 180° pulse along an axis in the xy plane). A short TR 
and TE will emphasise the Tl characteristics of the tissue and produce a “Tl weighted” 
image. A long TR and TE produce a “T2 weighted image”. Since the data sampling rates 
depends on the TR, it is desirable to have a short TR rather than a long one. However, 
because the TR depends upon the strength of the scanner and from other basic imaging 
parameters of a chosen sequence, the only way to reduce the TR is to reduce the number 
of slices acquired in a single EPI image. For a more extensive review see Liang and 
Lauterbur (2000).
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2.1.2 functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI): basic principles
2.1.2.1 BOLD contrast in fMRI
The BOLD (Blood Oxygenation Level Dependent) effect was observed initially in 
animal based experiments (Ogawa et al., 1990a; Ogawa et al., 1990b). As described it is 
based of the bloods magnetic properties varying as a function of its oxygenation level. In 
fact the cellular component of blood contains red blood cells (erythrocytes), which 
contain haemoglobin, the protein responsible for oxygen transport. Oxygen binds to iron, 
a constituent of the haem component of haemoglobin. When haemoglobin has no oxygen 
bound, each haem group has a net magnetic moment because of iron’s 4 unpaired 
electrons (Pauling and Coryell, 1936). As soon as oxygen is bound, this net moment 
disappears due to a redistribution of the available electrons between iron and oxygen. The 
magnetic state of blood therefore reflects its level of oxygenation.
The T2* of water protons is influenced by interactions between the protons themselves 
and also by local Bo inhomogeneities caused by different magnetic properties of various 
molecules. Paramagnetic molecules, such as deoxyhaemoglobin, have a local magnetic 
field gradient. This local gradient will contribute to the decay of transverse magnetisation 
and consequently shorten the T2* decay time. Hence, changes in the level of 
deoxyhaemoglobin (more precisely, changes in the ratio of deoxyhaemoglobin to 
oxyhaemoglobin) should result in changes in T2*.
2.1.2.2 Neurophysiology of the BOLD signal
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It has been known for over 100 years (Roy and Sherrington, 1890) that changes in blood 
flow and blood oxygenation in the brain (collectively known as hemodynamics) are 
closely linked to neural activity. However, the precise relationship between neural signals 
and BOLD is still incompletely understood and remains under active research. It has been 
suggested that the intensity of the BOLD signal in human MTYV5, a visual area sensitive 
to motion, correlates linearly with the firing rates of neurons in the monkey’s homologue 
of the same area (Rees et al. 2000). By conducting simultaneous recording in the same 
monkey area in the MR scanner, Logothesis and colleagues (2001) demonstrated that the 
intensity of the BOLD signal correlates with both local field potential and the associated 
firing rates. However, it seems to be the case that the BOLD signal correlates better with 
the intensity of local field potential (LFP’s) than neuronal firing rates (Logothetis et al., 
2001). Although an exact and straightforward physiological interpretation of the BOLD 
signal is not possible, it is still possible to compare the BOLD signals associated with 
different experimental conditions. Given that the BOLD signal is likely to have a positive 
relationship with both synaptic activity, and action potentials, we can still interpreter the 
BOLD signal as increased activation in that area for that specific experimental condition. 
It is however important to be cautious due to the fact that that such a concept of 
activation does not distinguish between whether synaptic activity is inhibitory or 
excitatory.
The time course of the BOLD signal following transient neural activity in a local area
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has important implications for the interpretation and design of experiments. After 
transiently evoked neural activity, the BOLD signal typically takes 1-2 seconds to start 
deviating significantly from baseline, reaches a peak at 5-6 seconds, and returns back to 
baseline by 12-15 seconds with a small undershoot before returning to the initial state 
(Malonek and Grinvald, 1996) and figures. This entire temporal profile is called the 
haemodynamic response.
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Figure II. II Haemodynamic function
This graph represents the temporal evolution o f the blood release at capillary level that 
follows the neural action potential (the basis o f the BOLD signal). On the y  axis is 
plotted the haemodynamic response function (hrf) and on the x axis is plotted the time in 
seconds. As evident from this graph the haemodynamic change (hrf) is not instantaneous 
but peaks several seconds after the time o f the neural action potential.
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There is evidence that the profile of the haemodynamic response shows some variability 
between subjects (Aguirre et al., 1998) and between different areas. These variabilities 
pose important limitation in making temporal comparisons between activation in different 
brain areas (Moonen and Bandettini, 1999). Also, when two transient neural activations 
are too close in time, the intensity of haemodynamic responses may not add up linearly 
(Glover, 1999), making the interpretation of the BOLD activity difficult. Therefore, the 
trials in all fMRI experiments described in this thesis are placed at least 4 sec apart. The 
length of each trial in seconds is also always different from the TR and from any multiple 
of the TR in order in order to avoid a poor sampling of the haemodynamic response 
(Frackowiak, 2004).
Although the temporal resolution (seconds) of the BOLD signal in fMRI is somehow 
limited compared with other imaging techniques like EEG or MEG (milliseconds), it has 
reasonably good spatial resolution. The images acquired in the experiments described in 
this thesis have a spatial resolution in voxel (i.e, the smallest unit in a 3D image space) 
of 3 x 3 cubic mm. However, the spatial resolution of fMRI cannot be so easily quantified 
because there are a number of factors limiting the spatial resolution, rendering the actual 
resolution substantially lower than the voxel size. First, because the BOLD signal is only 
an indirect measure of local neural activity, is difficult to determine how close the change 
in oxyhaemoglobin/deoxyhaemoglobin ratio happens with respect to where neural 
activity occur (Matthews et al., 1999). Second, in a group analysis one also has to
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consider variability in individual anatomy. Third, the functional images acquired are 
usually deliberately smoothed (as explained in the next session), thus reducing the spatial 
specificity. Finally, there may also be artefactual spatial distortions to the images 
acquired, the correction of which is not always straightforward (as explained in the next 
session). However despite these considerations, it has been shown that fMRI can yield 
results that are clearly suitable for analysis of a systems level neuroanatomy. For example 
it has been shown that BOLD signal can be used to reveal information as spatially fine­
grained as retinotopic organization in the visual cortex (Engel et al., 1997).Also in terms 
its spatial specificity, fMRI is the best method for whole brain imaging, as compared with 
other neuroimaging techniques (e.g. EEG, MEG or PET) and it is therefore the method of 
choice for neuroanatomy studies.
2.2 Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) -  
Part II: Statistical analysis
Functional neuroimaging techniques provide a means for making inferences about 
differences in regional brain activity between different conditions or states. To localise a 
function to a specific anatomical region it is critical that the experimental design allow 
one to unambiguously consider only the effect of the appropriate cognitive manipulation. 
In the fMRI studies presented in this thesis the identification of functionally specialised 
brain was achieved using statistical parametric mapping (SPM) (Frackowiak, 2004). 
Statistical parametric mapping is a voxel-based approach, employing classical inference,
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to make some comment about regionally specific responses to experimental factors. In 
order to assign an observed response to a particular brain structure, or cortical area, the 
data must conform to a known anatomical space. Before considering statistical modeling, 
this chapter will briefly describe how a time-series of images are realigned and mapped 
into a standard anatomical space (e.g. a stereotactic space). The general ideas behind 
statistical parametric mapping are then described and illustrated with attention to the sorts 
of inferences that can be made with different experimental designs.
2.2.1 Pre-processing
The imaging time series is first realigned to a common reference frame to correct for 
subject movement during scanning. After realignment the data are transformed using 
linear and nonlinear mappings into a standard anatomical space (Friston et al., 1995a). 
This normalisation procedure allows averaging data across subjects and permits data 
reporting within a standardised reference co-ordinate system.
2.2.1.1 Spatial and temporal realignment
Head motion during fMRI can give rise to artefactual change in signal intensity. Despite 
subjects being firmly immobilised with soft head pads, even the best subjects show 
movement up to a millimetre or so. Realignment removes variance from a time series 
which would otherwise be attributable to error (hence decreased sensitivity) or to evoked 
effects i.e. if movement is correlated with the cognitive task. In order to realign for all the 
images there is an estimation of 6 parameters of the affine ‘rigid body’ transformation
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that minimises the [sum of squared] differences between each successive scan and the 
first. In three dimensions, a rigid body transformation can be defined by 6 parameters, 
typically three translations and three rotations about orthogonal axes. Using the first 
volume in an in an EPI series as a reference image all other images are spatially moved 
and/or rotated (adjusting the 6 parameters) until the difference is minimised.
In addition, it is necessary to perform a temporal realignment because multi-slice 
acquisitions, different slices will be acquired at slightly different times (Henson et al. 
1999). In fMRI analysis, stimulus onset times are specified in scans, hence posing the 
problem for event-related fMRI studies (see later) that certain slices will be more 
sensitive to a particular model of haemodynamic responses. Temporal realignment 
ensures that the data from all slices within a given volume correspond to the same time 
point.
2.2.1.2 Spatial normalization
Spatial normalization is needed because the group analysis of brain imaging data 
typically takes a voxel-based approach as in the analysis of the data of individual 
subjects. For this reason it is necessary to ensure that the same coordinate is referring to 
the same brain area in different subjects. This is normally achieved by geometrically 
distorting the brains’ images of individual subjects into a standard shape, and this 
procedure is known as spatial normalization (Friston et al., 1995). Early normalization
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methods applied linear spatial transformation, which means for a given geometric plane, 
the subject’s brain image is only starched evenly to mach the standard shape. However, 
nonlinear spatial transformation can be applied in addition to linear transformation in 
order to improve the normalization procedure (Ashbumer and Friston, 1999), and it is 
applied to the pre-processing of all data described in this thesis. In this procedure the 
structural standard brain structure produced by Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) is 
used as template. This template conforms to the geometric space and coordinate system 
of Talariach and Toumoux (1998) (Nowinski and Belov, 2003), such that x  refers to the 
laterality of the location (positive is right), y  refers to the anterior-posterior dimension 
(positive is anterior), and z refers to the dorsal-ventral dimension (positive is dorsal) and 
the origin (i.e. coordinate [0, 0, 0]) refers to the anterior commissure (AC), using 
millimetre (mm) as unit. Using a Bayesian framework is possible to estimate the 
parameters where one wants to find the deformation that is most likely given the data. 
The deformation is updated iteratively to minimise the sum of squared differences 
between the template and the deformed image and reflects the probability of actually 
getting that image if the transformation was correct. Prior information about the 
likelihood of a given transformation is incorporated by weighting the least squares 
(Ashbumer et al., 1997).
2.2.1.3 Spatial smoothing
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After normalisation, the fMRI data are smoothed by applying a Gaussian kernel (point 
spread function), of known width, to each voxel. The motivations for smoothing are:
1. Smoothing the data render them more parametric in their distribution and ensures the 
validity of parametric statistical tests.
2. Smooth data is one of the assumptions of Gaussian Field Theory (see later).
3. In order to average across subjects it is necessary to smooth so that regional effects 
are expressed at a spatial scale where homologies in functional anatomy exist over 
subjects.
4. The matched filter theorem states that the optimum smoothing kernel corresponds to 
the size of the effect anticipated.
All experiments described in this thesis are smoothed with a kernel of 8 mm.
2.2.2 General linear model (GLM)
The statistical tools used in brain imaging data analysis primarily apply the general linear 
model (GLM), which is the standard model for multiple regression. The statistical 
analysis of evoked haemodynamc responses tests for experimentally-induced effects at 
each intracerebral voxel individually and simultaneously. The time series data for each 
voxel is treated as independent, and the same regression model is applied to each voxel.
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This approach is called a mass-univariate approach. The regression model is often called 
the design matrix a two dimensional array of numbers based on the experimental design.
2.2.1.3 Parameters estimation using the GLM
The regression process is also called parameter estimation. Commonly used parametric 
models, such as linear regression, t-tests and analysis of variance (ANOVA) are special 
cases of the general linear model. This model explains variation in the data, Y, in terms of 
a linear combination of the explanatory variables (x), plus an error term:
Yj  = X / i p i  + . . .  + X / / P /  + . . .  + Xji$L + 8 j .
The Pi are unknown parameters, corresponding to each of the L explanatory variables for 
the yth observation of Y. The errors e are assumed to be identically and normally 
distributed.
For/observations of Y, the general linear model can be expressed in matrix formulation: 
Y = Xp + e
for the column vector of observations Y, the column vector of error terms e and the 
column vector of parameters p; p = [Pi . . . Pj . . . pj]T. Matrix X, of size J  x L, is the
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design matrix. This matrix has one row per observation and one column per model 
parameter. The number of parameters L is (usually) less than the number of observations 
J  hence the simultaneous equations implied by the general linear model (obtained by 
expanding the matrix formulation with 8=0) cannot be solved (it is overdetermined). 
Therefore, some method is required for estimating parameters that “best fit” the data. The 
common method adopted is that of least squares.
Each column in the design matrix (X) corresponds to some effect that one has built into 
the experiment, such as the alternating ‘boxcar’ function modelling alternating activation 
and control epochs in the experiment presented in chapter 3, or effects that may confound 
the results. The latter include a series of terms that are designed to remove, or model, 
low-frequency variations in signal due to artifacts such as aliased biorhythms or scanner 
drift. The relative contribution of each of these columns to the experimental variance (i.e. 
the parameter estimate for each column) is assessed using generalised least squares 
estimators.
Inferences about the parameter estimates are made using their estimated variances. This 
allows for two types of statistical test. One can test the null hypothesis that all the 
estimates are zero using the F  statistic to give a SPM [F] or, alternatively, that some 
particular linear combination or “contrast” (e.g. a subtraction) of the estimates is zero 
using a SPM [7]. The T statistic is calculated by dividing the contrast (specified by 
contrast weights) of parameter estimates by the standard error of that contrast. This error
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term is estimated using the variance of the residuals about the least squares fit. An 
example of contrast weights could be [1 -1 0 0 ...] to compare the differential responses 
evoked by two conditions that have been modelled by the first two condition-specific 
regressors (columns) in the design matrix.
As stated above, an important assumption in the analysis of time-series is that the 
residuals are identically and normally distributed. However, the haemodynamic response 
is of longer duration than the typical scan acquisition time, which leads to serial 
correlations among the error terms. The general linear model accounts for these 
autocorrelations by imposing a known temporal smoothing function on the time-series 
and adjusting the estimators and degrees of freedom accordingly (Worsley and Friston, 
1995).
2.2.1.4 Choice of haemodynamic response function (HRF)
To take account of the latency of the hemodynamic response in the statistical analysis the 
regressors are convolved with a certain mathematical function to create the desired 
predicted temporal profile of the induced heamodynamic response. That mathematical 
function is called haemodynamic response function (HRF'). The most commonly used 
HRF is a canonical HRF (Friston et al., 1998), which mathematically is a linear 
combination of two gamma functions. This function captures our current knowledge of
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what the real HFR in the brain looks like, which has a bump-like shape that peaks at 
about 5-6 seconds after onset. When the vector containing the information about the 
temporal profile of the presentation of trials of a certain task condition is convolved with 
HRF function, graphically the bump-like shape are being inserted at the points where a 
trial is presented. (Figure I.II)
The canonical HRF it is used because it is assumed that our knowledge of the actual HRF 
is reasonably precise. In order to accommodate slight violations of the assumption that 
the actual HRF takes exactly the same form of the canonical HRF, non-linear derivatives 
of the canonical HRF can be included in the regression model. The two commonly used 
additional HRFs are the temporal derivatives and the dispersion derivatives of the 
canonical HRF (Friston et al., 1998). A further more flexible approach to model the 
actual HRF is to employ Fourier sets (Henson et al., 2002; Henson et al., 2001). A 
Fourier set is a collection of harmonic functions (i.e. sines and cosines). Given sufficient 
order (or size of the set), it can model any continuous curve. The advantage of the Fourier 
set is that does not make any strong assumption about the shape of the actual HRF. 
However, the disadvantages of the use the Fourier set is that there is no single regressor 
that stands out as the representative vector for a certain task condition. As explained in 
the follow sections, this complicates the statistical analysis at the group level. All the 
experiments described in this thesis use the canonical HRF to convolve the statistical 
regressors.
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2.2.1.5 Event related design
Event-related fMRI can be defined as the use of fMRI to detect transient haemodynamic 
responses to brief stimuli or tasks (Friston et al., 1998). Event-related, or trial-based 
measurement is already standard in electrophysiology, namely stimulus-locked event- 
related potentials (ERP’s). Previous functional imaging methods, such as PET, have 
limited temporal resolution necessitating measurement of prolonged states of brain 
activity. Such state-based designs were initially adopted in fMRI and referred to as 
epoch-related designs, the first experiment presented in this thesis being an example. 
Improvements in sensitivity and temporal resolution of fMRI have allowed an event- 
related approach. The event-related approach offers several advantages (Josephs, 1999).
1. The order of trials can be randomised hence the response to a trial is neither 
confounded by a subject’s cognitive set nor systematically influenced by previous 
trials (Josephs, 1999).
2. Individual trials can be categorised or parameterised post-hoc according to a subject’s 
performance.
3. Some experiments involve events that cannot be blocked, such as ‘oddball’ paradigms 
where the event of interest is a stimulus that violates the prevailing context.
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4. Some events can occur unpredictably and can only be indicated by the subject (such 
as the spontaneous perceptual transitions measured by Portas and collegues (Portas, 
2000).
5. Event-related fMRI allows more direct comparison with other techniques such as 
ERP or psychophysics.
6. Extensions to epoch-related designs. A state can be modelled, to first order, as a 
continuous train of events, each representing one trial within an epoch. This method 
also enables stimulus or response parameters to be modelled within an epoch. For 
example, the experiment presented in the chapter seven of this thesis was epoch- 
based, but analysed in an event-related manner to enable selling and buying trials to 
be modelled separately, and trial-by-trial within-epoch performance to be modelled 
parametrically.
In analysing event-related data, the explanatory variables are created by convolving a set 
of delta functions, indicating the onset times of a particular event, with a small set of 
basis functions that model the haemodynamic responses to those events (Josephs, 1999). 
All fMRI studies presented in this thesis are based on an event related design.
2.2.1.6 Inferences about subjects and populations: Random vs. Fixed effects analyses
The statistical inference drawn from fMRI time series may be of two types. Firstly, the 
results may be specific to the particular subject at the time of scanning. This fixed effects
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inference is drawn from the effect size relative to the within subject variability. Highly 
significant results typically obtain from a fixed effects analysis because the degrees of 
freedom are high as they pertain to the number of scans across all subjects. The effect 
size is averaged across subjects hence six subjects are normally included in these analyses 
to provide a representative mean across subjects. However, the limitation of this type of 
analysis is that an effect size may be primarily driven by a few subjects. To overcome this 
one could perform a conjunction analysis across the six subjects which tests for regions 
commonly activated by a particular condition in all subjects. In essence, the fixed effects 
analysis is an extension of a case report, commonly used in clinical studies and animal 
lesion experiments, where an effect is observed in a particular subject and then this effect 
is replicated in further subjects.
Random effects analyses allow inferences to be made about the population from which 
the sample of subjects was drawn. One observation per subject per condition is entered 
into a random effects analysis (usually a contrast of parameter estimates from a 1st level 
analysis). Hence the effect size is compared against the between subject variability in 
these contrasts. This type of analysis is, therefore, protected against the risk of being 
biased by strong effects in a subset of subjects. It follows that more subjects are required 
to achieve a significant result with random effects analyses, as the degrees of freedom 
depend on the number of subjects scanned, a suitable minimum number of subjects being 
12. A random effects analysis was the default analysis for data presented in this thesis.
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Random effects analyses are typically a one-sample t-test testing whether the estimated 
effect size (i.e. contrast) is significantly greater than zero across all subjects. In an fMRI 
experiment it is, however, unlikely that there is only one effect of interest. Take for 
example a 2x2 factorial design. Using one-sample t-tests to draw second level inferences 
would mean running separate analyses for each main effect and the interaction. An 
alternative is to conduct a repeated measures ANOVA, entering one observation for each 
of the four cells of the 2x2 design for each subject. It should, however, be noted that if 
more than one condition is entered into the second level analysis, an assumption of 
sphericity (e.g. homogeneity of co-variance) must be made. This assumes that the 
between subject, within-condition, variability is at the same level for each contrast 
observation (e.g. cell in the 2x2 factorial design).
2.2.1.6 Problem of multiple comparisons
The problem of multiple comparisons arises when we try to reject the null hypothesis by 
making more than one statistical test. In the mass-univariate approach implemented in 
SPM (described previously in this thesis) we test the significance of each voxel as if 
independent. If we threshold each individual voxel at an alpha value of 0.005 (i.e. we 
accept a voxel as significantly if the p-value of that voxel is smaller than 0.005) there is a 
greater than 0.005 chance that we would produce a false positive by mistakenly accepting 
that some voxel(s) in the brain are activated. The chance of false positive increase the 
more voxels we test, since in a brain imaging experiments we typical tests tens or
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hundreds of thousands of voxels in each comparison. Hence, correcting for false positives 
is critical. To make sure that we have a reasonably family-wise alpha level, it is 
necessary to have a much more conservative voxel-level alpha value.
One formal and classical approach to the problem of multiple comparison is to apply 
Bonferroni correction (Dunn, 1961), which is a way of formally determining the voxel- 
level alpha value based on a desired family-wise alpha value. However, this approach can 
be too conservative unless one has an extremely good statistical power. An alternative 
approach is based on Gaussian random field theory (Worsley et al., 1996). Since brain 
images are typically spatially smoothed by the time they are entered into statistical 
analysis, it is possible to conceptualize the objects of statistical testes as smoothed 
clusters of voxels (called resells) instead of individual voxels. Since the problem of 
multiple comparisons is only severe when there are many statistical tests performed, by 
adopting this conceptualisation we lower the severity of the problem as there are always 
less resells than voxels in any smoothed image. Therefore, a correction based on the 
Gaussian random field theory typically gives a higher voxel-wise alpha value compared 
with the Bonferroni correction, depending on the smoothness of the images.
Although less conservative than the Bonferroni correction using the Gaussian random 
field theory, it is very likely to produce false negative and does not take in account any a 
priori anatomical and functional hypothesis on the a specific brain area. Another way of
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dealing with the multiple comparison problem that take in account a priori information is 
called small volume correction (SVC). The role of family-wise correction is to ensure 
there is a reasonably small chance of mistakenly rejecting the null hypothesis that no 
voxel/resel in the whole brain is activated in a certain comparison. This null hypothesis, 
however, is rarely of interest to the researcher, unless the analysis performed is 
exploratory. Instead, in most comparisons performed in the experiments described in this 
thesis, there is a clear anatomical a priori hypothesis to test. Focusing on a few key 
regions of the brain dramatically reduces the problem of multiple comparisons. The 
requirement is that is necessary to define the region before the comparison is tested. This 
requirement is addressed by using results based on previous studies or from independent 
(i.e. orthogonal) statistical contrasst in the same experiment. SVC is normally based on 
Gaussian random field theory.
2.2 Drug experiments
2.2.1 Double blind design
Double-blind designs provides an especially stringent way of conducting an experiment, 
usually on human subjects, in an attempt to eliminate subjective bias on the part of both 
experimental subjects and experimenters. In most cases, double-blind experiments are 
held to achieve a higher standard of scientific rigour. In a double-blind experiment, 
neither the individuals nor the researchers know who belongs to the control and the 
experimental group. Only after all the data are recorded (and in some cases, analyzed) do 
the researchers learn which individuals are which. Performing an experiment in double­
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blind fashion is a way to lessen the influence of the prejudices and unintentional physical 
cues on the results (the placebo effect, observer bias, and experimenter's bias). Random 
assignment of the subject to the experimental or control group is a critical part of double­
blind research design. The key that identifies the subjects and which group they belonged 
to is kept by a third party and not given to the researchers until the study is over. Double­
blind methods can be applied to any experimental situation where there is the possibility 
that the results will be affected by conscious or unconscious bias on the part of the 
experimenter. Double blinding is relatively easy to achieve in drug studies, by 
formulating the investigational drug and the control (either a placebo or an established 
drug) to have identical appearance (colour, taste, etc.). Patients are randomly assigned to 
the control or experimental group and given random numbers by a study coordinator, 
who also encodes the drugs with matching random numbers. Neither the patients nor the 
researchers monitoring the outcome know which patient is receiving which treatment, 
until the study is over and the random code is broken. Effective blinding can be difficult 
to achieve where the treatment is notably effective (indeed, studies have been suspended 
in cases where the tested drug combinations were so effective that it was deemed 
unethical to continue withholding the findings from the control group, and the general 
population), or where the treatment is very distinctive in taste or has unusual side-effects 
that allow the researcher and/or the subject to guess which group they were assigned to 
(Hoffer, 1967).None of these situations applies to the drug experiments described in this 
chapter four of this thesis.
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Chapter 3
Enhanced processing of emotional 
information under limited attentional
resources____________________________
The experiment described in this chapter employs fMRI and a modified version of an
attentional blink paradigm to investigate neural mechanisms involved in the increased
processing of emotional information (i.e. threatening targets) under conditions of limited
attentional resources.
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3.1 Introduction
Humans share with other animals a striking ability to detect a threatening stimulus. This 
capacity confers adaptive advantages, allowing organisms to commit attentional 
resources to goal-directed behaviour, whilst retaining an ability to respond quickly to 
potential harm. Several researchers have proposed that the emotional significance of 
stimuli are evaluated pre-attentively (Dolan, 2002; Palermo and Rhodes, 2007; 
Vuilleumier, 2005; Vuilleumier and Pourtois, 2007). Stimuli tagged with emotional 
significance are then prioritized for access to selective attentional mechanisms that 
operate within a limited-capacity system. Presumably, the brain has been designed by 
evolution to direct more cognitive processing toward those aspects of the world that are 
have survival importance. But what defines or determines “importance”? Emotional 
significance is a prime marker of importance to the organism.
Although cognitive neuoroscience has often been criticized for ignoring emotional 
relevance while pursuing an information-processing model of the mind, the notion that 
the emotional meaning of a stimulus can influence selective attention is not new. For 
example, research in the 1950s first described the phenomenon in which a person’s own 
name can capture attention, even when embedded in a stream of information that is 
otherwise effectively ignored (Moray, 1959). Although mainly known for its contribution 
to the debate about early- versus late-selection theories of attention, the own name effect 
could be considered as early evidence for the role of personal meaning, and indeed
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emotion, in guiding attention. Although less dramatic than the sound of a scream or the 
sight of a bloody murder, the sound of one’s own name is emotionally meaningful 
because it is almost always self-relevant. Since this early demonstration, subsequent 
studies using a variety of paradigms have confirmed that emotionally relevant stimuli are 
likely to capture attention.
A recent behavioural study (Anderson and Phelps, 2001) demonstrated an emotional 
modulation of attention using an attentional blink paradigm, which involves rapid serial 
presentation of visual stimuli (RVSP). A common finding in this paradigm is difficulty 
detecting a second target if it follows too closely a first target (Raymond et al., 1992). 
This study showed that normal subjects were more likely to detect the second target if it 
was emotional whereas patients with amygdala lesions do not show this effect (Anderson 
and Phelps, 2001). Clinical neuropsychological studies on patients with unilateral neglect, 
who typically have right-hemispheric damage, and who fail to attend to stimuli in the left 
half of space, show a drastic reduction in their behavioural deficit when the left side is 
emotionally salient (Vuilleumier et al., 2001; Vuilleumier and Schwartz, 2001c). Finally, 
anxious individuals are more likely than controls to display attentional biases toward 
threatening stimuli (Bishop et al., 2004a; Bishop et al., 2004b).
The emotional significance of a stimulus can influence attentional process through two 
distinct mechanisms. A bottom-up boosting of activity in cortical regions coding for 
sensory attribures and top-down control from frontal areas that imposes priorities on
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selective processing. In support of a bottom-up mechanism, numerous studies have found 
increased activity in cortical visual processing areas when participants view emotionally 
provocative images, compared to when they view neutral images (Lane et al., 1997c; 
Lang et al., 1998; Paradiso et al., 1999; Vuilleumier et al., 2001; Vuilleumier and 
Schwartz, 2001a). Likewise, activity in the fusiform face area increase when participants 
view emotionally expressive compared to neutral faces (Breiter et al., 1996; Vuilleumier 
et al., 2001). Other studies have found increased fusiform activity in response to fear- 
conditioned faces (Armony and Dolan, 2002; Morris et al., 2001).
Emotional information processing may benefit from top-down mechanisms of selective 
attention. In the case of emotional processing such top-down influences are likely to 
involve the prefrontal cortex, in particular the ventromedial regions and rostral cingulate 
cortex. These areas show close reciprocal connections with subcortical limbic regions 
such as the amygdala and ventral striatum (Groenewegen and Uylings, 2000; Wise, 2004) 
involved in early stages of processing emotional material. For example, focusing 
attention on the spatial location of an emotionally relevant stimulus is associated with 
increased activity in bilateral VMPFC (Armony and Dolan, 2002). One interpretation of 
these findings is that the VMPFC is associated with directing the spatial attention toward 
emotionally significant targets. Several other studies have also found increased activity in 
the anterior cingulate cortex (rACC) during selective attention to emotional information 
(Elliott et al., 2000; Lane et al., 1997c). In addition, rACC activity increase when
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participants have to ignore emotional information, compared to when they have to ignore 
neutral information (Whalen et al., 1998). In this study, I employed fMRI and in the 
context of an attentional blink paradigm, to investigate how these two distinct 
mechanisms control an increased detection of threatening targets under conditions of 
limited attentional resources.
3.2 Materials and methods
3.2.1 Subjects
Fifteen healthy, right-handed subjects [8 males (mean age 23.4= years ± 1.9) 7 females 
(mean age 21.7 years ±2.1)] were studied. All subjects had a university degree, or were 
in the process of obtaining one. The study was conducted with the approval of the 
National Hospital for Neurology and Neurosurgery and the Institute of Neurology Joint 
Research Ethics Committee.
3.2.2 Experimental paradigm
In an attentional blink (AB) task subjects searched for two targets among an RSVP of 15 
distrators items at fixation for 70ms each with no interstimulus interval. The first stimulus 
(Tl) was a scene (either indoor or outdoor) and the second target (T2) was a face (either 
neutral or fearful (Marois et al., 2004). The distractors were scrambled images of the 
scene and face together, with each greyscale stimulus subtending 8.5° x 8.5°. All face 
stimuli were selected from the KDEF database (D. Lundqvist and J.-E. Litton, personal
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communication; photographic face set available from the Department of Neurosciences, 
Karolinska Hospital, Stockholm, Sweden). The scrambled images originated from a pool 
of scene and face images (mixed in 50% proportion) and were created by dividing each 
quadrant of images into 25 squares randomly scrambling their position. Thin black grids 
were drawn over the scrambled and intact images to occlude the boundaries of blocks. A 
trial began with presentation of a fixation cross for a variable time between (2000- 
4000ms) before the onset of the RSVP, which consisted of 15 images each displayed on a 
screen for 70ms. All images were scrambled picture of scenes and faces (distractors) but 
two of the distractors were replaced by two intact target images (Marois et al., 2004).
At the end of RVSP subject reported the identity of both targets using a keypress in two 
response period of 4000ms each. During the T1 response period a display was shown 
with three options: NoScene, Indoor or Outdoor. Subjects indicated by a keypress 
whether no scene, an outdoor scene or an indoor scene was presented. For T2 response 
subjects were shown the face that had been presented during the current trial together 
with two other faces of the same gender (male or female) and expression (neutral or 
fearful) and were asked to indicate using a keypress the face shown at T2. A scene target 
(Tl) and face target (T2) was presented every trial. T1 was presented randomly between 
the 2nd to 7th position during the RVSP, where T2 was always presented after 5 
distractors (350ms) from Tl. A total of 144 trials were presented in 3 sessions of 48 trials 
each.
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The participants task was to identify both targets identity at the end of each trial. The first 
target (Tl) was always a scene (either indoor or outdoor) followed, after 5 intervening 
distractors (350ms lag), by another target (T2) which was always a face (either neutral or 
fearful) Figure III.I. This experimental design allowed me to identify the neurobiological 
underpinnings supporting an increased capacity to process emotional stimuli, under 
conditions of high attentional load.
Figure III. I  The emotional attentional blink task
Subjects were asked to search for two targets (Tl and T2) embedded in between 13 
distrators items at fixation for 70ms each with no interstimulus interval. The first stimulus
(Tl) was a scene (either indoor or outdoor) and the second target (T2) was a face (either
♦
neutral or fearful). The distractors were scrambled images o f the scene andface together. 
The two targets were always separated by 5 distractors (350ms). At the end o f the rapid
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visual stimuli presentation (RVSP) subjects were asked to report by a keypress whether 
no scene, an outdoor scene or an indoor scene was presented (Tl response 4 sec). 
Subsequently they were asked to identify the identity o f the face T2 by keypress in a 
forced choice between 3 faces one o f them was the one presented in the trial (T2 response 
4 sec). Note that the red frame is showed here only for display purpose and was not part 
o f the original stimuli.
3.2.4 Image acquisition and data analysis
3.2.4.1 Scanning parameters
Gradient-echo T2*-weighted images (EPI) were acquired on a 1.5 Tesla magnetic 
resonance scanner using a 30 degree titled acquisition sequence designed to reduce signal 
dropout in orbitofrontal lobes. Image parameters were as follows: TE 50ms; TR 3.96s; 
slice thickness 2mm; inter slice gap 1mm. I collected 810 volumes (across 3 sessions) per 
subject. Tl-weighted structural images co-registered with mean EPI images and averaged 
across subjects to allow group level anatomical localization. Images were analyzed using 
the statistical parametric software SMP2 (Wellcome Department of Imaging 
Neuroscience London http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). Preprocessing consisted of 
spatial realignment and normalization to a standard EPI template, and spatial smoothing 
(8mm kernel).
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3.2.4.2 Voxel-based analysis
The fMRI data were analyzed in an event-related manner using the general linear model 
(GLM), using SPM2. After discarding the first six image volumes from each run to allow 
for Tl equilibration effects, image volumes were realigned and co-registered to each 
subject's structural scan. Subject-specific regressors of interest were assembled by 
convolving 5 functions (corresponding to the time of onset of the beginning of the RVSP) 
with a canonical hemodynamic response function (HRF). I removed low frequency 
fluctuations by a high-pass filter with a cut-off at 128 s. A correction for temporal 
autocorrelation in the data (AR 1 + white noise) was applied. Four regressors of interest 
were built according to the trial type and the subjects’ responses and were include in the 
GLM. The onset was locked to the beginning of the RVSP. Two nuisance regressors (Tl 
incorrect trials and T2 response period) were included in the GLM. Parameter estimates 
were used to calculate the appropriate linear contrast. These contrast images were then 
entered into a one-sample t test across all subjects (random effects analysis). The 
resulting Z statistic images were thresholded at Z > 3.1 corresponding to P < 0.001 
uncorrected. I report results in a priori regions of interest (FFA, amygdala, striatum, 
ACC) previously identified in neuroimaging studies on emotional regulation of attention 
[6, 7, 10, 16, 22] at P < 0.001 uncorrected for multiple comparisons. I also performed a 
small volume correction (SVC) using a sphere of 10mm radius centered on coordinates of 
a priori regions of interest (rACC: [x= -38, y—50, z=-22] (Bush et al., 2000); ventral 
striatum: [x= ±22 y=10, z=-10] (Seymour et al., 2005)). The SVC procedure, as 
implemented in SPM2 using the family-wise error (FWE) correction (p < 0.05), allows
results to be corrected for multiple non-independent comparisons with a defined region of 
interest. Activations in other regions are reported if they survive whole-brain correction 
for multiple comparisons at P < 0.05 (FWE).
3.2.4.3 ROI-based analysis
I performed a region-of-interest (ROI) analysis in the bilateral FFA with the MarsBaR 
SPM toolbox: (http://marsbar.sourceforge.net/). The ROI’s for the FFA were defined by 
the SPM cluster (P<0.05 whole-brain corrected for multiple comparisons) contrasting the 
activity during the entire task against baseline. Thus, the ROI is orthogonal and unbiased 
with respect to all the contrasts of interests. Using the MarsBaR SPM toolbox, I obtained 
parameter estimates for all voxels within this region, for the group as a whole. These 
parameter estimates were averaged across the ROI, and specific effects tested by one- 
sample t tests.
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Behavioural results
This experimental paradigm elicited in the subjects a robust attentional blink effect. For 
the entire scanning period participants were able to detect the Tl scene 91.7% of the 
trials. After correct Tl detection subjects could correctly report the T2 face stimuli 
significantly more often when the face was fearful (Fearful-T2) versus when it was
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neutral (Neutral-T2) 58.8% vs. 46.8% (t<i4)=5.2 p<0.001 two tailed paired t-test) (Figure 
Ill.IIa).
The 2x2 fully factorial design employed in the experiment allowed me to study how the 
emotional valence of the T2 face, that was either fearful or neutral (Fearful-T2 vs. 
Neutral-T2), affects correct or incorrect T2 face detection (Correct-T2 vs. Incorrect-T2). 
Reaction times (RTs) for T2 targets were analyzed by repeated measures ANOVA. It was 
possible to detect a shortening in reaction times (RT’s) for correct T2 detection (mean 
value 2.76 ±0.20 sec) relative to incorrect T2 detection (mean value 2.95 ±0.28 sec), a 
reduction that was statistically significant (F(i,i4)=22.6 p<0.001) (Figure Ill.IIb). By 
contrast the emotional valence of the T2 face stimulus (fearful vs. neutral) did not 
produce significant changes in reaction time (F(U4)=2.8 p=0.11). Note that RTs were 
used in the fMRI analysis as measure of confidence for the T2 correct identification (see 
methods session in this chapter).
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Figure III. II Behavioural results
(A) The graph shows the x percentage (%) increase o f trials in which the subject 
correctly reported the T2 face identity (CT2) for a T2 fearful face condition (FT2 58.8% ; 
S.E. 1.85) with respect to a T2 neutral face condition (NT2 46.8%> ; S.E. 1.95) FT2 vs. 
NT2 (t(14)—5.2 p<0.001 two tailed paired t-test). In both the T2 detection was 
significantly above chance level o f 33% (forced choice between tree faces) represented in 
the graph with a dashed line (NT2: t(14) = 7.05 p<0.001, FT2: t(14)=13.9 p<0.001 two 
tailed one-sample t-test). (B) The histograms represent the reaction time (RT) 
distributions for number o f trials. In black is shown the condition in which the T2 face 
was correctly reported (CT2) and in brown the condition in which the T2 face was 
incorrectly reported (IT2). The two distributions partially overlap with the RT mean 
value significantly shorter in the CT2 versus the IT2 (F(l,14)=22.6p<0.001). The dashed 
line represent the median split for the CT2 condition (see material and methods chapter).
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3.3.2 Imaging (fMRI) results
Contrasting the BOLD activity during the period in which the subjects were engaged in 
the task versus the resting period, a contrast that enabled me to identify stimulus 
responsive regions. This contrast revealed significant activation for both right and left 
fusiform face regions (FFA) (R-FFA ([x= 30, y=-48, z=-24] Z=5.88, 25-voxels) and L- 
FFA ([x= -38, y—50, z=-22] Z=5.28, 97-voxels) p<0.05 whole-brain corrected for 
multiple comparisons (FWE)). The location of these two clusters of activity is consistent 
with FFA activity previously reported (Kanwisher et al., 1999) (Figure III.Ilia). These 
clusters were then used to define regions of interest (ROIs) in which I performed a 
statistical analysis between the different conditions during the AB task.
Activity in both FFA’s significantly predicted subjects’ ability to report correctly face 
identity in the response period (R-FFA Z=3.27 p<0.05, L-FFA Z=5.32 p<0.05) (Figure 
Ill.IIIb). Neither the left or right FFA showed increased activity for fearful face T2 
compared to neutral (Fearful-T2 vs. Neutral-T2), although I observed trend level effect in 
the L-FFA (Z=2.01 p=0.11). Nevertheless in the trials in which the T2 were incorrectly 
reported L-FFA I showed a significant increase in activity ^= 2 .56  p<0.05) for fearful 
T2, targets versus neutral T2 (Fearful-T2_Incorrect-T2 vs. Neutral-T2_Incorrect-T2). No 
significant interaction between valence of the target T2 (Fearfiil-T2 vs. Neutral-T2) and 
increased performance in T2 detection was observed suggesting that the FFA activity 
cannot fully account for the behavioural increase in T2 fearful face detection.
A B
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Figure III.II1 Fusiform face area (FFA)
(A) Coronal section of SPMs showing both fusiform face areas (FFA) contrasting 
activity during the entire task against the baseline (R-FFA ([x— 30, y=-48, z=-24] 
Z=5.88, 25-voxels L-FFA ([x= -38, y=-50, z--22] Z=5.28, 97-voxels p<0.05 whole- 
brain corrected for multiple comparison FWE). Both clusters were used to identify 
respective regions o f interests used in a ROFs analysis that revealed a significant 
increased activation in the CT2 versus IT2 (R-FFA Z—3.27 p<0.05, L-FFA Z—5.32 
p<0.05). L-FFA showed a nonsignificant trend for FT2 versus NT2 (Z—2.01 p —0.11) 
with a significant simple effect in the IT2 condition FT2 IT2 versus NT2 IT2 (Z=2.56 
p<0.05) (B) Plot o f signal percentage changes for the L-FFA cluster. SVC).
Using a voxel based analysis I then identified regions showing an increase in activity for 
fearful T2 faces versus neutral T2 faces (Fearful-T2 vs. Neutral-T2). Bilateral ventral 
striatum showed a significant increase in BOLD activity: R-striatum ([x= 20, y=16, z=0] 
Z=4.08, 6 8 -voxels, p<0.001 uncorrected and p<0.05 SVC), L-striatum ([x= -26, y=14, 
z=-4) Z=3.63, 8 -voxels, p<0.001 uncorrected and p<0.05 SVC). Figure III.I
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Figure IIIJV: Ventral striatum
(A) SPM showing response in both ventral striatum nuclei for the FT2 versus NT2 
statistical contrast R-striatum ([x= 20, y=16, z—0] Z—4.08, 68-voxels, p<0.001 
uncorrected), L-striatum ([x— -26, y-14, z=-4) Z=3.63, 8-voxels, p<0.001 uncorrected 
and p<0.05 SVC). (B) Plot o f signal percentage changes for the both ventral striatum 
nucleai clusters.
The fully factorial design of the fMRI experiment described in this chapter allowed me to 
examine how emotional valence of T2 (Fearful-T2 vs. Neutral-T2) modulated accuracy 
in T2 detection (Correct-T2 vs. Incorrect-T2), the principal aim of the study. The most 
direct way to determine at neural level an effect of T2 valence on the T2 response
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accuracy is to identify brain areas showing a significant interaction between the two 
factors across all trial conditions ([Fearful-T2_Correct-T2 -  Fearfiil-T2_Incorrect-T2] > 
[Neutral-T2_Correct-T2 -  Neutral-T2_Incorrect-T2]). This interaction contrast identifies 
brain areas specifically activated when emotional T2 stimuli are correctly reported, rather 
than responding to the valence of T2 stimuli alone. The rostral anterior cingulate cortex 
(rACC) showed significantly enhanced activity within this interaction ([x=14, y=40, 
z=22] Z=3.59, 25-voxels p<0.001 uncorrected and p<0.05 SVC). Critically rACC was 
significantly more active when subjects correctly reported the T2 identity in the fearful 
face condition as shown by the simple main effect (Fearful-T2_Correct-T2 vs. Fearful- 
T2_Incorrect-T2) ([x=T0, y=38, z=18] Z=4.25, 32-voxels p<0.001 uncorrected and 
p<0.05 SVC). Figure III.V
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Figure III. V: Rostral anterior cingulated cortex (rACC)
(A) Plot o f signal percentage changes for the rACC cluster. (B) Sagittal SPM image 
during the interaction contrast ([FT2 CT2 -  FT2 IT2] > [NT2 CT2 — NT2 IT2]) 
showing the activity o f the rACC ([x-14, y —40, z=22] Z=3.59, 25-voxels p<0.001 
uncorrected and p<0.05 SVC) is modulated by the T2 identification (CT2 vs. IT2) 
selectively in the when the T2 stimulus was a fearful face (FT2). rACC is significantly 
more active simple effect (FT2 CT2 vs. FT2 IT2) ([x=10, y=38, z=18] Z=4.25, 32- 
voxels p<0.001 uncorrected andp<0.05 SVC) .
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3.4 Discussion
The behavioural results described in this chapter replicate previous findings (Anderson 
and Phelps, 2001) by showing an increase in detection of arousing compared to neutral 
words in the attentional blink, but extends these findings to a more ecological context of 
face processing. Moreover, these findings support a model that suggests an overlap in 
face identity and face expression recognition processes in contrast with a view that 
proposes two distinct parallel mechanisms (Calder and Young, 2005). Reaction time for 
the correctly reported target was significant shorter supporting a more complete and 
accurate processing of these targets.
While previous fMRI studies have examined the neurobiology of this attentional blink 
effect using neutral stimuli (Marois et al., 2000; Marois et al., 2004) the present study is 
the first to investigate the associated mechanisms underlying a reduced blink effect for 
emotional T2 items. The fMRI data show a significant increase in FFA activity for faces 
that subsequently would have been correctly reported. These results support claims data 
that (Kanwisher et al., 1997; Kanwisher et al., 1999), detection and identification of 
faces, critically depends on FFA activity (Grill-Spector et al., 2004). Moreover in trials 
where a fearful face was incorrectly reported L-FFA showed increased activity for fearful 
faces compared to the neutral ones. This finding is in keeping with previous findings that 
reported an increase in FFA activity for fearful unattended faces versus neutral 
unattended faces (Vuilleumier, 2005; Vuilleumier et al., 2001; Vuilleumier and Schwartz,
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2001a) in a spatial divided attention task. These results extend these research to the 
domain of non-spatial attention, and supports a model that proposes enhanced processing 
of emotional stimuli even under conditions where they do not reach full awareness 
(Vuilleumier and Driver, 2007). These data show that FFA activity is critically 
associated with the correct face identification and is to some degree modulated by face 
emotionality. Nevertheless, because FFA activity did not show an interaction between 
valence of the target T2 and increased performance in T2 detection these observations 
cannot fully explain the behavioural increase in T2 fearful face detection.
Comparing brain activity in trials where the T2 target was a fearful face with trials where 
T2 was a neutral face as associated with activity increase in bilateral ventral striatum. 
These areas are implicated in anticipation of reward stimuli (O'Doherty, 2004; Schultz, 
2006), anticipation of aversive stimuli as well as anticipation or experience of painful 
stimulation (Jensen et al., 2003; Salamone, 1994; Seymour et al., 2007; Seymour et al., 
2005). Previous neuroimaging studies also show that ventral striatum is more active when 
subjects are exposed to unpleasant visual stimuli (Paradiso et al., 1999). It has also been 
suggested that striatum is implicated in responding to arousing stimuli (Horvitz, 2002). 
Furthermore, evidence from animals and humans literature, show that ventral striatum 
plays a key role in instrumental learning and goal-directed behaviour (Hollerman et al., 
2000). These data are in keeping with this of role of the striatum in motivation and 
adaptation of behavior related to affective (Everitt et al., 1999; Robbins and Everitt, 
1996; Schultz, 2006).
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The rostral anterior cingulate cortex (rACC) showed an increase in activity for the critical 
interaction contrast that delineated brain areas underpinning an increase in detection for 
fearful T2 targets seen in the behavioural findings. The rACC (Brodman areas 24 a-c and 
32) is considered to have distinct anatomical and functional characteristics compared with 
the more caudal part of the anterior cingulate cortex (cACC) (Bush et al., 2000). At 
neuroanatomical level this area shares reciprocal connections with amygdala, nucleus 
accumbens, anterior insula, and orbitofrontal cortex. At functional level convergent 
evidence shows that rACC has a primary role in processing emotional information and 
regulating emotional responses (Bush et al., 2000). In particular rACC activity is 
implicated in awareness for emotional material (Carretie et al., 2001; Lane et al., 1997a; 
Lane et al., 1998; Simpson et al., 2001), attention to emotional stimuli (Fichtenholtz et 
al., 2004; Vuilleumier and Schwartz, 2001a) and rating of affect intensity (Taylor et al., 
2003). During anxiety, altered response of rACC has been associated with impaired 
processing of treat-related attentional competitors (Bishop et al., 2004a; Bishop et al., 
2004b) and appraisal of emotional material (Kalisch et al., 2006). More generally rACC 
activity has been shown as crucial for selective attention to emotional information (Elliott 
and Dolan, 1998; Elliott et al., 2000; Lane et al., 1997a). The behavioural manipulation in 
this study allowed me to show that rACC plays a key role in early stages of the emotional 
processing (Kalisch et al., 2006). These results extend the functional role of rACC to 
include mediating selective enhancement in detecting potential threat under conditions of 
limited attentional capacity, as elicited by the attentional blink paradigm.
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A previous study (Anderson and Phelps, 2001) using a word RVSP, with either a neutral 
or an arousing T2, demonstrated that patients with left amygdala damage have a 
significant behavioural disadvantage in emotional T2 detection. Indeed, theoretical 
models of emotional modulation of AB predicts that amygdala plays a key role in 
mediating this effect (Fragopanagos et al., 2005; Palermo and Rhodes, 2007). In this 
study I did not find a statistically significant amygdala activation in the critical interaction 
([Fearful-T2_Correct-T2 -  Fearful-T2_Incorrect-T2] > [Neutral-T2_Correct-T2 -  
Neutral-T2_Incorrect-T2]) or in the main effect of fearful versus neutral T2 even at more 
liberal threshold of P<0.05 uncorrected. This finding does not exclude a possible 
involvement of amygdala in this task. In fact the statistical power of the analysis was 
limited by the number of events and brief presentation of the target. This may have made 
it more difficult to detect rapid changes in amygdala, particular when considering the low 
signal to noise ratio in this subcortical area (LaBar et al., 2001). Additionally, all faces, 
even neutral ones especially when presented briefly may have potential emotional 
significance and can activate amygdala (Wright and Liu, 2006).
Finally, these data suggests a model in which early top-down control exerted by rACC is 
required for enhanced processing of threat targets. In fact the stimulus driven bottom-up 
activity in visual areas, although necessary for the correct T2 process, does not appear 
sufficient to explain enhanced behavioural processing of the fearful T2 targets. One 
possibility is that enhanced activity in rACC, triggered by subcortical areas (e.g. striatum)
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sensitive to stimulus valence, mediates correct target identification by gating the access of 
the potentially threatening stimulus to full awareness.
In conclusion, using a modification of an attentional blink task in which I manipulated the 
emotional valence of a face T2 target, I observed a significant increase in correct 
detection of fearful compared to neutral targets. These data replicate previous findings 
using words as arousing stimuli (Anderson and Phelps, 2001). These behavioural results 
demonstrate that even when humans are unable to detect non-threatening stimuli due to 
attentional overload, they retain the ability to detect emotional items. The imaging data 
indicates that although bottom-up activity in visual areas like FFA is necessary for the 
correct stimulus detection is not accountable for the increased detection of threatening 
targets. Instead frontal rACC activity mediates a top-down control on attention and 
awareness for emotional items even in conditions in which normal attentional capacity is 
limited.
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3.4 Appendix (SPM significant activation tables)
Abbreviations:
FT2: Fearful face target T2 
NT2: Neutral face target T2 
CT2: Correctly identified face target T2 
IT2: Incorrectly identified face target T2
Table 1. Brain areas significantly more active during interaction contrast ([FT2 CT2 -  
FT2 IT2] > [NT2_CT2 -  NT2 IT2])
All values p<0.001 uncorrected with all clusters exciding an extent threshold of 5 voxels 
* statistically significant activation (see Methods)_________________________________
Region Laterality X y z z-score
rACC* R 14 40 22 3.59
Cerebellum L 32 -76 -30 4.04
Inferior postcentral sulcus R 56 -10 26 3.89
Lingual gyrus R 14 -78 -8 3.69
Table 2. Brain areas significantly more active during interaction contrast (FT2 > NT2) 
All values p<0.001 uncorrected with all clusters exciding an extent threshold of 5 voxels 
* statistically significant activation (see Methods)_________________________________
Region Laterality X y z z-score
Ventral striatum * R 20 16 0 4.08
L -28 14 -4 3.63
Lingual gyrus R 8 -78 4 3.59
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Table 3. Brain areas significantly more active during interaction contrast (CT2 > IT2)A11 
values p<0.001 uncorrected with all clusters exciding an extent threshold of 5 voxels 
* statistically significant activation (see Methods)__________________________________
Region Laterality X y z z-score
Posterior insula L -42 -8 16 4.64
L -32 -2 2 4.05
Inferior frontal sulcus R 30 54 10 4.98
R 44 48 2 3.91
Superior frontal sulcus L -26 46 38 4.14
Orbitofrontal cortex R 32 42 -16 3.51
L -34 22 -20 4.21
ACC R 2 32 28 3.67
Pre-SMA L -4 10 46 3.67
Cerebellum L -36 -68 -46 3.50
Inferior parietal gyrus R 66 -42 22 4.98
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Chapter 4
Noradrenergic neuromodulation of 
human attention for emotional and 
neutral stimuli
In this chapter I describe three experiments involving a pharmacological manipulation of 
an emotional attentional blink paradigm: the aim of these experiments is to define the role 
of noradrenaline in modulating attention to neutral and emotional information.
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4.1 Introduction
Norepinephrine (NE) is a monoaminergic neurotransmitter released by ascending 
projections from the locus coeruleus (LC). The LC is located within the dorsal wall of the 
rostral pons, in the lateral floor of the fourth ventricle. Norepinephrine neurones project 
bilaterally (i.e. they send signals to both sides of the brain) from the locus coeruleus along 
distinct pathways to multiple cortical and subcortical areas in the central nervous system 
(Figure IV.I).
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Noradrenergic System
Cerebellar
Cortex
Figure IV. I  Projections o f  the NE system in the CNS
The figure shows cortical and subcortical targets o f the NE neurons ascending from the 
two sites o f origin o f noradrenergic neurons in the mid-brain respectively (the locus 
coeruleus and lateral tegmental nucleus).
NE mediates its physiological effect by activating a class of G protein-coupled-receptors, 
called adrenergic receptors, that are primarily divided in the two groups a  and p. Within 
this broad class are subgroups ai and 012 and Pi, p2 , and P3. The 012 receptors are often 
located at pre-synaptic level and have an inhibitory effect on the NE release.
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NE plays a critical role in regulating cortical function and a dysfunction of this system is 
implicated in the pathophysiology of major psychiatric disorders such as depression, 
schizophrenia and attention deficit disorder (ADHD) (Beane and Marrocco, 2004; Pliszka 
et al., 1996). While the role of the NE system in arousal is well established (Jouvet, 1969; 
Robinson and Berridge, 1993), recent data from animal models suggest that it also plays a 
role in facilitating the processing of relevant, or salient, information (Berridge and 
Waterhouse, 2003; Yu and Dayan, 2005).
Electrophysiological studies in monkeys indicate two modes by which LC activity 
modulates attention (Aston-Jones and Cohen, 2005). Phasic LC neuronal activation is 
evoked by salient or goal-relevant stimuli during vigilance tasks, a response positively 
associated with outcomes in task-related decisions and coupled with highly accurate 
responses (Aston-Jones et al., 1994). Phasic responses are evoked against the background 
of (and are in turn modulated by) tonic LC activity which correlates with general arousal 
levels (Aston-Jones et al., 1991; Aston-Jones et al., 1994).
Recently it has been shown (Strange and Dolan, 2007) that the cortical circuitry activated 
by salient stimuli is inhibited by the pharmacological blockade of the noradrenergic 
system. In this chapter I demonstrate a role for 6-adrenergic receptors in this process. 
This differs from previous psychopharmacological experiments addressing NE 
modulation of attention, which have typically examined the effects of a2-adrenergic
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receptor agonists such as clonidine (Coull et al., 2001). Subjects receiving clonidine (as 
opposed to a placebo) are impaired in the task of target discrimination (Clark et al., 
1986), and additionally report withdrawal and difficulties with concentration. Clonidine 
acts on presynaptic a2-adrenergic auto-receptors to inhibit NE release: thus clonidine- 
induced impaired attention may reflect decreased arousal, or the decreased stimulation of 
predominantly postsynaptic ai- or B-adrenergic receptors due to a presynaptic inhibition 
of NE release. Given that the BiB2-adrenergic antagonist propranolol is non-sedating 
(Harmer et al., 2001), its administration enables the investigation of the adrenergic role in 
attention without sedation, as well as localising particular attentional effects to a 
particular receptor subtype.
To investigate noradrenergic modulation of human attention I implemented a 
modification of the RSVP attentional-blink (AB) paradigm, in which subjects view a 
rapid sequence of visual stimuli (RSVP) (Raymond et al., 1992) with a requirement to 
identify embedded targets under different pharmacological manipulations. A classic 
finding in the AB task is that the identification of a target stimulus (T l) causes transient 
impairment in detecting a subsequently presented second target (T2), an effect reduced 
with the increasing temporal lag between the two targets.
Of particular interest to the present study is a finding that the AB can be modulated by the 
emotional significance of stimuli. Thus, an arousing T2 stimulus is detected more often
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than a neutral T2 (Anderson and Phelps, 2001), although this effect is not present in 
patients with amygdala damage (Anderson and Phelps, 2001). This is equivalent to the 
studies of episodic memory which show that memory is normally enhanced in the 
recording of emotional events, except in patients with amygdala lesions (Cahill et al., 
1994; Strange et al., 2003). Enhanced emotional memory is abolished by propranolol 
(Cahill et al., 1994; Strange et al., 2003), which leads to an hypothesis that the emotional 
modulation of the AB might also be abolished by 13-adrenergic blockade. However, in 
light of recent finding (Strange and Dolan, 2007) that propranolol modulates the cortical 
circuitry involved in salience detection, the effects of propranolol on the AB may be more 
complex, i.e. there may be a generic effect of 13-adrenergic blockade on T2 detection.
Prior to the first experiment, subjects received either propranolol or placebo in a double­
blind fashion (Exp.l). In Exp. 2, subjects performed a more difficult version of the task, 
to address possible ceiling effects in Exp. 1. As an additional manipulation, subjects were 
randomised to receive either placebo, propranolol or the selective norepinephrine 
reuptake inhibitor (SNRI) reboxetine. Thus, this experimental design enabled me to 
investigate the effects of adrenergic modulation, inhibitory and facilitatory, on an 
attention paradigm in which both the salience and valence of the T2 target could be 
manipulated. In a third experiment, I tested for the contribution of peripheral 13-blockade 
to the attentional effects observed with propranolol by administering nadolol, a 13-blocker 
that does not cross the blood-brain barrier (BBB). Exp. 3 also included a group which
109
received a lower dose of propranolol to determine whether modulatory effects observed 
in Exps. 1 and 2 were dose dependent.
4.2 Materials and methods
Ninety-six healthy right-handed native English-speaking subjects took part in the three 
separate studies. All volunteers gave informed consent, were free of neurological, 
psychiatric and physical illness and had not been on medication for > 3 months. The 
study was approved by the National Hospital for Neurology and Neurosurgery and the 
Institute of Neurology Joint Research Ethics Committee.
Within the critical experiments described in this chapter, each trial consisted of 15 words, 
2 targets (bright green) and 13 distractors (black), presented either for 130ms or 110ms 
each and immediately followed by a subsequent T2 stimulus (Figure IV.II). In half the 
trials the T2 stimuli consisted of arousing words (e.g. rape, incest) and in the other half 
neutral words. Difficulty was manipulated by introducing different temporal lags. Prior to 
the first experiment, subjects received either propranolol or placebo in a double-blind 
fashion (Exp.l). In Exp. 2, subjects performed a more difficult version of the task (i.e. 
110 ms stimulus presentation) and were randomised to receive placebo, propranol 40mg 
or the selective Norepinephrine reuptake inhibitor (SNRI) reboxetine. In Exp. 3, subjects 
performed the same version of the task used in the exp.2 and were randomised to 
receive placebo, propranol 20mg or the nadolol a beta-blocker that unlike propranolol act 
only at peripheral level because does not pass the BBB. Thus, this experimental design 
enabled us to investigate the effects of adrenergic modulation, inhibitory and facilitatory,
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on an attention paradigm in which both the salience and valence o f the T2 target could be 
manipulated.
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Figure IV. I I  Schematic diagram o f  the AB task
Each trial consisted o f 15 words [2 targets (bright green) and 13 distractors (black)] 
each presented for 130ms (Exp. 1) or 110ms (Exp. 2) and immediately followed by the 
subsequent stimulus. In half the trials the T2 stimuli consisted o f an arousing word (e.g. 
rape, incest) and in the other halfT2 were neutral words (eg. pepper, omit). The neutral 
and emotional stimuli were matched for average word length, word frequency and 
interletter frequency. Order or presentation o f emotional and neutral trials was random.
I l l
The temporal lag between the first target (Tl) and the second target (T2) was variable. At 
early lag (<500 ms SO A) the detection o f target T2 is more susceptible to the attentional 
blink compared with late lag (>500 SO A). The subjects’ task was to monitor the RSVP 
stream and report both coloured green targets (Tl and T2) by typing them at the end o f  a 
stimulus sequence
4.2.1 Experiment 1
4.2.1.1 Subjects
In a double blind experimental design, 36 subjects [18 male, mean age (sd) = 24.2 (3.9); 
18 female, mean age= 23.1 (4.0)] received either a 40-mg oral dose of propranolol 
hydrochloride (a 131 and 62 adrenergic receptor antagonist) or a lOOmg oral dose of 
ascorbic acid (placebo pill). Drug allocation, in this and subsequent experiments, was 
balanced for gender. In view of the kinetics of propranolol’s peak plasma concentration 
(l-2h), the attentional-blink task commenced 90 minutes following drug administration. 
Blood pressure was measured immediately before drug administration (time 0 min) and 
the attention task (time +90min).
4.2.1.1 Stimuli
I used a modification of the RSVP paradigm (Anderson and Phelps, 2001; Raymond et 
al., 1992) where each trial consisted of 15 words [2 targets (bright green) and 13 
distractors (black)] each presented for 130ms and immediately followed by the
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subsequent stimulus (Figure IV.II). Six trial lags were introduced from lag 2 [1 distractor 
presented between the two targets (T1-T2) SOA=260ms] to lag 7 [6 distractors presented 
between the two targets (T1-T2) SOA=910ms]. In half the trials the T2 stimuli consisted 
of an arousing word (e.g. rape, incest) and in the other half T2 were neutral words (eg. 
pepper, omit). The neutral and emotional stimuli were matched for average word length, 
word frequency and interletter frequency. Presentation order of emotional and neutral 
trials was random. The subjects’ task was to monitor the RSVP stream and report both 
coloured green targets (Tl and T2) by typing them at the end of a stimulus sequence 
(trials in which a Tl target was not reported correctly were discarded from the analysis of 
T2 effects).
4.2.1.1 Statistical data analysis
Following the analysis of Anderson and Phelps (Anderson and Phelps, 2001), data were 
segregated into early (lags 2-3, 260-390ms) and late lag phases (lags 6-7, 780-910ms). I 
performed a 2x2x2 drug (propranolol 40 mg, placebo) x valence of T2 stimulus 
(emotional, neutral) x lag (early vs late) analysis of variance (ANOVA). I also performed 
a post-hoc two sample unequal variance single-tailed t-test to analyze all simple effects 
using the statistical software SPSS (http://www.spss.com).
4.2.2 Experiment 2
4.2.2.1 Subjects
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In a double blind experimental design 30 subjects [15 male, mean age (sd) = 24.7 (2.8); 
15 female, mean age = 23.3 (3.1)] were allocated to one of three equal sized groups and 
received either a 40-mg oral dose of propranolol, a 4mg oral dose of reboxetine 
methansulphonate (a selective norepinephrine reuptake inhibitor) or a 1 OOmg oral dose of 
ascorbic acid (placebo pill). In view of the kinetics of propranolol and reboxetine’s peak 
plasma concentration (l-2h and 1.5h respectively), the attentional-blink task commenced 
120 minutes following drug administration. One subject in the propanolol group was 
excluded from further analysis because performance was more than two standard 
deviations below the group average.
4.2.2.2 Stimuli
The task used was identical to Exp.l except for two critical modification; time of 
stimulus presentation was decreased from 130 ms in Exp.l to 110ms; targets were 
separated by six different time lags ranging from 1 to 9 distractors presented between the 
two targets (lags 2-3-4-7-8-9) [e.g. lag 2 (T1-T2) SOA=220ms; lag 9 (T1-T2) 
SOA=990ms].
4.2.2.3 Statistical data analysis
Data were collapsed into early (lags 2-3-4, 220-440ms) and late lags (lags 7-8-9, 770- 
990ms) and a drug (propranolol 40 mg, reboxetine, placebo) x T2 valence (emotional, 
neutral) x lag (early, late) 3x2x2 ANOVA performed. For each drug group I also 
performed a 2x2 drug (drug, placebo) x T2 valence (emotional, neutral) ANOVA I also
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performed a post-hoc two sample unequal variance single-tailed t-test to analyze all 
simple effects.
4.2.3 Experiment 3
4.2.3.1 Subjects
In a double blind experimental design 30 subjects [15 male, mean age (sd) = 25.2 (3.7); 
15 female, mean age = 25.5 (3.9)] were allocated to one of three equal size groups and 
received either a 20mg oral dose of propranolol, a 40mg oral dose of nadolol (a 131 and 132 
adrenergic receptor antagonist that does not cross the BBB) or a lOOmg oral dose of 
ascorbic acid (placebo pill). In view of the kinetics of propranolol and nadolol peak 
plasma concentration (l-2h), the attentional-blink task commenced 120 minutes 
following drug administration. One subject in the propanolol group was excluded from 
further analysis because his performance was more than two standard deviations below 
the group average (task outlier). Three subjects in the placebo group were excluded (two 
because task outliers and one because was not native English speaker).
4.2.3.2 Stimuli
The task used was identical to Exp.2 using the same equipment.
4.2.3.3 Statistical data analysis
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After exclusion criteria, the size of the placebo group was reduced (7 subjects). Thus, to 
retain sufficient statistical power I collapsed data from the current placebo group with the 
placebo group from Exp. 2. Data were collapsed into early (lags 2-3-4, 220-440ms) and 
late lags (lags 7-8-9, 770-990ms) and separate analyses performed for each drug group 
(propanolol 20mg, nadolol 40 mg) versus placebo i.e. separate group (drug x placebo) x 
T2 valence (emotional, neutral) x lag (early, late) 2x2x2 ANOVAs.
4.3 Results
4.3.1 Experiment 1
Experiment 1: This psychopharmacological experiment demonstrated that 13-adrenergic 
blockade by propranolol significantly impaired detection of T2 targets independent of 
their emotional valence (i.e. emotional and neutral) (Figure IV.III). In both placebo and 
drug groups, I observed enhanced reporting of emotional, relative to neutral, T2 stimuli 
as well as a proportional increase in detecting both types of T2 stimuli with increasing 
T1-T2 lag, in agreement with previous observations (Anderson and Phelps, 2001). In the 
placebo group at early lag the percentage of T2 correctly reported for neutral T2 (NT2) 
was 86.99% ± 2.42 and for emotional T2 (ET2) was 93.93 % ± 1.43, at late lag these 
value increased to NT2 =92.62 %± 1.28 and to ET2 =95.8 %± 1.13. Conversely in the 40 
mg propranolol group at early lag was NT2 =80.69 %± 1.90 and ET2 =91.26 %± 1.93, at 
late lag NT2 =88.18 %± 1.90 and ET2 =93.84 %± 1.47 respectively (see table 1 for a 
summary).
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A drug (propranolol, placebo) x T2 valence (neutral, emotional) x lag (early, late) 2x2x2 
ANOVA yielded significant main effects of treatment (F(i,34)=4.98, p<0.05), T2-valence 
(F(i,34)=51.31, pO.OOOl) and lag (Fp,34)=26.33, pO.OOOl). In line with the observation of 
Anderson and Phelps that affective modulation of the attentional blink is most 
pronounced at early lags, I found a lag x T2-valence interaction significant at trend level 
(F(i,34)=3.72 P=0.062). Critically, there was no significant interaction between T2-valence 
and drug manipulation (F(i,34)=2.65, p=0.29) indicating that propranolol impaired 
detection of the T2 target independently of valence (i.e. emotional or neutral T2 stimuli) 
(Figure IV.III). The simple effects for T2 correctly reported between the two groups 
(placebo, propranolol) was significant for the neutral T2 p<0.05 t<u9)=2.04 but not 
significant for the emotional T2 p=0.13 t(i,i9)=l.13. Furthermore, no significant 
interaction was found between lags (early, late) and drug manipulation (propranolol, 
placebo) (F(i,34)=0.51 P=0.476) showing that the effect of propranolol is present across all 
lags. Figure IV.IIIc shows the percentage (% ± S.E) of correctly reported emotional (E) 
and neutral (N) T2 for early (260-390 ms - SOA) and late lags (780-910 ms - SOA). 
Importantly, performance on Tl target detection was not statistically different between 
placebo (96.27%) and propranolol (96.18%) groups (t<ij9)=0.17 P>0.05 one-tailed 
independent-samples t-test).
As seen in Figure IV.III, performance in both placebo and drug groups at late lags 
approached ceiling levels, which may have obscured differential effects at these later 
lags. Thus, in Exp. 2 I reduced the interstimulus interval, making T2 detection more
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difficult. Removing this ceiling effect enabled us to test the further hypothesis that 
increasing NE levels, with the SNRI reboxetine, would enhance T2 detection.
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Figure IV .III Behavioural results o f  Experiment1
The panels (a-b) show the percentage (%>) ofT2 stimuli correctly reported for each T1-T2 
temporal lag for (a) placebo and (b) propranolol (40 mg) groups. In both groups T2 
detection improves with increasing temporal lags, and is significantly higher for  
emotional T2 (red squares) compared with neutral T2 (blue diamonds). The 
administration of propranolol significantly impairs T2 detection independently o f  
valence, (c) Impaired emotional (red lines) and neutral (blue lines) T2 detection
118
produced by propranolol (dashed lines) relative to placebo (solid lines) is more marked 
at early lags (260-390 ms - SOA), when attentional demand is higher, compared with late 
lags (780-910 ms - SOA).
4.3.2 Experiment 2
Three different drug groups (placebo, propranolol and reboxetine) performed an 
attentional blink task identical to Exp. 1 except for a reduction in stimulus presentation 
time from 130ms to 110ms. This experiment confirmed the above finding of propranolol- 
induced impaired detection of both emotional and neutral T2 stimuli, and demonstrates 
that reboxetine selectively boost the detection of emotional T2 with no effect on the 
neutral T2 (Table 2 and Figure IV.IV). In the placebo group the percentage of T2 
correctly reported was at early lag NT2=64.02% ± 4.67 and ET2 =74.26 % ± 5.65, at late 
lag NT2=77.87%± 4.56 and ET2=84.5% ± 4.99. In the 40mg propranolol group the 
percentage of T2 correctly reported at early lag was NT2=46.1± 5.28 and ET2=61.6 %± 
5.93 conversely at late lag NT2=62.68 % ± 7.69 and ET2=70.48% ±7.62. In the 
reboxetine group at early lag the percentage of T2 correctly reported was NT2=62.8 %± 
3.65 and ET2=82.64 %± 4.18 at late lag NT2=80.95 % ± 2.05 and ET2=90.23 % ± 1.92. 
(see table 2 for a summary)
Figure IV.IVc shows the percentage (% ± S.E) of correctly reported emotional (E) and 
neutral (N) T2 for early (220-440 ms - SOA) and late lags (770-990 ms - SOA). A drug
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(placebo, propranolol, reboxetine) x T2 valence (neutral, emotional) x lag (early, late) 
3x2x2 ANOVA yielded a significant main effect of drug (F(i>27)=5.44, p<0.01), 72- 
valence (F(i,27)=73.8, pO.OOOl) and lag (F(i,27)=93.54, pO.OOOl). The 3-way interaction 
drug x T2-valence x lag was also significant (F(2,27)~3. 46, pO.05).
In order to investigate the effects of drug relative to placebo, I performed two further 
2x2x2 ANOVAs. The effect of propranolol in a drug (placebo, propranolol) x T2-valence 
(neutral, emotional) x lag (early, late) 2x2x2 ANOVA yielded a significant main effect of 
drug manipulation (F(i,ig)=4.58, pO.05), T2-valence (F(ij8)=24.87, pO.OOOl) and lag 
(F(i,i8)=86.51, pO.OOOl). The interaction between T2-valence and drug manipulation was 
not significant (Fp, 18)0.62, p=0.44). The simple effects for T2 correctly reported 
between the two groups (placebo, propranolol) was significant for the neutral T2 pO.Ol 
t(ij9)=2.53 and at trend level for the emotional T2 p=0.07 t(i?i9)=1.53. These data replicate 
the results of Exp. 1, confirming that propranolol impairs T2 detection independently of 
T2 emotional valence. As in Exp. 1, the degree of affective modulation was most 
pronounced at early lags, evident in a significant interaction of lag x T2-valence 
(F(i,i8)=6.59 P<0.05). Again, no significant interaction was found between lags (early, 
late) and drug manipulation (propranolol, placebo) (F(i5i8)=0.05 P=0.862). Finally, in this 
more difficult version of AB task Tl detection is impaired in the propranolol group 
relative to placebo (82.13% vs. 89.28% correct, respectively; t(i,i9)= l.84 P<0.05 one­
tailed independent-samples t-test).
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By contrast, reboxetine evoked a selective enhancement in emotional T2 detection. A 
drug (placebo, reboxetine) x T2 valence (neutral, emotional) x lag (early, late) 2x2x2 
ANOVA yielded a significant main effect of T2 valence (F(i,i8)=107.89, p<0.0001) and 
lag (F(i,i8)=54.39, pO.OOOl), but the main effect of reboxetine relative to placebo was not 
significant (F(i,ig)=0.57, p=0.46). However, the interaction between T2-valence and drug 
manipulation was significant (F(i,i8)—10.61, p0.005). The simple effects for T2 correctly 
reported between the two groups (placebo, reboxetine) was not significant for the neutral 
T2 p=0.66 t(i,i9)=0.44 and at trend level for the emotional T2 pO .07 t(i,i9)=1.54. These 
data demonstrate that enhanced NE levels selectively improve detection of an emotional 
T2 stimulus with no effect on a neutral T2. Again, detection of emotional relative to 
neutral T2 stimuli was greatest at early lags for both groups indexed by a significant 
interaction of lag x T2-valence (Fp, i8)=22.8 P<0.001). By contrast, a lag (early, late) x 
drug manipulation (reboxetine, placebo) interaction was not significant (F(ij8)=0.036 
P=0.852), indicating that the behavioural effect of reboxetine is present across all lags.
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Figure IV .IV  Behavioural results o f  Experiment 2
The panels (a-b-c) show the percentage ofT2 stimuli that are correctly reported for each 
T1-T2 temporal lag respectively in the placebo, reboxetine and propranolol groups. In all 
groups T2 detection improved with increasing temporal lags and is significantly 
enhanced for emotional (red squares) relative to neutral (blue diamonds) T2 detection.
(b) As in Exp. 1, propranolol significantly impairs T2 detection independently o f valence.
(c) Conversely reboxetine significantly enhances detection o f emotional T2 with no effect 
on neutral T2. (d) T2 target detection in placebo (solid lines), propranolol (small dashed 
lines) and reboxetine (large dashed lines) groups on early lag (220-440 ms - SOA), when 
the attentional demand is higher, compared with late lags (770-990 ms - SOA) for 
emotional (red lines) and neutral (blue lines) T2 stimuli.
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4.3.3 Experiment 3
To further investigate the effects of propranolol, we conducted a third experiment in 
which three different drug groups (placebo, nadolol 40mg and propranolol 20mg) 
performed the AB task identical to Exp. 2. The first drug group received 40mg of 
nadolol, a beta blocker molecule with the same pharmacodynamic profile of propanolol 
but, critically, does not pass the brain blood barrier (BBB) (BNF, 2006). This 
manipulation controlled for the contribution of peripheral 6-blockade on the attentional 
effects observed with propranolol The second group received a dose of propranolol 
(20mg) that was half that used in Exp. 1 and Exp. 2. This treatment was aimed at 
determining whether a lower dose of propranolol would result in an attentional effect that 
was specific for target valence. In the placebo group the percentage of T2 correctly 
reported was at early lag NT2=59.19% ± 3.44 and ET2 =75.32 % ± 3.58, at late lag 
NT2=76.45 % ± 3.13 and ET2=86.68 % ± 3.21. In the 20mg propranolol group the 
percentage of T2 correctly reported at early lag was NT2=65.40 %± 6.40 and ET2=78.20 
%± 6.31 conversely at late lag NT2=80.43 % ± 5.02 and ET2=87.62 % ± 4.27. In the 
40mg nadolol group at early lag the percentage of T2 correctly reported was NT2=62.24 
%± 4.76 and ET2=76.82 %± 5.57 at late lag NT2=76.59 % ± 4.08 and ET2=88.07 % ± 
3.69 (see table 3 for a summary).
T2 target detection did not differ between nadolol and placebo groups (Figure IV. V). The 
drug (placebo, nadolol) x T2 valence (neutral, emotional) x lag (early, late) 2x2x2 
ANOVA yielded a significant main effect of T2 valence (F(i,25)=89.16, pO.OOOl) and lag
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(Fo,25)=12.45, p<0.005), but no significant main effect of drug relative to placebo 
(Fo,25)0.06, p=0.80) or drug x T2-valence interaction (F(i,25)=l.48, p=0.23) (Table 3 and 
Figure IV. V). These results confirm that the modulatory effects of propranolol observed 
in Exp. 1 and Exp. 2 are due to central activity.
Performance in the low dose propanolol group (20mg) was equivalent to that of the 
placebo group. The drug (placebo, propanolol low dose 20 mg) x T2 valence (neutral, 
emotional) x lag (early, late) 2x2x2 ANOVA yielded a significant main effect of T2 
valence (F(i,24)=49.33, pO.OOOl) and lag (F(i,24)08.99, pO.OOOl), but no main effect of 
drug relative to placebo (Fo,24)0.42, pO.52). Critically, there was no significant 
interaction between drug and T2-valence (Fo,24)=1.08, pO .31) (Table 2 and Figure
IV.V). Thus, only the higher propranolol dose (40mg) impairs target detection, an effect 
that is independent of target valence. A lower propranolol dose does not impair detection 
of neutral or emotional T2 detection.
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Figure IV. V Behavioural results o f  Experiment 3
The panels (a-b-c) show the percentage o f T2 stimuli that are correctly reported fo r  each 
T1-T2 temporal lag respectively in the placebo, nadolol and propranolol low dose (20 
mg) groups. In all groups T2 detection improved with increasing temporal lags and is 
significantly enhancedfor emotional (red squares) relative to neutral (blue diamonds) T2 
detection. Both propanolol 20 mg (b) and nadolol 40 mg (c) do not show significant 
differences from the placebo group, (d) T2 target detection in placebo (solid lines), 
nadolol 40 mg (small dashed lines) and propanolol 20 mg (large dashed lines) groups 
on early lag (220-440 ms - SOA), when the attentional demand is higher, compared with 
late lags (770-990 ms - SOA) for emotional (red lines) and neutral (blue lines) T2 stimuli.
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4.4 Discussion
The critical new observation I report in this chapter is that p-adrenergic blockade by 
propranolol (40 mg) impairs detection T2 stimuli independent of the T2 stimulus valence 
(Exp. 1). This is the first demonstration that manipulation of the adrenergic system affects 
the AB, as a recent study found no effect of clonidine on neutral T2 detection 
(Nieuwenhuis et al., 2007). The robustness of the reported P-adrenergic effect is evident 
in a replication within Exp. 2. Furthermore, these data replicate previous observations 
regarding emotional modulation of the attentional blink (Anderson and Phelps, 2001). 
Placebo and drug groups, in Exp. 1 and 2, showed enhanced T2 detection with increasing 
T1-T2 lag for both emotional and neutral T2. Secondly, emotional T2 stimuli were more 
frequently detected than neutral T2, an effect more pronounced at early lags.
A recent, comprehensive account of the role of NE in attention is derived from monkey 
electrophysiological experiments, which indicate two modes of LC activity(Aston-Jones 
and Cohen, 2005). Phasic LC neuronal activation is evoked by salient or goal-relevant 
stimuli during vigilance tasks (Aston-Jones et al., 1994). Phasic responses are evoked on 
the background of, and in turn modulated by, tonic LC activity which correlates with 
general arousal levels (Aston-Jones et al., 1991; Aston-Jones et al., 1994). Whereas the 
LC phasic response itself is relatively brief in duration (typically of 50-100 ms), the 
ensuing neuromodulatory effects of NE on target cortical areas are known to be sustained 
relative to the LC phasic response.
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One hypothesis on the neurobiological underpinnings of the attentional blink suggests 
that it is a product of the temporal dynamics of the LC-NE system (Nieuwenhuis et al., 
2005c). Although NE may potentiate processing in cortical areas, local NE release within 
LC is thought to be auto-inhibitory, due to effects of NE at presynaptic and dendritic 0.2 
autoreceptors (Egan et al., 1983; Washburn and Moises, 1989; Williams et al., 1985). 
This auto-inhibition results in a refractory-like period after a LC phasic response, during 
which a subsequent LC phasic discharge is rarely observed (Aston-Jones et al., 1994; 
Usher et al., 1999). This refractoriness peaks approximately 50-100 ms following the LC 
phasic response, typically 200-250 ms after the eliciting stimulus, and usually lasts 200 
ms or until about 400—450 ms post-stimulus. The length of the refractory period coincides 
with the T1 and T2 temporal lag in which the blink for the second stimulus T2 is most 
marked (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005a). Thus, this theory predicts an effect of NE 
modulation on both emotional and neutral T2 detection.
The behavioural effects described in this chapter can therefore be explained via an 
extension of this AB-NE model (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005a) in which I also model the 
salience level of the T2 target (arousing or neutral). Previous studies demonstrate that 
arousing stimuli presented in different modalities induce a robust phasic discharge of NE 
neurons in LC (Aston-Jones and Bloom, 1981; Foote and Morrison, 1987). Therefore, the 
enhanced detection of emotional relative to neutral T2 stimuli, demonstrated by Anderson
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and Phelps (Anderson and Phelps, 2001), and replicated in Exp. 1 and 2, can be 
attributable to an increase in NE release elicited by emotional, relative to neutral, stimuli.
Propranolol has been demonstrated to reduce the phasic response elicited by novel stimuli 
in rats (Kitchigina et al., 1997). The observed effects that I report following propranolol 
administration can thus be explained in terms of a reduced impact of LC phasic response 
to targets. A critical observation in these data is that propranolol treated subjects show 
impaired T2 detection, relative to placebo, for both neutral and emotional T2. 
Importantly, emotional T2 items, eliciting an increase in NE release, are still detected 
more frequently than neutral T2 even in the presence of propranolol. According to the 
model I propose, the behavioral effect in target detection is relative to the magnitude of 
NE release, assumed to be larger for an arousing T2. Note that the task I used required 
subjects to report both T1 and T2 stimuli correctly. The NE-AB hypothesis (Nieuwenhuis 
et al., 2005b) states that initial T1 detection is mediated by phasic LC activity, with the 
subsequent LC refractory period leading to impaired T2 detection. If propranolol inhibits 
phasic LC activity, it follows that T1 detection should also be impaired by beta-blockade. 
In Exp. 2, in which an increase in task difficulty prevented T1 detection ceiling effects, I 
showed a significant impairment for T1 detection in propranolol compared with the 
placebo group.
One of the aims of Exp. 3 was to determine whether a lower dose (20 mg) of propranolol 
would yield valence-specific effects on T2 detection. In other words, I tested whether less
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p-adrenergic blockade could be sufficient to abolish enhanced detection of emotional T2 
targets, without affecting neutral T2 detection. I did not, however, observe any difference 
in T2 detection for either neutral or emotional targets between the propranolol 20 mg 
group and placebo. Exp. 3 also served to demonstrate that administration of nadolol, a 
peripherally acting p-adrenergic antagonist, has no effect on T2 detection, thus indicating 
that the attentional effects of propanolol are centrally mediated.
In addition to demonstrating attentional impairment evoked by blocking the P-adrenergic 
system, administration of a selective NE reuptake inhibitor (SNRI) in Exp. 2 also enabled 
examination o f the attentional effects of increased NE concentration at the synaptic level. 
Here I provide evidence for reboxetine-evoked enhanced attention, which, in 
contradistinction to the impairment observed with propranolol, is an effect dependent on 
the emotional salience of the target. That reboxetine failed to improve neutral T2 
detection accords with previous data showing no effect of reboxetine on a neutral 
continuous performance attention task (Plewnia et al., 2006).
Reboxetine-induced enhanced emotional T2 detection can potentially be explained in 
terms of the NE-AB hypothesis (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005b). Previous studies 
demonstrate increased concentration of cortical NE, particularly in frontal cortex, 
following acute reboxetine administration (Sacchetti et al., 1999). By contrast, in the 
locus coeruleus, NE reuptake inhibitors attenuate the firing activity of LC-NE neurons via
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a 2-adrenergic autorcceptor ovcr-activation (Bcique et al., 2000; Kasamo ct al., 1996; 
Lacroix et al., 1991)Thus, SNRIs mediate two opposite effects: at a cortical level they 
potentiate attentional gain but also, at the level of LC, SNRIs increase the refractory 
period via presynaptic 012 receptors. These two NE influences may produce opponent 
effects on T2 detection involving facilitation and impairment in the AB task. In Exp. 2 I 
found that reboxetine selectively boosted detection of arousing T2 stimuli with no effect 
on neutral T2. These findings can be reconciled with the proposed model if, for neutral 
T2 detection, the facilitatory and impairing effects of reboxetine are in relative 
equilibrium, resulting in no net effect on neutral target detection. Conversely the boost in 
NE elicited by the arousing T2 positively interacts with this state of equilibrium thereby 
significantly improving target detection for emotional items.
The results described in this chapter show a dissociation in the effects of propranolol on 
attention from effects previously reported on episodic memory (Strange et al., 2003)=. 
Whereas the effect of propranolol is selective for the emotional modulation of memory, I 
demonstrate for the first time in humans (Exp. 1 and 2) that engagement of 13-adrenergic 
receptors in the central nervous system is essential for optimal target detection 
independent of stimulus valence. Moreover I demonstrate that the increase in NE levels 
(Exp. 2) selectively improves detection of arousing stimuli. These attentional effects of 
pharmacological manipulation of the NE system in human subjects support and extend 
current theoretical models o f the role of NE in attention.
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4.5 Appendix (tables of the behavioural scores)
Table 1* (experiment 1)
Early Lag Late Lag
Placebo Placebo
N -86.99%  ± 2.42 N -92.62 %± 1.28
E -93.93 % ±  1.43 E -95.8 %± 1.13
Propranolol 40mg Propranolol 40mg
N -80.69 %± 1.90 N -88.18 %± 1.90
E -91.26 %± 1.93 E -93.84 %± 1.47
*N ^ percentage o f  neutral T2 correctly reported 
E —percentage o f  emotional T2 correctly reported
Table 2* (experiment 2)
Early Lag Late Lag
Placebo Placebo
N -64.02% ± 4.67 N -77.87 % ± 4.56
E -74.26%  ±5.65 E -84 .5%  ±4.99
Propranolol 40mg Propranolol 4Qmg
N -46.1 %± 5.28 N -62.68 % ± 7.69
E -61.6 %± 5.93 E -70.48 % ± 7.62
Reboxetine 4mg Reboxetine 4mg
N -62.8 %± 3.65 N =80.95 % ± 2.05
E -82.64 %± 4.18 E =90.23 % ±  1.92
*N=percentage o f  neutral T2 correctly reported 
E —percentage o f  emotional T2 correctly reported
Table 3* (experiment 3)
Early Lag Late Lag
Placebo Placebo
N =59.19% ± 3.44 N =76.45 % ±3.13
E =75.32 % ± 3.58 E =86.68 % ±3.21
Nadolol 40mg Nadolol 40mg
N -62.24 %± 4.76 N =76.59% ±4.08
E =76.82 %± 5.57 E =88.07 % ± 3.69
Propranolol 20mg Propranolol 20mg
N =65.40 %± 6.40 N =80.43 % ± 5.02
E =78.20 %± 6.31 E =87.62 % ± 4.27
^N-percentage o f  neutral T2 correctly reported 
E —percentage o f  emotional T2 correctly reported
Chapter 5
Contextual information and decision- 
making: “the framing effect”___________
The experiment described in this chapter shows how the human brain process contextual 
emotional information when the choice options are presented and how this information 
biases the decision process.
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5.1 Introduction
A central tenet of rational decision-making is logical consistency across decisions, 
regardless of the manner in which available choices are presented. The assumption that 
preferences are not affected by inconsequential variations in the description of outcomes 
has been called extensionality (Arrow, 1982) and invariance (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1986), and is considered an essential aspect of rationality.
Invariance is violated by framing effects, where extensionally equivalent descriptions 
lead to different choices by altering the relative salience of different components of the 
problem. Kahneman and Tversky originally described this deviation from rational 
decision-making, which they termed the ‘framing effect’ as a key aspect of Prospect 
Theory (see introduction section 1.3.2) (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). From the time of 
this pioneering work the proposition that human decisions are ‘description-invariant’ is 
challenged by a wealth of further empirical data in both laboratory and field research 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 2000; McNeil et al., 1982).
The framing effect exerts a very systematic and widespread decision bias that may have 
critical consequences for human social organization. For example in a particular type of 
framing effect, where a choice between two options A and B is affected by designating 
either A or B as a default option; it is known that the option designated as the default has 
a large advantage in such choices. This effect can have a dramatic impact on the welfare 
of a society as demonstrated by a recent report (Johnson and Goldstein, 2003). These
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authors compared the proportions of the population enrolled in organ donation programs 
in seven European countries in which enrolment was the default and four in which non­
enrolment was the default. Averaging over countries, enrolment in donor programs was
97.4 percent when this was the default option, 18 percent otherwise (Johnson and 
Goldstein, 2003).
The failure to address invariance raises significant doubts about the descriptive realism 
of rational-choice models (Tversky and Kahneman, 1986), the overwhelmingly dominant 
view in economics theory. Indeed this model assumes that people are rational-agents and 
that their choices reflect a comprehensive algorithmic calculation of all the relevant 
details of the decision that excludes the irrelevant ones (i.e. the frame). In particular, this 
view of decision-making have tended to emphasize the operation of analytic processes in 
guiding choice behavior.
Psychology has long accepted that intuitive or emotional responses play a key role in 
human decision-making. An early proponent of the importance of affect in decision­
making was Zajonc (1980) (Zajonc, 1984), who argued that affective reactions to stimuli 
are often the very first reactions, occurring automatically and subsequently guiding 
information processing and judgment. One of the most comprehensive and dramatic 
theoretical accounts of the role of emotion in decision making was proposed by the 
neurologist, Antonio Damasio (Damasio et al., 1994). Damasio observed that patients
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with damage to the ventromedial frontal cortices of the brain who retain their basic 
intelligence, memory, and capacity for logical thought intact are impaired in their ability 
to “feel” (i.e. associate affective feelings and emotions with the anticipated consequences 
of their actions). Close observation of these patients led Damasio to argue that this type 
of brain damage induces a form of acquired sociopathy (Damasio et al., 1990) that 
destroys the individual’s ability to make rational decisions; that is, decisions that are in 
his or her best interests. Persons suffering this damage became socially dysfunctional 
even though they remain intellectually capable of analytical reasoning.
Thus, when taking decisions under conditions when available information is incomplete 
or overly complex, as in social interactions, subjects rely on a number of simplifying 
heuristics, or efficient rules of thumb, rather than extensive algorithmic processing 
(Gilovich et al., 2002). One suggestion is that the framing effect results from systematic 
biases in choice behaviour arising from an affect heuristic underwritten by an emotional 
system (Gabaix and Laibson, 2003; Slovic et al., 2002). However, despite the substantial 
role of the framing effect in influencing human decision-making, the underlying 
neurobiological basis is not understood. In this chapter, I have investigated the 
neurobiological basis of the framing effect by means of functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) and a novel financial decision-making task.
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5.2 Materials and methods
5.2.1 Subjects
Twenty healthy, right-handed subjects [11 males (mean age 22.3 years ± 2.1) 9 females 
(mean age 22.7 years ± 2.5)] were studied. All subjects had a university degree, or were 
in the process of obtaining one. The study was conducted with the approval of the 
National Hospital for Neurology and Neurosurgery and the Institute of Neurology Joint 
Research Ethics Committee.
5.2.2 Experimental paradigm
The experiment was divided into three parts: an instruction phase, a scanning phase 
during which subjects performed the task, and the post-scan debriefing session. In the 
instruction phase, the subjects were familiarized with the decision-making task, and given 
a number of practice trials. They were also told that during the task they would not 
receive feedback concerning the outcomes of their decisions, but instead receive a sum 
proportional to their total winnings at the end of the experiment (between £10-£50).
The scanning phase of the experiment was divided into three sessions of 17 minutes each. 
Each session was composed by 96 trials (32 Loss frame, 32 Gain frame and 32 catch 
trials), ordered pseudorandomly. At the beginning of each trial participants were shown a 
message indicating the starting amount of money that they would receive (e.g. ‘You
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receive £50’) (2 sec). Four different starting amounts were used in the experiment (£25- 
£50-£75-£100). Subjects were instructed that they would not be able to retain the whole 
of this initial amount, but would next have to choose between a sure or a gamble option 
(4 sec). The sure option was presented in the Gain frame trials as an amount of money 
retained from the starting amount (e.g. keep £20 of a total of £50) and in the Loss frame 
trials as the total amount of money lost from the starting amount (e.g. lose £30 of a total 
of £50. The gamble option was identical for both frames and represented by a pie-chart 
depicting the probability of winning or losing.
Four different probabilities were used in the study, such that the probability of winning 
(or losing) in a given trial was either 20%, 40%, 60%, or 80%. All experimental variables 
(total starting amount, percentage of the money offered, number of trials per session) 
were fully balanced between the frame conditions. The expected outcomes of sure and 
gamble options were always equivalent in each trial (with the exception of the catch 
trials, see below), and also mathematically equivalent between frames.
Subject were given 4 seconds in which to respond, using an MRI-compatible keypad, 
operated with their right hand. Given the equivalence of the choices in terms of expected 
outcomes, “catch” trials (32 trials each session) were included to ensure that subjects 
remained actively engaged in the decision-making task throughout the course of the 
experiment. In these catch trials, for both frames, expected outcomes for the sure and 
gamble option were markedly unbalanced: in half of the trials (“gamble weighted”) the
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gamble option was highly preferable (e.g. 95% probability of winning by taking the 
gamble option versus a sure choice of 50% percent of the initial amount) and for the other 
half of trials (“sure weighted”) the sure option was preferable (e.g. 5% probability of 
winning by taking the gamble option versus a sure choice of 50% percent of the initial 
amount). As in the main experimental trials, the catch trials were also presented in either 
a Gain or a Loss frame.
5.2.3 Behavioural data analysis
The behavioural data were analyzed using the statistical software SPSS 
(http://www.spss.com). The main effect of the frame was calculated from the percentage 
of trials in which subjects chose the “gamble” option within each frame, using a double­
tailed paired t-test. Risk-seeking and risk-averse behavior was defined with respect to 
risk-neutral behavior (i.e. gambling in 50% of trials), tested with a single tail one-sample 
t-test. The different percentages of the amount offered (20%, 40%, 60%, 80%) together 
with the behavioural results for both frame conditions were included as factors in a 4X2 
analysis of variance (ANOVA). A similar ANOVA was performed for the initial amounts 
presented (£25, £50, £75, £100).
A single paired double-tailed t-test was calculated for the reaction time (RT) (risk 
decision, no-risk decision) for both frame conditions. A rationality index (level of
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sensitivity to the frame effect) was calculated for each subject from the difference 
between the proportion of trials in which a given subject chose the gamble option in the 
Loss frame, as compared to the Gain frame. This value was then linearly transformed into 
a rationality index, ranging from 0 (least rational) to 1 (most rational).
5.2.4 Image acquisition and data analysis
Gradient-echo T2*-weighted images (EPI) were acquired on a 1.5 tesla magnetic 
resonance scanner using a 30 degree titled acquisition sequence designed to reduce signal 
dropout in orbitofrontal lobes. Image parameters were as follows: TE 50ms; TR 3.96s; 
slice thickness 2mm; inter slices gap 1mm. I collected 810 volumes (across 3 sessions) 
per subject. T1 -weighted structural images co-registered with mean EPI images and 
averaged across subjects to allow group level anatomical localization. Images were 
analyzed using the statistical parametric software SMP2 (Wellcome Department of 
Imaging Neuroscience London www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). Preprocessing consisted of 
spatial realignment and normalization to a standard EPI template, and spatial smoothing 
(8mm kernel). The fMRI data were analyzed in an event-related manner using the general 
linear model, using the SPM2 statistical analysis software. After discarding the first six 
image volumes from each run to allow for T1 equilibration effects, image volumes were 
realigned and co-registered to each subject's structural scan. Subject-specific regressors 
of interest were assembled by convolving 5 functions (corresponding to the time of onset 
of the choice pair, for each condition) with a canonical hemodynamic response function
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(HRF). I removed low frequency fluctuations by a high-pass filter with a cut-off at 128 
s. A correction for temporal autocorrelation in the data (AR 1 + white noise) was applied. 
Parameter estimates were used to calculate the appropriate linear contrast. These contrast 
images were then entered into a one-sample t test across all subjects (random effects 
analysis).
The experiment constituted a 2x2 factorial design with the first factor representing the 
task condition (Gain frame, Loss frame) and the second representing the behavioural 
decision of each subject on a trial by trial basis, during the gambling task in the scanner 
(gamble option, sure option). The primary aim of our neuroimaging analysis was to 
determine which brain regions mediate the frame effect, that is subjects’ behavioral 
tendency to be risk-averse in the Gain frame (i.e. prefer the sure option), and risk-seeking 
in the Loss frame (i.e. prefer the gamble option). The interaction contrast speaks directly 
to this question and identifies brain areas more active when subjects chose in accordance 
with the frame effect (i.e. G su re  + L gamble), as opposed to when their decisions ran 
counter to their general behavioral tendency (G gam ble + L sure). Crucially, this 
interaction contrast, as opposed to simple effects contrasts (e.g. G sure -  G gamble), is 
balanced with respect to both decision type (sure or gamble) and valence of the frame 
(Gain or Loss). Hence, brain activations identified in this interaction contrast, therefore, 
are uncontaminated by effects attributable to either decision type or valence of the frame 
alone.
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A simple correlation analysis was performed to identify voxels in which activity in the 
frame effect contrast [(G sure + Lgam ble) - (G gamble + L sure)] for a given subject 
directly correlated with their rationality index. The resulting Z statistic images were 
thresholded at Z > 3.1 corresponding to P < 0.001 uncorrected. We report results in a 
priori regions of interest (insula, amygdala, striatum, DLPFC, OMPFC, ACC) previously 
identified in neuroimaging studies on emotional regulation or decision-making (Adolphs, 
2002; Bush et al., 2000; Knutson et al., 2005; Montague et al., 2006a; O'Doherty et al., 
2002; Phelps et al., 2004) at P< 0.001 uncorrected for multiple comparisons. Activations 
in other regions are reported if they survive whole-brain correction for multiple 
comparisons at P < 0.05. For display purposes in this chapter, statistic images are shown 
with Z>2.6 corresponding to P<0.005.
5.3 Results
Participants (20 university students or graduates) performed the behavioral task (figure
V.I) inside an fMRI scanner, allowing us to obtain continuous measures of regional brain 
activity.
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Figure V.I. The financial decision-making task.
At the beginning o f each trial, participants were shown a message indicating the starting 
amount o f money that they would receive (e.g., “You receive £50”) (duration 2 s). 
Subjects were instructed that they would not be able to retain the whole o f this initial
Start o f  trial
Initial amount
Choose between the 
gam ble or the sure option
143
amount, but would next have to choose between a sure option and a gamble option (4 s). 
The sure option was presented in the Gain frame trials (A) as an amount o f  money 
retained from the starting amount (e.g., keep £20 o f the £50) and in the Loss frame trials 
(B) as an amount o f  money lost from the starting amount (e.g., lose £30 o f  the £50). The 
gamble option was represented as a pie chart depicting the probability o f  winning 
(green) or losing (red) all o f  the starting money. The expected outcomes o f the gamble 
and sure options were equivalent. Gain frame trials were intermixed pseudo-randomly 
with Loss frame trials. No feedback concerning trial outcomes was given during the 
experiment.
5.3.1 Behavioural results
The behavioral results indicated that subjects decisions were significantly affected by the 
framing manipulation, with a marked difference in choices between the two frames 
(Figure V.II.A). Specifically, and in accordance with predictions arising from prospect 
theory, subjects were risk-averse in the Gain frame, tending to choose the sure option 
over the gamble option gambling on 42.9% of trials; [significantly different from 50%
(P < 0.05, 119 = 1.96)], and were risk-seeking in the Loss frame, preferring the gamble 
option gambling on 61.6% of trials; [significantly different from 50% (P < 0.005, ti9 = 
3.31)]. At the end of the scanning session the subjects were debriefed and asked about 
their strategies when performing the task, and about their awareness of the frame 
manipulation. Despite the marked though variable impact of the frame on subjects’ 
choice behavior (Fig. V.II. B), the majority (16/20) of subjects were unaware of any
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biasing effect when specifically questioned in a debriefing session that followed the 
experiment.
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Figure V.II. Behavioral results.
(A) Percentages o f  trials in which subjects chose the gamble option in the Gain frame 
and the Loss frame. Subjects showed a significant increase in the percentage o f  trials in 
which the gamble option was chosen in the Loss frame with respect to the Gain frame 
[61.6% vs 42.9% (P <0.001, ti9 = 8.06)]. The dashed line represents risk neutral 
behavior (choosing the gamble option in 50% o f  trials). Error bars denote SEM. (B) 
Each bar represents, fo r  each individual subject, the percentage difference between how 
often subjects chose the gamble option in the Loss frame as compared to the Gain frame. 
A hypothetical value o f zero represents a complete indifference to the framing 
manipulation (i.e., fully “rational” behavior). All participants, to varying degrees, 
showed an effect o f  the framing manipulation.
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The behavioural effect of the framing manipulation framing effect was consistently 
expressed across different probabilities (i.e. 20% - 40% - 60% - 80% see material and 
method section) and starting amounts (i.e. £25 - £50 £75 - £100 see material and 
methods section). (Figure V.III)
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Figure V.III Behavioural results: decisions across varying amount and probabilities.
(A) The plot shows the percentages (%) o f trials in which subjects chose the gamble 
option in the Gain (hatched bar) and Loss (solid bar) frames, fo r  the four different
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starting amounts (£25-£50-£75-£l00). ANOVA 2X4 (frames, initial amounts): Main effect 
o f the frame Fijg — 65 P < 0.001; Main effect o f  the amounts Fijg = 14 P < 0.001; 
Interaction (frames x amounts) F U g = 0.87 P = 0.36. (B) The plot shows the percentages 
(%) o f  trials in which subjects chose the gamble option in Gain (hatched bar) and Loss 
(solid bar) frames fo r  the four percentages o f  total amount offered in the sure option 
(20%-40%-60%-80%). ANOVA 2X4 (frames, percentages): Main effect o f  the frame Fijg 
= 65 P < 0.001; Main effect o f  the probabilities Fijg = 9.2 P  = 0.007; Interaction (frame 
x probability) Fijg — 6.9 P — 0.017. The dashed line represents risk-neutral behaviour 
(choosing the gamble option in 50% o f  trials)
Critically reaction times (RT) for decisions were not affected by frame [Gain frame, 1895 
ms; Loss frame, 1884 ms (P >0.1)] providing evidence that difficulty was well matched 
between the two frames. This evidence was also supported by subjects’ post-scan 
debriefing in which none of the participants reported difficulty increased for any of the 
experimental conditions. Moreover, subjects performed highly accurately on catch [ trials 
(see material and method session) (Figure V.IV) where the expected outcomes of the sure 
and gamble options were unbalanced, indicating their continued engagement with the 
task throughout the experiment.
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Figure V.IV Behavioural results fo r  catch trials.
In this type o f trial (33% o f the all trials) the expected outcomes o f the sure and gamble 
option were markedly unbalanced. Two type o f catch trials were used fo r  each: gamble 
weighted - where the sure option was 50% o f  the starting amount and the gamble option 
was a 95% probability o f winning the starting amount; and sure weighted - where the 
sure option was 50% o f the starting amount and the gamble option was a 5% probability 
o f winning the starting amount. The plot shows the percentages (%) o f trials in which 
subjects chose the gamble option in the Gain (hatched bar) and Loss frames (solid bar), 
fo r  the gamble weighted and sure weighted conditions. The subjects were highly accurate 
in making optimal choices in these catch trials, providing evidence o f continued 
engagement with the task throughout the experiment.
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5.3.2 Imaging (fMRI) results
Subjects performed the behavioral task inside an fMRI scanner, allowing us to obtain 
concurrent measures of regional brain activity. The subjects’ individual decisions during 
the entire fMRI experiment were recorded and used to construct four regressors of 
interest: sure decisions in the Gain frame (Gsurc), gamble decisions in the Gain frame 
( G g a m b l e ) ,  sure decisions in the Loss frame ( L s u r c ) ,  and gamble decisions in the Loss frame 
( L g a m b i c ) -  Given that the frame effect relates to subjects’ asymmetrical pattern of decisions 
across frames, the key experimental contrast of interest is the interaction between the 
decision to gamble (or not) and the valence of the frame: [( G s u r c  +  L g a m b i c )  -  ( G g a m b ic  +  
Lsurc)]. It is noteworthy that this interaction contrast is balanced with respect to both 
decision type and frame valence. Consequently, it was possible to identify brain areas that 
were more active when subjects chose in accordance with the frame effect (i.e., G SUrC +  
L g a m b i c ) ,  as opposed to when their decisions ran counter to their general behavioral 
tendency ( G g a m b ic  + LSUrc). This contrast revealed significant activation in the bilateral 
amygdala (Fig. V.V, A and B). To ensure that this activation in the amygdala was not 
being driven by a significant effect in one frame alone (e.g., Loss frame), I conducted an 
independent analysis for each frame. This confirmed that robust activation in the 
amygdala was equally observed for simple effects of decision type (sure or gamble) in 
each frame separately. Thus, amygdala activation was significantly greater when subjects 
decided to choose the sure option in the Gain frame [ G s u r c  -  G g a m b i c ]  [Montreal 
Neurological Institute (MNI) space coordinates (x, y, z) 18, -4 , -24; Z score = 4.0], and 
the gamble option in the Loss frame [ L g a m b ic  -  L s u rc ]  [MNI space coordinates -16, 0, -26;
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Z score = 3.80; 12, 2, -22; Z score 0 4.67], in keeping with a central role in mediating the 
frame effect.
A different pattern of brain activation was identified when subjects made decisions that 
ran counter to their general behavioral tendency. In this reverse interaction contrast :[( 
G g a m b i c  +  Lsurc) -  ( G SUrc  +  L g a m b i c ) ] ,  it was observed enhanced activity in the anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC) (Figure V.V, C and D) (and to a lesser extent in the bilateral 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex at an uncorrected threshold of P <0.005; Figure V.V, E) 
when subjects chose the gamble option in the Gain frame and the sure option in the Loss 
frame.
□  Gain frame 
13 Loss frame
Gamble Gamble
GambleGamble
o 1 2 3 4 s
Figure V. V fM R I whiten subjects results.
(A) Interaction contrast :[( GSUre + Lgambie) -  (Ggambie + LSUre)]'■ brain activations 
reflecting subjects ’ behavioural tendency to choose the sure option in the Gain frame and
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the gamble option in the Loss frame (i.e., in accordance with the frame effect). Bilateral 
amygdala (Amyg) activation [MNI space coordinates (x, y, z)j: left hemisphere, —14, 2, 
24 (peak Z  score —3.97); right hemisphere, 12, 2, —20 (Z score — 3.82). (C - E) Reverse 
interaction contrast:[( Ggambie + Lsure)  -  (Gsure + Lgambie)]: brain activations reflecting the 
decision to choose counter to subjects ’ general behavioral tendency. Anterior cingulate 
cortex (ACC) (C) activation: 2, 24, 44 (Z score = 3.65); —2, 8, 56 (Z score 0 3.78) 
Bilateral dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) (E) (MNI space coordinates (x,y,z) (- 
48,18,24 z = 3.61; 56,18,28 z  = 3.49) Effects in (A) and (C) were significant at P < 
0.001; and in (E) were significant at P < 0.005. For display all the statistical maps are 
shown at P< 0.005. (B and D) Plots o f  percentage signal change fo r  peaks in right 
amygdala (12, 2, -20) (B) and ACC (2, 24, 44) (D). Error bars denote SEM.
In light of a substantial intersubject variability in behavioural susceptibility to the frame, I 
next identified subject-specific differences in neural activity associated with their 
decision bias (that is, the decision by frame interaction) (Figure V.II). Using the overall 
susceptibility of each subject to the frame manipulation as a between subjects statistical 
regressor, operationalized as a rationality index (see materials and methods session), a 
significant correlation as evident between decreased susceptibility to the framing effect 
and enhanced activity in the orbital and medial prefrontal cortex (OMPFC), specifically 
in the right orbitofrontal cortex (R-OFC; r = 0.8, P < 0.001) and the ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex (VMPFC; r = 0.75, P < 0.001) (Figure V.VI). In simple terms, those
153
subjects who acted more rationally exhibited greater activation in OMPFC associated 
with the frame effect.
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Figure V. VI Between subjects fM R I results.
Rationality across subjects: fM RI correlational analysis. Regions showing a significant 
correlation between rationality index [between-subjects measure o f susceptibility to the 
framing manipulation; see materials and methods session] and the interaction contrast 
image:[( Gsure + Lgambie)  -  (Ggambie + Lsure) ]  are highlighted.
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(A) Orbital and medial prefrontal cortex (OMPFC) [MNI space coordinates (x, y, z)]: 
VMPFC (left panel), -4, 34, -8  (Z score = 4.56); OMPFC and R-OFC circled in right 
panel [R-OFC: 24, 30, -10  (Z score = 5.77)]. Effects were significant at P < 0.001; fo r  
display purposes they are shown at P < 0.005. (B) Plot o f  the correlation o f parameter 
estimates fo r  R-OFC with the rationality index fo r  each subject (r = 0.8, P < 0.001).
5.4 Discussion
The data described in this chapter provides a neurobiological account of the framing 
effect, both within and across individuals. Increased activation in the amygdala was 
associated with subjects’s tendency to be risk-averse in the Gain frame and risk-seeking 
in the Loss frame, supporting the hypothesis that the framing effect is driven by an affect 
heuristic underwritten by an emotional system.
The amygdala plays a key role in value-related prediction and learning, both for negative 
(aversive) and positive (appetitive) (Baxter and Murray, 2002; LeDoux, 2000; Paton et 
al., 2006). Furthermore, in simple instrumental decision-making tasks in animals, the 
amygdala appears to mediate decision biases that derive from value related predictions 
(Corbit and Balleine, 2005). In humans, the amygdala is also implicated in the detection 
of emotionally relevant information present in contextual and social emotional cues 
(Adolphs, 2006). It was previously shown that activation in the amygdala during the 
passive viewing of surprised faces is significantly modulated by the valence of preceding
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verbal contextual information (Kim et al., 2004). The data in the current study extend the 
role of the amygdala to include processing positive or negative emotional information 
communicated by the frame in the context of a decision-making task. In our study, 
activation of the amygdala was driven by the combination of a subject’s decision and the 
frame in which it took place, rather than by the valence of the frame per se. 
Consequently, these findings indicate that frame-related valence information is 
incorporated into the relative assessment of options to exert control over the apparent risk 
sensitivity of individual decisions.
The observation that the frame has such a pervasive impact on complex decision-making 
supports an emerging role for the amygdala in decision-making (Balleine and Killcross, 
2006; Hsu et al., 2005). When subjects’ choices ran counter to their general behavioral 
tendency, there was enhanced activity in the ACC. This suggests an opponency between 
two neural systems, with ACC activation consistent with the detection of conflict 
between predominantly “analytic” response tendencies and a more “emotional” 
amygdala-based system (Botvinick et al., 2001; Miller and Cohen, 2001). The 
experimental design described in this chapter allowed me to distinguish the anatomical 
bases of the frame effect, both within and between subjects.
Interestingly, amygdala activity did not predict the substantial intersubject difference in 
terms of susceptibility to the frame effect. Instead, subjects’ susceptibility to the frame 
showed a robust correlation with neural activity in the OMPFC. It is noteworthy that
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there exists strong reciprocal connections between the amygdala and the OMPFC 
(Amaral, 1982), although each may contribute distinct functional roles in decision­
making (Winstanley et al., 2004). Lesions of the OMPFC cause impairments in decision­
making often characterized as an inability to adapt behavioural strategies according to the 
consequences of decisions, leading to impulsivity (Bechara et al., 1994; Rolls et al., 
1994). It is thought that the OMPFC, incorporating inputs from the amygdala, represents 
the motivational value of stimuli (or choices), which enables it to integrate and evaluate 
the incentive value of predicted outcomes in order to guide future behavior (Schoenbaum 
et al., 2006; Schoenbaum et al., 2003). These data raise an intriguing possibility that more 
“rational” individuals have a better and more refined representation of their own 
emotional biases that enables them to modify their behavior in appropriate circumstances, 
as, for example, when such biases might lead to suboptimal decisions. As such, our 
findings support a model in which the OMPFC evaluates and integrates emotional and 
cognitive information, thus underpinning more “rational” (i.e., description-invariant) 
behaviour.
The findings described in this chapter suggest a model in which the framing bias reflects 
an affect heuristic by which individuals incorporate a potentially broad range of 
additional emotional information into the decision process. In evolutionary terms, this 
mechanism may confer a strong advantage, because such contextual cues may carry 
useful, if not critical, information. Neglecting such information may ignore the subtle
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social cues that communicate elements of (possibly unconscious) knowledge that allow 
optimal decisions to be made in a variety of environments. However, in modem society, 
which contains many symbolic artifacts and where optimal decision-making often 
requires skills of abstraction and decontextualization, such mechanisms may render 
human choices irrational (Stanovich and West, 2002).
5.4 Appendix (SPM significant activation tables)
Table 1. Brain areas significantly more active during interaction contrast [(G sure + 
Lgam ble) - (G gambie + L sure)]
All values p<0.001 uncorrected.
* statistically significant activation (see Material and methods session)_________________
Region Laterality X y z z -score
Amygdala * L -14 2 -24 3.97
R 12 2 -20 3.82
Inferior temporal gyms L -42 -4 -32 4.83
Middle temporal gyms L -6 6 -28 2 4.43
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Table 2. Brain areas significantly more active during interaction contrast [(G gambie + 
Lsure)  - (G sure + L gamble)]
All values p<0.001 uncorrected.
*statistically significant activation (see Material and methods session)_______________
Region Laterality x y z z-score
Anterior cingulate cortex*
Cerebellum 
Superior frontal sulcus
R -2 8 56 3.78
L 2 24 44 3.65
L -34 -56 -44 5.56
R 10 -6 72 4.62
Table 3. Brain areas significant correlation between rationality index (between-subjects 
measure o f susceptibility to the framing manipulation, see Methods) and the interaction 
contrast image [(G sure + L gamble) - (G gambie + L sure)].
All values p<0.001 uncorrected.
* statistically significant activation (see Material and methods session)___________
Region Laterality x y z z-score
Orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) * R 24 30 -10 5.77
Ventromedial prefrontal cortex
(VMPFC)* -4 34 -8 4.56
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Chapter 6
Contextual information and decision- 
making in Autism_____________________
The experiment described in this chapter shows how subjects affected by autism 
spectrum disorder (ASD) are less influenced by contextual emotional information when 
choice options are presented, and consequently show a reduced framing bias.
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6.1 Introduction
First described by Kanner (Kanner, 1943) and Asperger (Asperger, 1944), autism is a 
neuro-developmental disorder characterised by severe deficits in social interaction, 
qualitative impairments in communication and repetitive and stereotyped patterns of 
behaviour, interests and activities. The last twenty years have seen the acceptance of the 
concept that autism is a spectrum of disorders rather than a single syndrome. Autism 
Spectrum Disorders (ASD), also known as Pervasive Developmental Disorders (PDD), is 
thus an “umbrella category” which includes several autism-related disorders.
Several cognitive theories have been proposed in the attempt to explain the peculiar 
pattern of behaviour associated with ASD (for an extensive review see (Baron-Cohen and 
Belmonte, 2005)).
In an early study conducted by Bartlett (Bartlett, 1932), participants were asked to recall 
a story they had been told previously. Surprisingly, while most people would recall the 
general plot rather than precise details, people who would now be diagnosed autistic were 
able to recall exact words of the story but not the plot. Starting from this evidence Frith 
and Happe proposed what is called the weak central coherence theory in autism (Frith 
and Happe, 1994). According to this theory people with autism have a strong tendency to 
focus on the specific details rather than the global aspect of an object of interest, and are 
unable to integrate several pieces of information into a meaningful whole.
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This theory may explain the uneven profile of abilities and deficiencies in autistic 
individuals. For instance, they show a clear superiority on the Embedded Figures Task 
where patients are asked to locate a small part within a global picture (Shah and Frith, 
1993) but perform poorly in an homographs task where they must integrate the context of 
the sentence in order to understand the meaning of the word (Happe, 1997) or in a task 
where they have to arrange sentences to form a coherent context (Jolliffe and Baron- 
Cohen, 2000).
Another defining aspect of autistic behaviour is reflected in an inability to attribute 
mental states to others, known as mentalizing. This is an automatic ability necessary for 
effective social communication. A lack of intuitive mentalizing, and a consequential 
inability to experience appropriate emotional reactions to another person’s mental state 
(i.e. empathy), results in autistic individuals having severe social impairments.
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The first experimental evidence for a mentalizing 
failure in children with autism was demonstrated using 
what has been called the “Sally and Ann task” (Baron- 
Cohen et al., 1985). In this pictorial task (see cartoon 
on the side from (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985)), a first 
doll, Sally, puts a ball in her basket; while Sally is 
away, Ann takes Sally’s ball and places it in her own 
box; then, Sally comes back and children are asked 
“where will Sally look for her ball?”. Strikingly, 80% 
of children with autism will answer “in the box”: they cannot understand that Sally does 
not know that her ball has been moved. By contrast, the majority of children with the 
same mental age, even those with lower general intellectual ability, such as children with 
Downs syndrome, answer correctly (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985).
Recently it has been proposed that several critical aspects of the autistic behaviour may 
be explained by an imbalance in empathizing and systemizing behaviours (E-S theory) 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 2000). According to this view autistic individuals show increased 
analytical coupled with impaired empathic ability. The enhancement in systemizing is 
associated with some areas of cognitive strength and can explain the autistic person’s 
increased attention to details rather than context, described by the Weak Coherence
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theory (Frith and Happe, 1994). By contrast the inability to empathize can account for the 
social and emotional deficits as well as a lack of mentalizing ability.
6.2 Materials and methods
6.2.1 Subjects
Thirty-two subjects participated in the study. Of these 32, three subjects were excluded: 
one subject 2 was found to be on antipsychotic drug treatment (Olanzapine), one subject 
had learning difficulties and a third was excluded because he was statistical outlier (his 
score on the framing effect was more than twice the standard deviation above the mean of 
their group). Two subjects who were taking an SSRI (selective serotonin reuptake 
inhibitors) antidepressant medication were not excluded, since we had no reason to 
suspect these drugs would interfere with the cognitive abilities involved in the task. 
Therefore, after exclusion of these four subjects, 14 subjects remained in in the ASD 
group and 15 subjects in the control group.
In the ASD group, there were 10 males and 4 females, the mean age was 34.8 years 
(standard error mean: ±2.1) and the mean full-scale IQ score was 112.1 ± 3.6 (mean 
verbal IQ score: 112.6 ± 3.1 and mean performance IQ score 109.0 ± 4.3). All ASD 
subjects had received a clinical diagnosis of autism or autism spectrum disorder by a 
specialized clinician prior to inclusion. In addition, all subjects had an independent 
Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS) assessment to quantify the degree of 
impairment across different domains (Lord et al., 2000). The ADOS is a research 
standardized test which provides an index of autistic symptoms observed on a particular
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occasion. All subjects took module 4 (designed to assess adults), and received two scores: 
a communication score (labelled “ADOS score 1” in Appendix 1) on which the ASD cut­
off is 2 and the autism cut-off is 4; and a reciprocal interaction (or “social”) score 
(labelled “ADOS score 2”) on which the ASD cut-off is 4 and the autism cut-off is 7. 
Overall, the total ADOS score cut-off for ASD is 7 and the cut-off for autism is 12. We 
note, however, that the ADOS classification is not a clinical diagnosis (i.e.: based on 
standardised DSM-IV/ICD-10 criteria, see Table 1) and, whilst it may contribute to 
diagnosis cannot replace full systematic assessment by a specialized clinician. For this 
reason, two ASD subjects (subject 24 and subject 33) had clinical diagnoses of autism 
although scoring below the ADOS cut-off for autism.
In the Control group there were 11 males and 4 females, the mean decimal age was 32.2 
± 2.2 and the mean full-scale IQ score was 116.5 ± 2.0 (mean verbal IQ score: 114.8 ±
2.2 and mean performance IQ score: 115.6 ± 2.2). There were no significant differences 
between the two groups in age (P=0.41, 2-tailed independent t-test), full-scale IQ score 
(P=0.29, 2-tailed independent t-test), verbal IQ score (P=0.56, 2-tailed independent t-test) 
or performance IQ score (P=0.17, 2-tailed independent t-test).
The study was conducted with the approval of the National Hospital for Neurology and 
Neurosurgery and the Institute of Neurology Joint Research Ethics Committee.
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6.2.2 Experimental paradigm
The experiment was divided into three parts: an instruction phase, a task phase during 
which subjects performed the task (during this phase the skin conductance response 
(SCR) was recorded), and a questionnaire session. In the instruction phase, subjects were 
familiarized with the decision-making task, and given a number of practice trials before 
starting the main behavioural task. The behavioural task they were asked to perform was 
identical to the one used in the fMRI experiment described in chapter 5.2.2.
6.2.2 Skin conductance response (SCR)
The basic measure here is an elevation of the electrical conductance of the skin, known as 
the Skin Conductance Response (SCR), when an external stimulus is presented. The 
physiological mechanism underlying the SCR has been the subject of much debate. It is 
now agreed that the presentation of the external stimulus gives rise to emotion-evoked 
sweating generated by the eccrine sweat glands. When sweat fills the glands, the overall 
resistance of the “circuit” that they constitute decreases and thus the skin conductance 
(which is simply the inverse of resistance) is increased.
As sweat glands are under exclusive sympathetic cholinergic sudomotor fibre control, 
there is a high correlation between the SCR and peripheral sympathetic activity. Central 
influences on the control of the SCR is more complex and still not completely understood 
as excitatory and inhibitory control of the sympathetic nervous system is distributed
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among several brain regions and structures. Three main structures thought to play a role 
in the generation of SCR: ipsilateral regions of the limbic system, such as the cingulate 
gyrus, the amygdala, and hypothalamus have excitatory influences on electrodermal 
activity; contralateral premotor cortex and basal ganglia involve both inhibitory and 
excitatory control; lastly, the reticular formation of the brainstem is also associated with 
skin conductance responses (Dawson et al., 2000).
6.2.3 Questionnaires
Once the task was completed, the subject was left alone in a separate room and asked to 
fill in two questionnaires (see Appendix 2): the short form of the Need for Cognition 
(which was labelled as “Part 1”) and the Cognitive Reflexion Test (labelled “Part 2”).The 
Need for Cognition questionnaire, first introduced by Cacioppo and Petty as a 34 item 
test (Cacioppo and Petty, 1982), was designed to assess “the tendency for an individual 
to engage in and enjoy thinking”. A shorter form of the scale, consisting 18 items, 
(Cacioppo et al., 1984) was used here. : for each of the 18 statements, the subject had to 
say whether he considered that it was “extremely uncharacteristic” (score=l), “somewhat 
uncharacteristic” (score=2), “uncertain” (score=3), somewhat characteristic (score=4) or 
extremely characteristic (score=5) of himself. Half of the statements (items 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 
9, 12, 16, 17) were reverse scored, for example a “4” was considered as a “2”, and a “ 1” 
as a “5”. The global Need for Cognition score for each subject was obtained by summing 
the score of each item and was therefore over a total of 90 points.
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The second questionnaire was the Cognitive Reflection Test (Frederick, 2005). The 
Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) comprises three items (see Appendix 1). Each item 
consists in a short puzzle such as the following: “A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The 
bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost?” In this problem, as in 
the two others of the CRT, an intuitive answer immediately springs to mind (which would 
be here: “ 10 cents”). However, on considering the problem more carefully it becomes 
clear that the correct answer is “5 cents” and not “ 10 cents” (the correct answer for item 
(2) being: “5 minutes”, and that of item (3): “47 days”). For each participant, the CRT 
score indicates the number of items that were correctly answered: that is, 0, 1, 2 or 3. All 
three problems of the CRT are not difficult in the sense that anyone can easily understand 
the solution when explained. However, getting the right solution requires voluntary 
suppression of the intuitive response. It can be conjectured that the CRT provides a 
measure of impulsivity, or “cognitive reflection”, rather than a measure of the intellectual 
ability.
6.2.4 Behavioural data analysis
The behavioural data were analyzed using the statistic software SPSS. The main effect of 
the frame was calculated in each group (i.e. ASD and Control) from the percentage of 
trials in which subjects chose the “gamble” option within each frame, using a double­
tailed paired t-test. A single paired double-tailed t-test was calculated for the reaction 
time (RT) (risk decision, no-risk decision) for both frame conditions. The level of 
sensitivity to the frame effect was calculated for each subject from the difference between
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the proportion of trials in which a given subject chose the gamble option in the Loss 
frame, as compared to the gamble in the Gain frame. The main effect and interactions 
within and across group were analyzed by a 2x2x2 ANOVA with two within subjects 
factors namely frame (gains and losses frame) and choice (risky and sure choice) and 
group (ASD and Control) as a between subjects factor.
6.2.4 SCR data analysis
In our experiment, two Ag/AgCl electrodes (skin conductance recorder: AT-64, 
Autogenic Sytems Laboratory®) were attached using surgical tape to the palmar surface 
of subjects distal phalanges of the second and fourth fingers of the left hand. Conductive 
gel was applied between the skin and the electrodes. SCR signal and event markers were 
sent to an analogue-to-digital amplifier (CED-Powerl401®) then acquired on two 
different channels using the software Spike2 (v5, Cambridge Electronic Design).
Skin conductance responses and event markers were recorded at 100 Hz. The window of 
interest was defined as the 5 seconds following the subject’s decision. Baseline skin 
conductance was calculated by averaging the skin conductance level during the 0.5s prior 
to the presentation of the frames. Amplitude of the SCR was defined as the difference 
between the time-window peak value and the baseline. Only amplitudes greater than 0.01 
micro siemens (pS) were included to ensure only trials resulting in a skin conductance 
response were captured. In order to eliminate non-physiological SCR response (less than
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10% of the entire data set) were removed from the data analysis SCRs by visual 
inspections. For every subject, we determined the amplitude for each trial and then 
calculated the mean amplitude for each separate condition. Due to a technical failure, skin 
conductance for one subject (ASD) could not be analyzed. In order to get SCR 
amplitudes in standard deviations, four more subjects (2 in each group) were removed 
from the analysis due to a poor quality of their SCR data. Finally, we performed a Z- 
transformation of SCR amplitudes in order to normalize the SCR data (Yaremko, 1986).
SCR results were analyzed using a 2x2x2 ANOVA: The within subjects factors were 
Frame (LossesFrame; GainsFrame), Choice (Risky choice; Sure choice) with Group 
(ASD; Control) as a between subject factor. In order to get SCR amplitudes in standard 
deviations we performed a Z-transformation of SCR amplitudes.
6.3 Results
6.3.1 Behavioural results
In the ASD group, the mean proportion of trials in which the subjects decided to gamble 
in the gain frame was 34.52% (standard error mean: ± 4.99) and 42.19% (± 13.34) in the 
loss frame. Therefore, the mean framing effect (calculated as the % increase gamble in 
the loss frame compared with the gain frame) in this group was +7.66% (± 1.95). In the 
control group, the subjects gambled in 43.75% (± 4.72) of the trials in the gain frame and 
57.99% of the trials in the loss frame (± 4.70), giving a mean framing effect of +14.24%
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(± 1.68) showing a susceptibility to the frame that was twice that seen in the ASD group
(see Figure VI.I).
Susceptibility to the Framing effect
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Figure VI. I  Susceptibility to the framing manipulation.
The graph represents the susceptibility to the framing manipulation defined as 
percentage (%) increased gambling in the Loss Frame compared with the Gain Frame (y 
axis) in both groups, Control +14.24% (± 1.68) and ASD +7.66% (± 1.95) (x axis).
The effect in the control replicated the findings of the fMRI experiment reported in 
chapter 5. Notably, both the ASD group and the Control group showed a significant 
framing effect (i.e. gambling more in the loss frame than in the gain frame) (ASD Group: 
P<0.005, t(i3)= 3.92 and Control Group PO.OOOl, t(i3)= 8.48 double-tailed test paired t-
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test Figure VI.II). A group (ASD, Control) X frame (Gain, Loss) x choice (Risky, Sure) 
2x2x2 ANOVA yielded a highly significant interaction between choice and frame 
(Fd , 8 3 ,  p<0.0001) in accordance with framing effect manipulation (increase in risk 
in loss frame compared to the gain frame). The critical three-way interaction (group, 
choice, frame) showed yielded a significant results (Fo,27)=6.56, p<0.02) supporting our 
hypothesis that ASD subjects have a significant reduced susceptibility to the framing 
manipulation compared with the control group. Notably, the two-way interaction (group, 
choice) was significant ata trend level (F(i,27)=3.91, p=0.058), indicating a mild risk- 
adverse attitude in the ASD compared to the control group. (Figure VI.II)
In order to ensure that the significant susceptibility to the frame in the ASD group was 
unrelated with an increased risk-aversion in this group, the 2x2x2 ANOVA analysis was 
repeated covarying out from the frame manipulation individual subject risk tendency 
calculated as percentage of risky. This analysis corroborated the results from the previous 
analysis and again yielded a highly significant three-way interaction (group, choice, 
frame) (F(i,27)=10.03, p<0.005).
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Subjects's risk attitude
interaction P<0.02; Main effect of group P=0.054
Gain Frame 
■  Loss Frame
Effect of frame 
P<0.0001 Effect of frame 
P<0.05
CONTROL
Figure VI. I  I  Subjects ’ risk attitude
The graph represents the subjects ’ risk attitude defined as percentage (%) o f trials in 
which subjects chose the risky option rather than the sure option fo r  both frames 
manipulations: loss frame (black) and gain frame (grey) in both groups (x axis).
In order to further explore the relationship between general risk-attitude and susceptibility 
to the framing effect I performed a simple correlation between frame effect (i.e. % 
increased gambling in the loss frame with respect to the gain frame) and total risk (i.e. % 
of the gambling choices independent from the framing manipulation). The correlation 
between these two variables yielded no significant results across the two groups (r=0.1 
P=0.5 Pearson-correlatiori). However, when the two groups were considered separately
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the control group showed did not show a significant correlation (r=0.02 P>0.5 Pearson- 
correlation Figure VI.III) in accordance with previous studies (e.g. the fMRI study 
described in chapter 5). By contrastthe ASD group showed a significant correlation 
between total-risk and framing effect (r=0.7 P<0.005 Pearson-correlatiori). As illustrated 
in Figure VI.III, the increased risk-averse behaviour positively correlated with greater 
susceptibility to the framing effect.
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Figure VI.III Correlation between the subjects ’ risk attitude: control group.
The graph represents, in the control group, the correlation between the subjects’ risk 
attitude (x axis) defined as percentage (%) o f trials in which subjects chose the risky 
option rather than the sure option fo r  both frames manipulations and the susceptibility to
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the frame manipulation (y axis) defined as percentage (%) increase o f  gambling choice in 
the loss frame compared with the gain frame.
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Figure VI. IV  Correlation between the subjects * risk attitude: control group.
The graph represents, in the ASD group, the correlation between the subjects’ risk 
attitude (x axis) defined as percentage (%) o f  trials in which subjects chose the risky 
option rather than the sure option for both frames manipulations and the susceptibility to 
the frame manipulation (y axis) defined as percentage (%) increase o f gambling choice in 
the loss frame compared with the gain frame.
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6.3.2 Questionnaire correlations
The results for the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) and Need for Cognition (NC) 
questionnaire are summarized in table VI.I.
Table VI.I. Correlations between questionnaires results and other variables
All subjects ASD Controls
(n=29) (n= 14) (n= 15)
Sig. R Sig. R Sig. R
Need for cognition 0.017 0.440 0.096 0.462 0.120 0.419
V-IQ 0.002 0.559 0.098 0.460 0.006 0.676
IQ P-IQ 0.264 0.214 0.301 0.298 0.910 0.032
F-IQ 0.017 0.439 0.146 0.410 0.067 0.485
Score 1 - - 0.515 0.190 - -
Cognitive ADOS Score 2 - - 0.527 0.185 - -
Reflection Total score - - 0.490 0.201 - -
Test Framing
effect 0.344 0.182 0.764 0.088 0.594 0.150
Task Gain frame 0.838 0.040 0.331 0.281 0.427 0.222
Loss frame 0.538 0.119 0.238 0.337 0.318 0.277
V-IQ 0.124 0.292 0.309 0.293 0.357 0.256
IQ P-IQ 0.638 0.091 0.724 0.104 0.793 0.074
F-IQ 0.266 0.214 0.456 0.217 0.660 0.124
Score 1 - - 0.364 0.263 - -
Need for ADOS Score 2 - - 0.054 0.525 - -
cognition Total score - - 0.078 0.486 - -
Framing
effect 0.894 0.026 0.938 0.023 0.766 0.084
Task Gain frame 0.991 0.002 0.712 0.109 0.818 0.065
Loss frame 0.945 0.013 0.582 0.161 0.900 0.036
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Across all subjects, the mean CRT score was 1.28 (SEM: ± 0.22) and the mean NC score 
was 63.76 (± 2.30). In the ASD group, the mean CRT score was 1.07 (± 0.29) and the 
mean NC score was 61.86 (± 3.99). In the control group, the mean CRT score was 1.47 
(± 0.32) and the mean NC score was 65.53 (±: 2.52). There was no significant difference 
in the mean scores of both questionnaires between the two groups (see table VI.I.). On an 
independent samples double-tailed t-test, the P-value for difference of means between the 
ASD and the control group was not significant either for the CRT scores (P=0.369, t<27)=- 
0.193) or the NC score (P=0.436, t<27)=-0.791). On bivariate correlation tests, both the 
CRT and NC scores failed to correlate significantly with most variables (see table VI.I.). 
Among all the possible correlations, the only variables to correlate significantly with the 
CRT were IQ score, particularly verbal IQ (V-IQ; P=0.002, R=0.559 on all subjects; 
P=0.006, R=0.676 in controls and P=0.098, R=0.460 in the ASD group). The framing 
effect did not correlate with either test in either group with no significant difference in the 
framing effect evident across the two groups for subjects who scored high on the CRT 
(score > 2, P=0.141) or on the NC (score > 60, P=0.347).
6.3.2 SCR results
The mean SCR amplitude in the Control group was 0.5 IpS (S.E. 0.02 pS) for the sure 
choices in the gain frame and 0.50pS (S.E. 0.02 pS) for the risky choices in the gain 
frame. By contrast SCR mean values were 0.57pS (S.E. 0.03 pS) for sure choices in the 
loss frame and 0.59pS (S.E. 0.03 pS) for risky choices. In the ASD group the SCR mean
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amplitude value were 0.72 pS (S.E. 0.02 pS) for the sure choices and 0.75pS (S.E. 0.02 
pS) for the risky choices in the gain frame. By contrast the SCR mean values were
0.70pS (S.E. 0.03 pS) for sure choices in the loss frame and 0.7IpS (S.E. 0.02 pS) for 
risky choices. Figure VI.V
Effect of Frames on mean SCR Response
n.s.
Gain Frame 
■  Loss Frame
Effect of frame 
P<0.01
CONTROL ASD
Figure VI. V Effect o f  frames on SCR response
The graph represents the subjects mean skin conductance response (SCR) amplitude in 
micro-simens (pS) fo r  both frames manipulations: loss frame (black) and gain frame 
(grey) in both groups (x axis)
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2x2x2 ANOVA (Frame X Choice X Group) on SCR results revealed a significant main 
effect of frame (Fo,23)=4.84, p<0.05) and a significant 2 way interaction (Frame X Group) 
(F(2,23)—4.86, p<0.02) indicating that within the the control group the loss frame caused 
an increase in SCR response compared with the gain frame (t(i4)=3.19, p<0.01, double­
tailed paired t-test) a response not seenin the ASD group (1<i d=0.95, p=0.3 double-tailed 
paired t-test). The main effect of choice and the 2 way interaction ANOVA (Choice X 
Group) were both non significant (main effect: Fo,23)=0.95, p=0.3; interaction: 
F(2,23)=0.98, p=0.4). Finally, the 3 way interaction (Frame X Group X Choice) was not 
significant (F(2,23)=0.17, p=0.8) as was the between subjects main effect of group (ASD X 
Control) (F(2,23)—0.8, p=0.5).
6.4 Discussion
Canonical decision-making theory assumes that different representations of the same 
choice problem should yield the same preference (invariance axiom) (Arrow, 1982; Luce, 
1957; von Neumann and Morgestem, 1944). Nevertheless, countless empirical data have 
demonstrated that people are remarkably susceptible to the way in which options are 
presented in striking conflict with the economic accounts of rationality (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1984). Prospect theory described for the first time this systematic violation of 
the standard model as “framing effect” (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1981) (see chapter five).
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In this chapter I provide empirical evidence that individuals affected by autism spectrum 
disorder (ASD) are less susceptible to the framing effect and consequently show a more 
“rational” choice pattern, in accord with dominant models in economics. Although 
individuals affected by ASD were susceptible to the framing manipulation (i.e. risk 
seeking in the loss frame and risk averse in the gain domain) they nevertheless showed a 
reduced susceptibility compared with a matched control group. Moreover, in the control 
group, the autonomic response (SCR) for the negative frame (loss frame) was 
significantly higher than the SCR elicited by the positive frame (gain frame), supporting 
previous evidence (chapter 5) on the key role of the emotions in the framing bias (De 
Martino et al., 2006; Kahneman and Frederick, 2007). By contrast, the ASD group 
displayed no differential change in SCR between the two frames manipulation suggesting 
a lack of normal processing of emotional information carried by the frames.
Recent theoretical accounts of decision-making have proposed a “two-systems” model in 
human judgment (Evans, 2003). This view proposes that human decision-making arises 
from a combination of intuitive thinking and analytic processing. The intuitive type of 
reasoning is rapid and capable to process a large amount of information in parallel but 
prone to mistakes and strongly influenced by contextual emotional information 
(Kahneman, 2003). On the contrary, an analytical type of reasoning is more accurate but 
slow and computationally demanding. According to this view, the framing bias reflects 
an affect heuristic by which normal individuals incorporate a potentially broad range of 
additional emotional information into the decision process. In evolutionary terms, this
180
mechanism may confer a strong advantage, because such contextual cues may carry 
useful, even critical, information. This ability is particularly crucial in a social context in 
which subtle contextual cues communicate knowledge elements (possibly unconscious) 
that allow optimal decisions to be made in uncertain environments (Stanovich and West, 
2002).
People affected by ASD show a reduced procession of emotional contextual information 
present in the framing manipulation with a consequently increased resistance to the 
framing bias. In fact, the contextual information in the framing task does not carry any 
supplemental. At the same time, the ability to process and integrate contextual emotional 
cues has great advantages in social environments where a large part of the information 
exchanged between individual is implicit. Individual affected by ASD often show strong 
impairment in social context may be due to their inability to process these emotional 
cues.
In the context of the “two-systems” model of decision-making described above, these 
results suggest that ASD individuals have an increased tendency toward the analytic type 
of decision-making, due to an impairment within their intuitive reasoning mechanisms. 
This interpretation is also in keeping with the empathizing-systemizing (E-S) theory of 
autism, described in the introduction to this chapter (Baron-Cohen and Belmonte, 2005). 
The E-S theory proposes that the imbalance between analytic and empathic behaviour is
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responsible for the ASD social impairments and at the same time for their enhanced 
analytical skills. During the framing task, ASD subjects were better able to ignore the 
contextual information and isolate the critical information about the expected value of the 
sure and risky options. This result is consistent with other experimental findings that form 
the basis o f the weak coherence theory in autism (Frith and Happe, 1994) described at the 
beginning of this chapter.
Moreover, at the neurophysiological level, the findings presented in the previous chapter 
(De Martino et al., 2006; Kahneman and Frederick, 2007) showed engagement of an 
amygdala-based emotional as a function of the framing effect. These results, combined 
with the SCR data, support an hypothesis that a lesser susceptibility to the framing 
manipulation in ASD may be due to an impaired processing of the emotional cues due to 
an amygdala deficit. A wealth of empirical data supports this hypothesis. Firstly, 
histopathological abnormalities of the amygdala such as an increased cell density and a 
reduced dendritic arborisation have been described in autism (Bauman and Kemper, 
1994). Moreover, Howard and colleagues (Howard et al., 2000) suggested that people 
with high-functioning autism showed a similar neuropsychological profile to that seen in 
patients with amygdala lesions, particularly a selective impairment in the recognition of 
facial expressions of fear. Lastly, several imaging studies demonstrate blunted activation 
of the amygdala in ASD during tasks which involved processing of facial expressions 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 2000; Critchley et al., 2000).
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In conclusion, our results extend our understanding of cognitive impairments in ASD to 
the domain of decision-making, an under-explored aspect of autistic behaviour. At the 
same time, the data provide support for a “two-systems” model of decision-making, and 
challenge the economic rational model that, paradoxically, seems better suited to predict 
the choices of ASD as opposed to healthy individuals. The study I describe in this chapter 
suggests that normative economic rationality as expresses in hyper-analytic reasoning 
may not always be advantageous given that ASD subjects have such profound deficits in 
social contexts.
6.5 Appendix (questionnaire)
Short form of the Need for Cognition Scale
Instructions:
For each of the statement below, please indicate to what extent the statement is 
characteristic of you. If the statement is extremely uncharacteristic of you (not at all like 
you), please write a “ 1” to the left of the question; if the statement is extremely 
characteristic of you (very much like you) please write a “5” next to the question. Of 
course, a statement may be neither extremely uncharacteristic nor extremely 
characteristic o f you; if so, please use the number in the middle of the scale that describes 
the best fit. Please keep the following scale in mind as you rate each of the statement 
below:
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1 = extremely; 2 = somewhat; 3 = uncertain; 4 = somewhat; 5 =
extremely
uncharacteristic uncharacteristic characteristic
characteristic
Item
Number Item Wording
Rating
(1-5)
1. I would prefer complex to simple problems.
2. I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a 
lot of thinking.
*3. Thinking is not my idea of fun.
*4. I would rather do something that requires little thought than 
something that is sure to challenge my thinking abilities.
*5. I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is a likely chance I 
will have to think in depth about something.
6. I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours.
*7. I only think as hard as I have to.
*8. I prefer to think about small daily project than long-term ones.
*g I like tasks that require little thought once I’ve learned them.
10. The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to 
me.
11. I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to 
problems.
*12. Learning new ways to think doesn’t excite me very much.
13. I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve.
14. The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me.
15. I prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult and important to one that is 
somewhat important but does not require much thought.
*16. I feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that 
required a lot of mental effort.
*17. It’s enough for me that something gets the job done; I don’t care how 
or why it works.
18. I usually end up deliberating about issues even when they do not 
affect me personally.
* Item reverse-scored
184
The Cognitive Reflection Test
(1) A bat and a ball cost $ 1.10 in total. The bat costs $ 1.00 more than the ball. 
How much does the ball cost? cents
(2) If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 
100 machines to make 100 widgets? minutes
(3) In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. 
If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it 
take for the patch to cover half of the lake? days
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Chapter 7
Contextual information and the neural 
representation of value: “the endowment 
effect”
The experiment described in this chapter shows how the contextual information rooted in
the subjects’ position as either a seller or as buyer, during economic transactions, change
the price and the neural representation of an item’s value.
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7.1 Introduction
People accord a higher value to objects they own relative to ones they do not own. This 
“endowment effect” (Thaler, 1980) violates classical economic theory, which asserts that 
a person's willingness to pay (WTP) for a good should equal their willingness to accept 
(WTA) compensation for its loss (Willig, 1976). The endowment effect has significant 
implications for macroeconomics and law including the efficient allocation of property 
rights (Coase, 1960).
The attribute of value is highly contextual. This is well illustrated by the endowment 
effect where subjects value a good they own substantially more than an identical good 
available for purchase. In a seminal experiment, subjects designated as sellers accepted a 
minimum of $7.00 (WTA) to part with a mug they had been given, whilst those 
designated as buyers were only willing to pay a maximum of $2.00 (WTP) (Kahneman et 
al., 1990). This WTA-WTP discrepancy is not explicable by classical economic theory 
which asserts that preferences are independent of entitlements (Willig, 1976). Prospect 
theory embraces such findings by proposing that the value of a good (or an option) 
depends critically on a reference point (Kahneman et al., 1991), such that buyers evaluate 
the object as a potential gain whereas sellers view the transaction as a potential loss, 
demanding a higher price due to loss aversion (Kahneman et al., 1991; Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979). Although the endowment effect is a robust empirical observation 
(Kahneman et al., 1990; Knetsch and Sinden, 1984; Thaler, 1980) with profound
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macroeconomic implications (Coase, 1960; Kahneman et al., 1990), its neurobiological 
underpinnings are unknown. Here, using fMRI during an economic exchange paradigm, I 
demonstrate the neurobiological mechanisms underlying this effect.
7.2 Materials and methods
7.2.1 Subjects
Twenty-five subjects participated in the study. All subjects had a university degree, or 
were in the process of obtaining one. A highly significant behavioural endowment effect 
(i.e. WTP>WTA) (P<0.0001 ti7=5.02 double-tailed paired t-test) was observed across the 
entire group (n=25) who participated in the scanning phase of the experiment, confirming 
the robustness of this experimental protocol in eliciting a reliable endowment effect. A 
group of eighteen subjects [10 males (mean age 22.2 years ± 3.1) 8 females (mean age 
24.6 years ± 3.5)] were included in the final imaging analysis which was designed 
specifically to reveal brain regions mediating the endowment effect. One subjects was 
excluded due to excessive head movement in the scanner. Six subjects, who pursued a 
deviant strategy with no theoretical basis in the literature (WTP>WTA: significant 
reverse endowment effect p<0.01), were excluded after two sessions. Evidence obtained 
from debriefing these individuals indicated that their pattern of behavior resulted from a 
misconstrual of the experimental goals as maximisation of the number of successful 
market transactions effected by the BDM mechanism, rather than pursuing an overall 
financial gain. The study was conducted with the approval of the National Hospital for
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Neurology and Neurosurgery and the Institute of Neurology Joint Research Ethics 
Committee.
7.2.2 Experimental paradigm
The subjects were instructed carefully on all aspects of the experiment to ensure that they 
clearly understood the nature of the task. To enhance clarity, subjects were trained using 
a detailed computer tutorial. Finally, subjects were required to correctly complete a 
questionnaire prior to proceeding to the scanning phase to ensure that instructions were 
completely understood by the subject. The paradigm was divided in three phases: 
endowment, scanning and transaction phases respectively.
7.2.2.1 Endowment phase
Prior to scanning, each subject was asked to choose either of two distinct decks (red or 
green) each containing 18 lottery tickets. Subjects were endowed (i.e. given) with the 
deck they selected (e.g. red), and instructed that they would have the opportunity during 
scanning to buy tickets belonging to the other deck. Subjects were also endowed with an 
amount of cash (£36) with which to buy tickets.
Each deck was composed of 18 tickets, each having a different value on the front ranging 
between £2 and £36, in increments of £2. On the back of each ticket was written, hidden 
by a black scratchable covering, the amount that the ticket was actually worth (in pence 
and pounds). Subjects were told that this amount was determined randomly by a
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computer program, and therefore equally likely to be any figure between £0 and the 
amount written on the front of the ticket. As such, the expected value of the ticket was 
one half of the amount written on the front of the ticket.
7.2.2.2 Scanning Phase
The scanning phase was divided in four sessions of 12 minutes each.
During each trial, a screen displayed one of three tickets: 1) a ticket from the deck 
subjects had selected (e.g. red ticket: selling transaction) 2) a ticket from deck they did 
not select (e.g. green ticket: buying transaction) 3) a ticket from a third deck (yellow: 
evaluate condition).
Five different experimental conditions were employed, and presented in pseudorandom 
order:
1. Subject’s selling transaction (YouSELL) : The screen displayed one of the 
subject’s own tickets (i.e. taken from the deck they had selected prior to 
scanning). By moving a cursor on a bar subjects were asked to state the minimum 
selling price (WTA) that they would be happy to accept during the transaction 
phase, prices ranging between zero and the value indicated on the front of the 
ticket.
2. Subject’s buying transaction: The screen displayed a ticket from the deck that the 
subject did not select prior to scanning (e.g. green). By moving a cursor on a bar
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subjects were required to state the maximum buying price (WTP) that they would 
accept to pay during the transaction phase. Possible prices ranged between zero 
and the value indicated on the front of the ticket.
3. Subject’s evaluate condition: The screen displayed a ticket from a third deck (i.e. 
yellow). By moving a cursor on a bar subjects were asked to state the amount they 
felt the ticket was worth (i.e. evaluation price). The yellow deck was not used in 
the transaction phase. Possible prices ranged between zero and the value indicated 
on the front of the ticket.
4. Computer’s selling transaction: The screen displayed one of the subject’s own 
tickets (i.e. taken from the deck they had selected prior to scanning). The 
computer produced a minimum selling price for that ticket by showing a box on 
the price bar. The price was randomly generated such that it was greater than 
0.5xEV and less than 1.5 x EV (EV=expected value of the ticket), and 
represented by a box positioned on the price bar . The subject was required to 
accept this price and was required to move the cursor in the box with the 
computer price.
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5. Computer’s buying transaction'. The screen displayed a ticket from the deck that 
the subject did not select prior to scanning (e.g. green). The computer produced a 
maximum buying price for that ticket by showing a box on the price bar. The 
subject was required to move the cursor to within the position of the box. The 
price selected by the computer was determined as described above. The subject 
was required to accept this price and was required to move the cursor in the box 
with the computer price.
7.2.2.3 Transaction Phase
At the end of the scanning phase one of the four sessions was randomly assigned and one 
ticket for selling, and one for buying, was extracted from this session. These two tickets 
were used to perform a real money transaction using the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak 
(BDM) mechanism (Becker et al., 1964). The BDM mechanism is widely used in 
experimental economics as an incentive-compatible procedure for eliciting non-strategic 
reservation prices.
Selling transaction: One of the selling tickets was randomly extracted for the transaction 
(e.g. the ticket with £20 written on the front). A single ball was extracted from a bingo 
cage which contained a quantity of balls numbered from 1 to n (in increments of 1; where 
n=value written on the ticket) . The value on the ball extracted from the cage yielded the 
BDM buying price in pounds (e.g. £12). The amount in pence was determined by a roll 
of dice (e.g. £12.30). If the subject’s (or the computer’s) minimum selling price (WTA: 
e.g. £8 for that ticket was lower than the BDM price (e.g. £ 12.30) the subject received
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the BDM buying price (e.g. £12.30) and sold the ticket. Alternatively, if the subject’s 
price (e.g. £14.60) was higher than the BDM price the transaction did not go through and 
the subject kept his/her ticket. In this case she/he was allowed to scratch the back of 
her/his ticket and receive in cash the amount written on the back of the ticket.
Buying ticket transaction: One of the buying tickets was randomly extracted for the 
transaction (e.g. the ticket with £8 written on the front). A ball was extracted from a 
bingo cage which contained a quantity of balls numbered from 1 to n (in increments of 1; 
where n=value written on the ticket). The value on the ball extracted from the cage 
yielded the BDM buying price in pounds (e.g. £5). The amount in pence was determined 
by a roll of dice (e.g. £5.40). If the subject’s (or the computer’s) maximum buying price 
(WTP: e.g. £3) for that ticket was lower than the BDM selling price (e.g. £5.40) the 
transaction did not go through and the subject kept his/her money without receiving the 
ticket. Otherwise if the subject’s price (£6) was higher than the BDM price (e.g. £5.40) 
she/he received the ticket paying the BDM price (e.g. £5.40) with the subject’s amount 
cash received at beginning. In this second case, the subject was allowed to scratch the 
back of her/his ticket receiving in cash the winning amount of that ticket.
Subjects were given their total winnings at the end of the experiment. This was derived 
from 1) Cash remaining from the initial endowment they received at the start of the 
experiment (£36) 2) Cash gained from a selling transaction going through (at a price
193
determined by the BDM) 3) Cash gained from receiving the amount written on the back 
of a ticket (that they had either acquired through a buying transaction, or not sold).
7.2.3 Behavioural data analysis
Behavioral data were analyzed using the statistic software SPSS. I calculated, for each 
subject, the WTA (selling price) and WTP (buying price) for each individual ticket 
averaging the subject’s prices across the 4 scanning sessions. These results were 
collapsed across all subjects for a group level analysis. The behavioural endowment 
effect (WTA-WTP prices discrepancies) was calculated using a double-tailed paired t- 
test. The evaluate condition (e.g. ticket that were not traded) was used to estimate the 
subjective EV (sub-EV) for each ticket and each subject. Again the difference between 
WTA /sub-EV and WTP/sub-EV was calculated, either at subject level and at group 
level, using a double-tailed paired t-test.
7.2.4 Image acquisition and data analysis
Gradient-echo T2*-weighted images (EPI) were acquired on a 1.5 tesla magnetic 
resonance scanner using a 30 degree titled acquisition sequence designed to reduce signal 
dropout in orbitofrontal lobes. Image parameters were as follows: TE 50ms; TR 3.96s; 
slice thickness 2mm; inter slices gap 1mm. I collected 648 volumes (across 4 sessions) 
per subject. T1-weighted structural images co-registered with mean EPI images and 
averaged across subjects to allow group level anatomical localization. Images were 
analyzed using the statistical parametric software SMP2 (Wellcome Department of
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Imaging Neuroscience London www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). Preprocessing consisted of 
spatial realignment and normalization to a standard EPI template, and spatial smoothing 
(8mm kernel). The fMRI data were analyzed in an event-related manner using the general 
linear model, using the SPM2 statistical analysis software. After discarding the first six 
image volumes from each run to allow for T1 equilibration effects, image volumes were 
realigned and co-registered to each subject's structural scan. Subject-specific regressors 
of interest were assembled by convolving b functions (corresponding to the time of onset 
of the choice pair, for each condition) with a canonical hemodynamic response function 
(HRF). I removed low frequency fluctuations by a high-pass filter with a cut-off at 128 s. 
A correction for temporal autocorrelation in the data (AR 1 + white noise) was applied. 
Parameter estimates were used to calculate the appropriate linear contrast. These contrast 
images were then entered into a one-sample t test across all subjects (random effects 
analysis). The primary aim of this neuroimaging analysis was to identify brain regions 
mediating the endowment effect. To highlights brain areas where activity correlated with 
the magnitude of the price discrepancy in the buy and sell domains it was constructed a 
General Linear Model (GLM) with 4 regressors coding each condition separately 
(You Buy; You Sell; Computer Buys; ComputerSells). The onset of these regressors 
was time locked when the initial message appeared on the screen. Conditions were 
modelled with a boxcar function of 8.5 seconds (the entire time in which the condition 
was on the screen and the subjects were stating their prices). Two other trial-by-trial 
parametric regressors where included for each condition: one regressor encoded the sub-
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EV and the other encoded the percentage deviation in price from the sub-EV. The first 
parametric regressor (sub-EV) was calculated using the prices that subjects stated in the 
You_Evaluate condition (averaged across the 4 sessions). The second parametric 
regressor encoded the percentage change in subject’s prices (or the computer’s price) 
from the sub-EV for each specific ticket, in both the buying and selling domain. As an 
example: if a ticket had a maximum payoff of £20 and the sub-EV was £10 and subject 
WTA = £12; then the percentage price deviation was coded as +20%. By contrast if the 
subject price = £8 the percentage price deviation was coded as -20%. The two parametric 
regressors (sub-EV and % price deviation from sub-EV) were fully orthogonal.
Since the endowment effect reflects a disparity between the WTA and WTP prices, this 
neuroimaging analysis which was optimized to highlights activity correlated with the 
magnitude of the price discrepancy in the buy and sell domains. As such, a brain region 
that plays a central role in mediating the endowment effect (i.e. the WTA-WTP disparity) 
should exhibit greater activity on a given trial when a subject assigns a higher price in the 
sell domain, or a lower price in the buy domain. Hence I tested for an interaction across 
the parametric regressors encoding trial-by-trial percentage price deviation from the sub- 
EV [(You Sell -  You Buy) -  (Computer Sells -  Computer Buys)], for each individual 
subject. This contrast isolates brain regions specifically associated with the endowment 
effect and subtracts out regions whose activity also correlate with increasing selling and 
decreasing buying prices in the computer condition. This interaction contrast was
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subsequently taken to the random effects level to perform a group analysis in line with 
established procedures, by means of a one-sample t-test (Friston, 1995).
Furthermore it was also performed a between subjects analysis as follows: for each 
subject the size of the behavioural WTA-WTP disparity was calculated by subtracting the 
mean selling prices from the mean buying prices for all the tickets traded during the 
experiment. A simple correlation analysis was performed to identify voxels in which 
activity in the endowment statistical contrast [(You Sell -  You Buy) -  (Computer Sells 
-  Computer Buys)] for a given subject directly correlated with the size of WTA-WTP 
disparity across the entire experiment.
I report results in a priori regions of interest (striatum, insula, OMPFC) motivated by the 
fact that these are regions typically identified in neuroimaging studies financial gain 
evaluation (Knutson et al., 2007; Knutson et al., 2005; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005c; 
O'Doherty, 2004; Seymour et al., 2007; Tom et al., 2007) at P < 0.001 uncorrected for 
multiple comparisons (Z<3.1) (unless otherwise stated) and/or at P < 0.05 small volume 
correction for multiple comparison (SVC) using a 8mm sphere centred on the peak 
activity for the a priori regions of interest as reported by previous studies. Activations in 
other regions are reported if they survive whole-brain correction for multiple comparisons 
at P < 0.05. For display purposes in this paper, statistic images are shown with Z>2.6 
corresponding to P<0.005.
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7.3 Results
Prior to fMRI scanning participants received a deck of lottery tickets whose maximum 
payoff ranged from £2 to £36, as well as a cash sum (£36). The fMRI experiment 
consisted of four pseudorandomly presented conditions. “You_Sell” required subjects to 
assign a minimum selling price (WTA) for their own lottery tickets. “Y ouB uy” required 
subjects to assign a maximum buying price (WTP) for another deck of lottery tickets. 
“ComputerSell” and “ComputerBuy” conditions involved a computer randomly 
selecting a maximum selling or buying price which subjects were passively required to 
accept. Additionally, a fifth condition “YouEvaluate” required subjects to assign a 
value to a given ticket without an ensuing transaction. This last condition provided a 
means to estimate, for each participant, the subjective expected value (sub-EV) of a given 
ticket independent of a subjects’ position in a transaction. Finally, at the end of scanning, 
one sell and one buy trial (either “You” or “Computer”) were randomly selected and used 
to perform an actual economic transactions using the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) 
incentive compatible scheme (Becker et al., 1964) (see session 1.2.23). At the end of the 
entire experiment, subjects received a real cash payment proportional to their total 
winnings calculated by adding together the amount of cash remaining from the initial 
endowment, cash earned through the sale of a ticket, and the amount concealed on the 
back of tickets remained in their possession.
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Figure VII. I. The endowment effect task.
The diagram represents schematically all the different conditions used in the scanning 
phase. Note that all the conditions were pseudorandomly intermixed. YouSell condition 
(1st display): assign a minimum selling price for your £10 ticket (minimum payoff £0/
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maximum payoff £10; ticket EV £5). YouBuy condition (2nd display): assign a maximum 
buying price fo r  £28 (minimum payoff £0/ maximum payoff £28; ticket EV £14) ticket 
from the other deck. You Evaluate condition (3rd display): state the price £10 ticket 
(minimum payoff £0/ maximum payoff £10; ticket EV £5) worth to, this ticket will be not 
included in any transaction. Computer Sells condition (4th display): the computer 
assigns on your behalf a minimum selling price fo r  your £18 ticket (minimum payoff £0/ 
maximum payoff £18; ticket EV £9). Computer Buys condition (5th display): the 
computer assigns on your behalf a maximum buying price fo r  £28 (minimum payoff £0/ 
maximum payoff £28; ticket EV £14) ticket from the other deck. Subjects stated their 
prices buy moving a cursor on a bar below the ticket. In the computer conditions a yellow 
box on the bar showed the computer prices and subjects were required to move the 
cursor inside the box. Note that the bar in the original experiment had a finer scale (5 
ticks).
7.3.1 Behavioural results
Using a within-subjects design I demonstrated a robust endowment effect at the 
behavioural level. As such, this findings replicate between-subjects studies which have 
shown that there is a systematic increase in the minimum selling price (WTA) (Figure 
VII.II: red line), as compared to the maximum buying price (WTP) (Figure VII.II : green 
line) for a ticket (or object) with the same expected payoff (PO.OOOl ti7=7.47 double­
tailed paired t-test). Importantly, in the evaluate condition, which did not involve any 
transactions, subjects assigned ticket prices (Figure VII.II: yellow line) that fell between
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the overall average selling and buying prices, a price that was significantly different from 
both (buy-evaluate: PO.OOOl ti7=9.57; sell-evaluate: P<0.0001 ti7=5.61; double-tailed 
paired t-test).
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Figure VII.II. Behavioral results.
The first graph shows the prices that the all group o f  subjects (n. 18) assigned to each 
ticket during the scanning phase. The ticket expected value (EV) it is represented on the x 
axis and the subjects’ prices are on they axis. The minimum buying prices (WTP -  green 
line) are significantly lower than the maximum selling price (WTP -  red line). The yellow
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represent the evaluation prices that it is used to calculate the subjective ticket EV (Sub- 
EV). For display purpose a dotted line represents the prices fo r  a ticket with £16 EV. 
Note that in the graphs the buying tickets are represented in green and the selling tickets 
in red but in the actual experiment each subject chose the colour during the endowment 
phase. The second graph represents the trial-by-trial (x axisj percentage (%) prices' 
deviation from the Sub-EVfor WTA or selling (red dots) and WTP or buying (green dots) 
tickets (y axis). The two arrows represent the within-subjects fM R I analysis (see below in 
the chapter) that identify areas correlated with an increase in WTA price and a decrease 
in WTP.
7.3.1 Imaging (fMRI) results
Subjects performed the endowment task while being scanned using fMRI, a situation that 
enabled us to obtain on-line measures of regional brain activity. Since the endowment 
effect reflects a disparity between the WTA and WTP prices, this neuroimaging analyses 
sought to identity brain areas where activity correlated with the magnitude of the price 
discrepancy between the buy and sell domains. Critically, subjects exhibited a high 
degree of variability in the prices assigned to each ticket such that the magnitude of the 
percentage deviation of the WTA or WTP from the sub-EV (see methods) showed trial- 
to-trial variability. I therefore used individual subjects’ prices, in both the sell and buy 
conditions (for both You and Computer), to construct four regressors coding for trial-by- 
trial percentage price deviations from the respective sub-EV (calculated on the basis of
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the evaluation tickets). An additional regressor coding for the sub-EV of each individual 
ticket (calculated from the evaluate trials) was also included in the analysis. Of note, 
although the real expected ticket value (ticket-EV) was usually close to sub-EV I used the 
latter to calculate the percentage deviation in selling or buying prices. Indeed, using the 
sub-EV rather then ticket-EV is advantageous since it controls for a well-described 
distortion of outcome probability and general risk attitude (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979). These regressors were convolved with the haemodynamic response function 
(HRF) and used to construct a general linear model (GLM) for the statistical data analysis 
(Friston, 1995).
We reasoned that a brain region that plays a central role in mediating the endowment 
effect (i.e. the WTA-WTP disparity) should exhibit greater activity on a given trial when 
a subject assigns a higher price in the sell domain, or a lower price in the buy domain. 
Hence, these critical contrasts sought to identify brain areas where activity followed this 
prescribed pattern in our trial-by-trial parametric analysis (Figure VII.II b). In order to 
isolate brain regions specifically associated with the endowment effect, I also subtracted 
out non-specific activity correlated with increasing selling and decreasing buying prices 
in the computer condition.
Bilateral ventral striatum showed a pattern of activity consistent with the behavioural 
endowment effect (i.e. WTA>WTP), positively correlating with an increase in selling 
prices and a reduction in buying prices, an effect expressed solely when subjects
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themselves were agents in the evaluation process from the act (i.e. subtracted out activity 
correlated with the computer conditions). I confirmed that this ventral striatal activity was 
not driven selectively by either the buy or sell condition, but by both conditions by 
examining correlations in the buy and sell domains separately (activity peaks: 
[x=26,y=14,z=0 Z ( SCOrc )  =3.56 62 voxels] PO.OOl uncorrected and P<0.05 SVC [x=- 
28,y=-6,z=-4 Z ( SCo r C) =2.94 35 voxels]; [x=-16,y=6,z=8 Z ( SCo r c )  =2.86 14 voxels] P<0.005 
uncorrected and P<0.05 SVC) (Figure VII.III). Thus, this region correlated significantly 
with increasing prices in the Y ouSell condition (activity peak: [x=26,y=14,z=0 Z(SCorc) 
=3.57 26 voxels] PO.OOl uncorrected and PO.05 SVC), and decreasing prices in the 
Y o uB uy  condition (activity peak: [x=24,y=20,z=-6 Z ( SCo r c )  =3.36 15 voxels] PO.OOl 
uncorrected and PO .05 SVC), considered separately. Importantly, activity in the striatum 
did not correlate, even at a liberal threshold of pO.Ol uncorrected, either with sub-EV 
nor with the ticket-EV. I also identified increased bilateral anterior insula activity in the 
key interaction contrast (Figure VII.Ill and session 7.5). In contrast to the pattern of 
activation observed in the ventral striatum, insula activity correlated with decreasing 
prices in the You Buy condition and not with increasing prices in the You Sell 
condition.
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Figure VII.III. Within subjects fM R I results.
Striatal activations correlated with an increase in subjects’ selling prices (WTA) price 
and a decrease in subjects’ buying prices (WTP) subtracted from the increase in 
computers’ selling prices (WTA) price and the decrease in computers’ buying prices 
(WTP). The first panel shows the BOLD activation in anterior right striatum [x=26, 
y=14,z—0] in a coronal and sagittal plane, the second panel shows the activity o f 
posterior left striatum [x=-28,y=-6,z=-4J in a coronal and saggital plane 
These results demonstrate that ventral striatal activity tracks, on a trial-by-trial basis, in 
both buy and sell domains, a discrepancy between the price that subjects assign to a given 
ticket and their sub-EV. This pattern indicates that striatal activity reflects a computation 
of value scaled relative to a reference point (namely the deviation from the sub-EV) and
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contingent upon a subject’s position in the economic transaction, rather than computation 
based upon absolute value (i.e. the actual sub-EV or ticket-EV).
We next reasoned that if the striatum plays a role in the generation of the endowment 
effect, then subjects who showed a larger WTA-WTP discrepancy over the course of the 
experiment (i.e. larger endowment effect) should exhibit a tighter coupling between trial- 
by-trial striatal activity and price discrepancy. Using each subject’s overall susceptibility 
to the endowment manipulation as a between subject statistical regressor, I observed a 
significant correlation in ventral striatum: [Left: x=-14,y=10,z=-6 Z ( SCOr c )  =3.88 116 
voxels] [Right: x=T8,y=4,z=-6 Z ( SCOrc )  =2.94] p<0.005 uncorrected and P<0.05 S V C  5 
voxels; [Right: x=18,y=4,z=10 Z ( SCOr c )  =3.04 55 voxels] p<0.001 uncorrected and P<0.05 
S V C ) .  Thus, activity in ventral striatum not only tracked a price discrepancy on a trial- 
by-trial basis but also predicted individual subjects’ susceptibility to the endowment 
effect manipulation.
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Figure VII. IV. Within subjects fMRIresults
This graphs represent the between subjects the significant (r=0.67; p<0.005) correlation 
between the BOLD activity (x axis) in the ventral striatum (SPM figure) and the size o f  
WTA-WTP disparity (y axis) fo r  each individual subject (black diamonds dots)
7.4 D iscussion
Classical economic theory implies that the price assigned to an object during a costless 
market transaction (in which income effects are small) should reflect its absolute value 
(Willig, 1976), and is independent of a subject’s role (i.e. as buyer or seller) in the 
transaction. By contrast, prospect theory proposes that the value of an item is not
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appraised as an absolute quantity, but is calculated with respect to a reference point. In 
the endowment effect, this reference point corresponds to ownership of an item, which 
can be considered the status quo (Kahneman et al., 1991). In this study subjects were 
required to assign a price to an option, with a shift in reference point arising out of a 
subjects’ position as buyer or seller in the market transaction, rather than from how 
options themselves are framed, as studied previously (De Martino et al., 2006). In line 
with Prospect Theory ventral striatal activity reflected changes in value referenced to a 
subject’s position in the transaction (i.e. striatal activity correlated with increased WTP 
and decreased WTA), rather than coding for the absolute value of the ticket (i.e. striatal 
activity did not correlate with ticket-EV).
A considerable body of evidence implicates the striatum in encoding the motivational 
value of a stimulus, via a dopaminergic prediction error signal that registers the 
difference between an expected and obtained reward (Montague et al., 2006b; O'Doherty, 
2004; Schultz, 2002; Schultz, 2006; Schultz et al., 1997). Several recent neuroimaging 
studies employing financial decision making tasks provide evidence that the human 
striatum computes several microeconomics parameters of anticipated gains (e.g. expected 
value, magnitude and probability of a gamble) (Knutson et al., 2005; Tobler et al., 2007; 
Yacubian et al., 2006) as well as predicting the likelihood of purchasing an item (Knutson 
et al., 2007). However, despite a wealth of behavioural evidence suggesting that in some 
situations humans encode value relative to a reference point, rather than in an absolute
209
fashion, previous studies have not investigated the neural basis of such computations. 
Here, we show that striatal representations index reference-level dependent value during 
market transactions, a situation when neural computations of value must incorporate the 
trade-off between the cost of the item and its expected value, rather than simply the 
magnitude of an expected gain (e.g. see (Knutson et al., 2005)).
The pattern of ventral striatal activity I describe dovetails with recent data which suggests 
ventral striatal responses to financial outcomes reflect a prediction-error type signal, 
(Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005c; Yacubian et al., 2006). The efficient estimation of value 
requires that the computation of reward magnitude is scaled on a predicted magnitude 
(Tobler et al., 2005) or that the value of a current event is computed in relation to an 
event that has not happened yet (Montague and Bems, 2002). These findings indicate that 
during market exchanges this value computation is dynamically referenced with respect 
to a subjects’ role as a buyer or seller as predicted by prospect theory (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979). Further, these results offer new insights into how encoding within ventral 
striatum may underlie loss aversion (also see (Seymour et al., 2007; Tom et al., 2007)), a 
psychological phenomenon proposed to play a key role in the generation of the 
endowment effect.
How value is encoded in the brain remains a key question in neuroscience (Dayan and 
Abbott, 2001; Montague et al., 2006b), microeconomics (Camerer et al., 2005; Glimcher 
and Rustichini, 2004), reinforcement learning (Barto and Sutton, 1998) and animal
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behaviour (Dickinson and Balleine, 1994; Schultz, 2004). The present study points to a 
neural basis for a core concept in behavioural economics, namely the computation of 
reference-dependent value, and localises this function to the ventral striatum. The wider 
implication of these findings is that, during economics transactions, human brains may 
represent value from a relative rather than absolute metric.
7.5 Appendix (SPM significant activation tables)
Table 1. Brain areas significantly more active during an increase in selling prices and a 
reduction in buying prices subtracted out non-specific activity correlated with increasing 
selling and decreasing buying prices in the computer condition [(You Sell -  You Buy) -  
(ComputerSells -  ComputerBuys)]
All values p<0.001 uncorrected unless otherwise stated. 
* statistically significant activation (see Methods)
Region Laterality X y z z-score
Striatum * R 26 14 0 3.56
L 12 2 -20 2.86 (p<o.oo5)
Anterior Insula * L -48 22 4 3.69
R 46 4 -8 3.62 (p<o.oo5)
Fusiform Gyrus R 26 -42 -20 3.96
Occipital cortex R 12 -84 22 3.76
30 -86 22 3.92
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Table 2. Brain areas significant correlation between each subject’s overall susceptibility 
to the endowment manipulation and the interaction [(You Sell -  You Buy) -  
(ComputerSells -  ComputerBuys)]
All values p<0.001 uncorrected unless otherwise stated. 
*statistically significant activation (see Methods)_____
Region Laterality X y z z-score
Striatum * L -14 10 -6 3.88
L -28 -12 10 3.56
R 18 4 10 3.04
R 18 4 -6 2.94 (p<o.oo5)
Anterior Insula * L -44 24 2 3.80
Posterior Insula R 42 -22 2 4.24
Ventromedial prefrontal cortex
(VMPFC) -4 38 -20 3.50
Superior temporal gyrus L 56 -8 -14 4.32
R 58 -4 -18 3.85
Occipital cortex L -6 -76 4 4.24
R 8 -76 22 3.31
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Chapter 8
General discussion and conclusions______
In this chapter I consider the experiments described in the previous chapters in a broader 
context, and offer general conclusions to this thesis.
8.1 Overview....................................................................................................213
8.2 Mechanisms by which emotional stimuli enhance attentional 
processing........................................................................................................ 215
8.2 Mechanisms by which emotional information is integrated in the 
decision process changing the brain value computation...........................221
8.3 Final conclusions..................................................................................... 228
8.1 Overview
Emotional information is widely acknowledged to play a key role in shaping human 
behaviour. The aim of this thesis has been to advance our understanding of the 
neurobiological mechanisms of how emotional information modulates the high cognitive
Overview
abilities at both input and output level.
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Emotions are useful markers in guiding an organism through life. Humans, like other 
animals, have limited computational abilities that must be allocated in an efficient way to 
guarantee their survival. Emotions function to prioritize the accessing of information at 
input level by modulating attentional capacities. The modulation of attention by emotion 
provides a clear evolutionary advantage in facilitating quick responses to potential threat. 
Emotions also modulate the decision-making processes that influence behavioural 
outputs. In contrast to the emotional modulation of attention, the impact of emotional 
information on the decision-making process is often seen, erroneously in most instances, 
as engendering suboptimal or even so-called "irrational” behaviour. For this reason a 
large majority of economic accounts of decision-making has neglected the role of 
emotions in shaping human choices.
The empirical work presented in the previous chapters is centred on two central issues 1) 
How the neural processing of stimuli is affected by their emotional content, and 2) How 
this emotional content influences decision-making processes and shapes the computation 
of value. In this discussion I attempt a reconciliation of the aforementioned contrasting 
views on emotion, and I aim to show how these process have a high level of concordance 
at a theoretical and neurobiological level.
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8.2 Mechanisms by which emotional stimuli enhance 
attentional processing
In chapter three and chapter four of this thesis I addressed the problem of how emotional 
stimuli enhance attentional processing by using a modification of an attentional blink 
paradigm (AB) in the contexts of an fMRI experiment (chapter three) and a drug study 
(chapter four). This paradigm allowed me to investigate how the emotional stimuli 
modulate the allocation of limited attentional resources in time. A common finding of the 
attentional blink task is the difficulty of detecting a second target if it follows too closely 
in time a first target (Raymond et al., 1992). The interesting aspect of this paradigm is 
that AB is strongly susceptible to the emotional nature of the target.
Emotional targets are detected and processed in conditions in which similar neutral 
targets are extinguished from awareness (Anderson and Phelps, 2001). Unlike the 
previous studies, which I reviewed in section 1.2 of the introductory chapter, this 
approach allowed me to investigate how emotional information recruits supplementary 
resources in conditions of attentional overload. Another advantage of this experimental 
approach is the possibility of getting a quantitative behavioural measure (i.e. correct 
target detection) of the attentional processing of emotional compared with neutral stimuli. 
Moreover, while previous research (Vuilleumier and Schwartz, 2001b; Vuilleumier and 
Schwartz, 2001c) has focused on how emotional information engages spatial attentional 
resources, the attentional blink paradigm allows us to investigate how attention is
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engaged in time. Two different versions of this paradigm were implemented in the 
experiments described in chapter three and chapter four.
Two concurrent biological models have been proposed about the emotional control of 
attention, a bottom-up and a top-down mechanism respectively. The bottom-up model 
predicts that the emotional valence of a target enhances the detection of the targets 
themselves, by triggering activity in cortices normally involved in processing that type of 
stimuli (i.e. visual cortex, auditory cortex). This model assumes that the amygdala is 
involved in tagging the stimuli as emotional and in boosting cortical processing. The 
bottom-up model is supported by a wealth of empirical data that shows how fearful 
stimuli produce increased activity in the sensory cortical areas (Lane et al., 1997b; Lang 
et al., 1998; Paradiso et al., 1999; Simpson et al., 2000; Wik et al., 1993). Bottom-up 
control seems to be an essential aspect of the processing of emotional targets. Indeed, it 
has been shown that there is also an increase in cortical processing when emotional 
stimuli are unattended, and consequently do not reach the subjects’ awareness (Dolan, 
2002; Pourtois et al., 2006; Vuilleumier et al., 2001).
However, it remains unclear whether bottom-up control alone can account for the 
increased awareness of or attention to emotional stimuli. A top-down model predicts an 
involvement of frontal areas (in particular OMPFC and rACC) in modulating the 
attention capacity for emotional targets. This model is supported by several investigations 
that found an increase in activity in these frontal cortical areas when subjects were
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engaged in an attention task for emotional targets (Elliott and Dolan, 1998; Elliott et al., 
2000; Lane et al., 1997a). Nevertheless, it is unclear whether this top-down control 
contributes to a behavioural enhancement in detection of emotional stimuli in situations 
of attentional overload.
The fMRI study presented in chapter three was designed to investigate the 
aforementioned questions. In particular, this study employed a version of the attentional 
blink paradigm in which the first targets were constituted by images representing 
“places” and the second targets by images representing “faces” (either neutral or fearful). 
This modified paradigm allowed us to distinguish activity elicited by the face target T2 
(uncontaminated by the activity due to place target T l) in the fusiform face area (FFA) 
(Kanwisher et al., 1997). Using this experimental setup I was able to address the 
contribution of both mechanisms (i.e. top-down and bottom-up) in mediating the 
enhanced detection of the emotional targets. My findings showed that although activity in 
the FFA increased for emotional stimuli as predicted by the bottom-up model, this 
activity did not predict the increased behavioural detection of emotional targets. On the 
contrary, activity in the frontal regions, namely rostral anterior cingulate cortex (rACC), 
predicted an enhanced detection of emotional targets evident at a behavioural level. These 
results support the hypothesis that a top-down frontal control plays a crucial role in 
directing human attention towards emotional targets in conditions of limited resources.
217
Although this experiment demonstrated that the enhanced detection of emotional stimuli 
requires a top-down control elicited by the frontal cortex, it is still unclear how this 
frontal control is influenced by neuromodulators. The three experiments described in 
chapter four were designed to answer this question. These experiments implemented a 
modification of the AB paradigm (used in the fMRI experiment discussed above) 
together with a pharmacological manipulation of the adrenergic system. The choice to 
focus the investigation on the adrenergic system was guided by previous research that has 
indicated the key role played by noradrenaline in the control of attention and arousal 
(Aston-Jones and Cohen, 2005; Jouvet, 1969; Robinson and Berridge, 1993).
In the first experiment, described in chapter four, I showed that the administration of the 
beta-blocker propanolol produced a reduction in the detection of the second target T2 
independently of its emotional valence. In the second experiment I replicated the results 
of the first experiment (i.e. impairment of target detection by propanolol), showing in 
addition that the administration of reboxetine (an inhibitor of NE reuptake) produces a 
selective boost in the detection of emotional targets, without affecting the detection of 
neutral ones. Finally, in the third experiment I confirmed that the effect of propanolol is 
centrally mediated and dose-dependent.
These results support the adaptive gain model proposed by Aston-Jones and Cohen 
(Aston-Jones and Cohen, 2005). This model is the most comprehensive theoretical 
account to date of the noradrenergic (NE) function in modulating attentional capacity.
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The gain adaptive model is mainly based on experimental evidence that the phasic release 
of NE is associated with an increased target detection. On the contrary, an increase in 
tonic baseline level of NE boosts the distractibility of an animal, impairing the target 
identification (Aston-Jones et al., 1991; Aston-Jones et al., 1994). Thus, the adaptive gain 
model proposes that phasic release of NE is responsible for orienting attention towards 
motivationally relevant stimuli. It has recently been proposed at a theoretical level that 
the phasic release of NE can predict the dynamics of the AB (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005b) 
(i.e. AB-NE model). Note that the original AB-NE model does not account for the 
emotional modulation of the AB paradigm. In order to explain the data presented in 
chapter four I formulated an extended version of this model able to account for the 
enacted detection of emotional targets (for a full description of this model see chapter 
four session 4.4). The original AB-NE model proposes that the detection of targets is a 
consequence of increased phasic discharge of the NE neurons in the locus coeruleus. 
Based on evidence from an animal literature that phasic release of NE is also elicited by 
the presentation of emotional stimuli, I proposed that the enhanced detection of emotional 
stimuli is due to the increased release of NE triggered by the emotional valence of the 
stimuli. A prediction of this hypothesis is that the block of the post-synaptic beta- 
receptors with propanolol should impair the detection of both emotional and neutral 
targets. This prediction is confirmed by the experiments 1 and 2 described in chapter 
four. On the contrary, the increase in the concentration of NE in the synaptic cleft caused 
by reboxetine produces two opposite effects: firstly, it inhibits the release of NE at the
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level of the locus coeruleus by the alpha-2 pre-synaptic receptors; secondly, it boosts the 
NE signal from the beta and alpha-1 post-synaptic receptors, in particular within the 
frontal cortex where these receptors are most abundant (Sacchetti et al., 1999).
One intriguing possibility is that an increase in NE activity at the frontal level produced 
by reboxetine interacts synergistically with an increase in NE concentration produced by 
emotional targets. This functional interaction in 'frontal cortex would explain why 
reboxetine selectively boosts the identification of the emotional stimuli without affecting 
the identification of neutral stimuli. This hypothesis is supported by the fMRI experiment 
described in chapter three, where I demonstrated that the increased detection of emotional 
targets is associated with a top-down frontal control as shown by the enhanced activity in 
rACC.
In conclusion, the experiments presented in chapters three and four show that emotional 
information modulates attention capacity by a top-down control from rACC and that this 
control is likely to be mediated by an increase in NE phasic release triggered by the 
emotional valence of targets.
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8.2 Mechanisms by which emotional information is integrated 
in the decision process changing the brain value computation
In chapters five, six and seven I investigated how emotional information shapes decision­
making and affects the neural computation of value. These issues were approached by 
looking at psychological phenomena not predicted by current rational modesl of choice 
developed in economics (Arrow, 1982; Luce, 1957; von Neumann and Morgestem, 
1944). Using economic models as a benchmark against which to contrast psychological 
and neurobiological hypotheses is a very fruitful approach top decision making. In fact, 
economics has produced robust theoretical tools to investigate preference construction. 
Utility, risk, revealed preferences, efficiency and optimality are all useful conceptual 
tools for the investigation of how decisions and values are computed by the human brain. 
Nevertheless, as mentioned in section 1.3.1 of the introductory chapter, economic 
theories often fail to capture the real complexity of human choice behaviour. One of the 
major weaknesses in the economics neo-classical account of decision making is that the 
role of the emotions in shaping human choice has not been acknowledged. As discussed 
previously, emotions critically modulate every aspect of cognition. Here, I discuss how 
emotional information affects human behaviour at the output level, where preferences are 
revealed and actions performed.
My initial investigation focused on the contextual emotional information embedded in the 
presentation of choices. In chapter five I approached this problem by exploring the
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neurobiological underpinnings of the “framing effect”, a key element of prospect theory 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Kahneman and Tversky, 2000). The framing effect is a 
paradigmatic violation of an axiom at the core of the rational choice theory, namely the 
invariance axiom (von Neumann and Morgestern, 1944). This axiom prescribes that a 
variation of irrelevant features in the presentation of options, or outcomes, should not 
affect choice. Nevertheless, countless examples show that humans are indeed strongly 
and systematically affected by the way in which options are presented or “framed” 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 2000).
It has been proposed that the framing effect arises from an affective heuristic, 
underwritten by an emotional system, which is susceptible to contextual emotional 
information (Slovic et al., 2002). The experiment presented in chapter five was designed 
to test the neurobiological validity of this hypothesis. At the behavioural level, subjects 
showed risk-averse behaviour when options were cast as gain and risk-seeking behaviour 
when options were cast as loss as predicted by prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979). The imaging results showed that amygdala activity was underpinning this pattern 
of choice. In contrast, ACC activity was consistent with a pattern of behaviour 
incongruent to the one elicited by the framing manipulation. These findings suggest that 
an initial emotional response was responsible for the change in risk attitude, and that the 
suppression of this response induced conflict. This interpretation of the results is 
compatible with the theoretical account of risk behaviour that proposes that humans 
perceive and process risk ‘as’ feeling (Loewenstein et al., 2001). Furthermore, many
222
theoretical accounts of decision-making have proposed a “two-system” model of 
judgment arising from the interaction between analytic and heuristic systems (Evans, 
2003; Kahneman, 2003). According to this interpretive framework emotional cues 
present in the verbal labelling of options are processed by this heuristic system, and this 
system in turn affects the pattern of choices.
The study presented in chapter five supports the latter view and shows that amygdala 
activity plays a critical role in evaluations dominated by an heuristic decision system 
(Kahneman and Frederick, 2007). Finally, I showed that activity in the orbito and medial 
prefrontal cortex (OMPFC) predicts individual difference in susceptibility to the framing 
manipulation. More precisely, an increase in activity in this frontal area was associated 
with a diminished susceptibility to the framing effect and consequently with a more 
ratiional pattern of behaviour. It is noteworthy that there are strong reciprocal connections 
between the amygdala and the OMPFC (Amaral, 1982; Wallis, 2007). These anatomical 
interactions may have important functional roles in both decision-making and attention, 
as discussed previously.
One broader interpretation of the framing results is that frontal activity inhibits the initial 
emotional response elicited by amygdala activity by top-down control. This interpretation 
is supported by the empirical evidence from Damasio and colleagues (see session 1.1.3 of 
the introductory chapter) (Damasio et al., 1994). These authors demonstrated that patients
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with lesions in OFC show impulsive behaviour, which may reflect the fact that they are 
unable to overwrite their initial emotional response (Bechara et al., 1994). In terms of the 
two-system theoretical account, my results suggest that the OMPFC is likely to impact on 
the construction of preferences by integrating the emotional and analytic information, 
thus underpinning more “rational” (i.e. description-invariant) behaviour.
My overall conclusion from the findings described in chapter five is that it suggests a 
model in which the framing bias reflects an affect heuristic by which individuals 
incorporate a potentially broad range of additional emotional information into the 
decision process. A puzzling aspect of these results is that although an affective heuristic 
often leads subjects toward irrational or suboptimal decisions, it was clearly favoured by 
evolution. An interesting possibility is that, in evolutionary terms, this mechanism may 
confer a strong advantage, because such contextual cues may carry useful, if not critical, 
information. This is particularly true for social animals like humans that are required to 
interpret the subtle social cues that communicate elements of (possibly unconscious) 
knowledge.
The experiment described in chapter six sheds light on the above hypothesis. This study 
investigated the effect of a framing manipulation on individuals affected by autism 
spectrum disorder (ASD) compared with matched control subjects. ASD is a 
developmental disorder characterized by widespread abnormalities of social interactions 
and communication, as well as severely restricted interests and highly repetitive
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behaviour (Baron-Cohen and Belmonte, 2005; Frith and Happe, 2005). The results of this 
experiment show that ASD subjects are less susceptible to the framing manipulation in 
comparison with the control group.
In this study we also measured the skin conductance response (SCR) while the subjects 
were performing the task. The SCR is a well-established marker of an autonomic 
emotional reaction (Venables, 1991). The analysis of these data showed that while in the 
control subjects a SCR response was associated with the negative frame presentation, in 
the ASD group this response was totally abolished. Although the decision-making in 
ASD subjects have not been fully investigated, these results support the prediction from 
the current theoretical models on autism. In particular, the “empathizing-systemizing” 
theory in autism proposes that ASD is characterized by both an impoverished emotional 
response in social contexts and remarkable analytic strength (Baron-Cohen and 
Belmonte, 2005). The increased systemizing ability in ASD individuals is associated with 
an enhanced attention to details at the expense of a more global processing. This aspect of 
ASD has been replicated by several experiments using different paradigms (Baron-Cohen 
and Belmonte, 2005; Jolliffe and Baron-Cohen, 2000; O'Riordan et al., 2001; Plaisted et 
al., 1998; Shah and Frith, 1993) and it is the core of the “weak coherence hypothesis” of 
autism (Frith and Happe, 1994).
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The inability to integrate contextual emotional information and the enhanced ability to 
perform analytic processing may be the basis for a reduced susceptibility of ASD 
individuals to the framing manipulation. This interpretation is supported by lack of SCR 
autonomic emotional responses to the negative frame presentation. In the fMRI study 
presented in chapter five I showed that activity in the amygdala underpins the framing 
bias. An intriguing possibility is that the lack of SCR in subjects affected by ASD may 
reflect a reduced amygdala response to the emotional contextual information embedded 
in the option presentation. This hypothesis is supported by convergent evidence for an 
amygdala deficit in autism (Baron-Cohen et al., 2000). Further experiments are required 
to test this hypothesis.
Interpreting these results in the framework of the “two-system” decisions model I suggest 
that ASD subjects may suffer from an impairment of the affective heuristic decision- 
system compensated by an enhancement of analytic capacities. This interpretation is also 
in keeping with the empathizing-systemizing theory presented above (Baron-Cohen and 
Belmonte, 2005). As mentioned earlier in this section, a heuristic decision-system is 
highly susceptible to the emotional information carried by verbal labelling of the options. 
Conversely, an analytic decision-system is by definition not influenced by contextual 
information irrelevant to the choice outcomes. Human life is characterized by many 
situations in which an ability to interpret subtle contextual emotional cues is 
advantageous. Social interactions are paradigmatic examples of such situations where the 
information is either excessive or overly complex to be efficiently processed by a full
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analytic system. In these situations, the use of a quick intuitive heuristic can be extremely 
helpful. An affective heuristic processing complementing an analytic one may had been 
significantly advantageous in human evolution. Nevertheless, in modem society, where 
individuals are required to deal with symbolic and abstract artefacts, this affective 
heuristic may render human choices inconsistent.
In section 1.1 of the introductory chapter of this thesis, I defined emotions as complex 
psychological and physiological states that inform an organism about the value of an 
action or events, which in turn influences global aspects of behaviour. In chapters five 
and six I investigated the neural mechanisms by which this contextual emotional 
information impacts on choice behaviour. The experiment described in chapter six 
instead explored how value computation is informed and shaped by contextual emotional 
information. This study was inspired by a wealth of evidence showing that the attribution 
of value to an object is highly context-dependent. People value a good they own 
substantially more than an identical good available for purchase, even when the 
transaction costs are null. Prospect theory embraces such findings by proposing that the 
value of a good (or an option) depends critically on a reference point, such that buyers 
evaluate the object as a potential gain whereas sellers view the transaction as a potential 
loss, demanding a higher price due to loss aversion (see session 1.3.2 chapter one). This 
effect, described initially by Thaler (Thaler, 1980), the “endowment effect”, shares some 
features with the framing effect described in chapters five and six. In the framing effect
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the contextual information is explicitly given by the labelling of options, in the 
endowment effect the context is implicitly set by the subjects’ relation (as buyer or seller) 
to an item.
Investigating the neurobiology that underpins the endowment effect, allowed me to 
dissect how the human brain performs a subjective value computation, and how this 
computation is shaped by context. The experiment showed that when people appraise the 
value of an object or an option this value is computed as a change from a “status quo” 
that in the endowment effect is represented by the ownership of the item (Kahneman et 
al., 1991). These findings contrast with the predictions of classical utility theory, which 
assumes that people compute value in an absolute fashion. At the neurobiological level, I 
showed that a reference-dependent value computation is localized to ventral striatum. 
Striatal activity in this study accounted for both the trial-by-trial price discrepancies and 
the susceptibility to the endowment effect across subjects. While the study described in 
chapter five showed how contextual emotional information changes the output of choice 
behaviour, this study showed how this information is already incorporated at the level of 
preference construction and value encoding.
8.3 Final conclusions
In this PhD thesis I combined different experimental approaches to investigate the 
neurobiological mechanisms by which emotional information modulates attention and 
decision-making. These two processes control the way in which organisms interact with
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the external environment at both the input and the output level. Individuals have to deal 
with a large amount of information to ensure survival in a highly changeable 
environment. Human brains have developed efficient strategies to solve such uncertainty. 
One of these is by ‘tagging’ as emotional information that might be relevant for an 
individual’s survival. Attention prioritizes the processing of this type of information, 
which in turn exerts an influence on behaviour by modulating a decision process. In this 
thesis I show that even in conditions of limited attentional resources individuals can still 
fprocess emotional information. The human brain achieves this through a top-down 
mechanism that it is likely to involve a phasic release of noradrenaline elicited by the 
emotional stimuli. This capacity has a clear evolutionary advantage in that it liberates 
individuals to engage in demanding tasks, whilst retaining an ability to respond to 
potential treat. In the second part of this thesis I dissected the neurobiological 
mechanisms by which this emotional information, embedded in the context in which 
options are presented, affects the decision-making process. I showed how an affective 
heuristic based on processing in the amygdala controls this process, and how the striatum 
incorporates this information at the level of value computations. I also showed that, 
similarly to attention, a frontal top-down mechanism modulates decision-making by 
integrating this emotional information with other type of information. Nevertheless, in the 
examples that I have used to investigate these mechanisms (i.e. framing effect and 
endowment effect), this contextual emotional information does not carry any 
supplemental information for the decision outcomes. As such, the change in behaviour
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produced has been often defined as “irrational” by the canonical decision-making model 
developed in economics (Arrow, 1982; von Neumann and Morgestem, 1944). I argue, on 
the contrary, that the incorporation of emotional information into the decision process 
may be advantageous in other kinds of context, for instance in social interactions as 
suggested by the experiment on autistic spectrum disorder (ASD). Although this 
hypothesis requires further investigation, it may reconcile the contrasting views on the 
role of the emotion in decision-making.
In conclusion, the work presented in this PhD thesis shows how the combination of 
experimental (i.e. fMRI experiment, pharmacological studies and patient study) and 
theoretical approaches (i.e. psychology, economics and neuroscience) can illuminate the 
mechanisms through which emotion influences human behaviour from perception to 
action.
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